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February 06, 2010 | ![]() | By Rohit Singh | ||
India has vital stakes in the unfolding of the new US strategy on Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission for Afghanistan , because of the radical change in the way ISAF now seeks to conduct its counter insurgency operations. That the ISAF mission was hurtling towards failure, too, has implications for India. It is in India’s interest to prevent that failure, which it must prevent by contributing to strengthening the pillars on which the ISAF mission success is based. “ISAF, in support of GIROA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ), will conduct operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and facilitate improvements in governance and socioeconomic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population” says the ISAF mission statement. The five pillars of mission success are: the Afghan population, GIROA, ISAF, the insurgency and the external players. India can make significant contribution to at least two of these pillars and play a viable role as part of the fifth pillar, that is, external ‘player’ . The success of the new strategy is dependent upon beginning the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the ANSF in mid-2011 . The US has acknowledged that the development of ANSF suffered because of low-to-moderate priority for more than half a decade, which no longer is the case. The ANSF, particularly the Afghan army , is required now to shape, clear, hold, build and then defeat the insurgency. India , it may be recalled, has been playing a stellar role in training the Afghan Army, and with this US emphasis on ANSF taking a leading role in counter insurgency efforts, India can step up its training infrastructure and capacities to further bolster the cutting edge of the ANSF. The ANSF suffers from corruption, drug dependencies and illiteracy. India’s contribution in these spheres can be significant. The McChrystal Strategy has acknowledged increasing Indian political and economic influence in Afghanistan by way of substantial developmental efforts . These efforts benefit the Afghan people, and in turn the ISAF effort in winning over the population. India can step up such activities, and more so in the Pashtun population centres, which will now be the focus of renewed ISAF surge to isolate them from Taliban influence. IN SO far as its role as external ‘player’ is concerned, General McChrystal states that the increasing Indian influence and friendly relations with the Afghan government is perceived by Pakistan to be contrary to their strategic interests. A collision of Indian and Pakistan interests in the region is seen to be counterproductive to the ISAF strategy. India must concentrate only on training the ANSF and bringing development to the population . Also, it needs to take Pakistani provocations in J&K and elsewhere in India in its stride and not precipitate a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the west to the east, thereby unhinging the counterinsurgency operations. The last peace talks held in Dubai on May 22, 2009 between the two failed because of unreasonable Taliban demands of a total US withdrawal in 18 months preceded by a ceasefire under the supervision of a ‘Muslim’ peace keeping force. India must not be left out in such initiatives. Another Taliban offer was made by Mullah Muttawakil (former Taliban foreign minister) on November 11, ’09, which was again turned down with US defence secretary Robert Gates stating ISAF must first arrest Taliban momentum. The geo-political tone of Afghanistan has been set by two major developments which India will do well to study. In Logar province, South of Kabul, the geopolitical future of South Asia in shaping up. US troops are providing security for a Chinese state-owned company to exploit the rich Aynak copper reserves worth tens of billions of dollars. China is set to exploit untapped deposits of copper , iron, gold, uranium and gems. What is more, it is determined to stay the course to achieve its goal. This will generate huge employment opportunities for the Afghans and enrich the Afghan government’s coffers. In a first public declaration of US geopolitical interests in the region, the US state department on Dec 15, ’09 stated “the region is at the fulcrum of key US security , economic and political interests ...any examination of US policy towards central Asia must start with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan ... We have begun to establish high-level mechanisms with each country in central Asia ..." Both China and the US are now interested in the Kandahar corridor to Gwadar port in the South and towards Central Asia in the North for energy and trade security. Can India ignore this emerging geopolitical reality? This geopolitical interest partly explains the different way in which US intends to pursue its strategy and why it has ignored favourable statistics showing them to be winning tactical battles and that a 64% increase in insurgent attacks in the year 2009 took place in only 13% (47) of Afghanistan’s 364 districts, and given precedence to CENTCOM statistics that showed Taliban to be having a full-fledged insurgency and shadow government in 33 of 34 provinces, including those in the North, with significant presence also in Northern provinces like Baghlan, Kunduz and Taqar. India will do well to maintain its stakes in the emerging Kandahar corridor of influence by playing its part in strengthening the three pillars of ISAF strategy. Pakistan will continue to use Taliban as a buffer. China will gain if the US stays. It will gain also if the US leaves. India too must stay the course with or without the US. ANSF and the population are India’s vital channels of Indian influence. Courtsey: The Economic Times, 30 January 2010 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5515855.cms (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies). | ||||||||
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Rohit Singh |