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Gurmeet Kanwal in a recent article UPA Dithers on Important Defence Reforms has reiterated a live issue that has been considered and debated for over four decades: the necessity of having a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), accepted by various committees and forums over time. The adverse effects of lack of meaningful inter-service coordination have been highlighted by Gurmeet. This matter receives its due importance after every war, the latest being after the Kargil conflict, but is put in cold storage soon thereafter. Major countries in the world with large-sized armed forces have a ‘head’ of the Services, a pointer to the success of such an appointment.
Why does India not have one? Is it lack of political will, bureaucratic hurdles, the inability of the three Services to adopt a common approach or a combination of all these?
Perhaps the first major hurdle is the inability of the three Services to come to an agreement and adopt a common approach. Unless this happens no headway is possible irrespective of which Government is in power. To make this possible evolving a detailed organisational and rank structure would be the first logical step. A joint committee comprising senior representatives of the three Services, possibly working under the Defence Planning Staff could be tasked to plan a workable structure. Examining and assessing the functioning of the model suggested by Gurmeet may be considered by this Committee.
The CDS
With the necessity already accepted, a beginning could be made to avoid inter- Service rivalry by fixing that this appointment is held by the three Services in rotation.
Gurmeet has suggested that at the inception stage the CDS be made “first among equals”. By implication he too would be a Four Star General – the same rank as the three Service Chiefs. Gurmeet Kanwal also suggests that the three Service Chiefs of Staff retain operational command and administrative control over their Services. If that be accepted, what would really be the role of the CDS? His suggestion is that the differences among the Service Chiefs be resolved by military professionals themselves, with one of them acting as the arbitrator. However, in our rank-conscious Defence Services, the CDS also being a four star general, he is unlikely to achieve the desired results. Also if Theatre Commands, all headed by four star generals, are created ab initio, the ability of the CDS to exercise effective command over the three Chiefs and the Theatre Commanders would remain doubtful.
Logic suggests that rather than accept an interim arrangement, for effective functioning of the system, the CDS ought to be made a Five Star General and be appointed as the Commander-in-Chief from the beginning itself.
Theatre Commands
The suggestion about the creation of such Commands is logical. However, for a smooth functioning of the system, planning its broad structure, mode of functioning and integration with the Services would need to be evolved by the Defence Committee. Defining the charter of duties of the Service Chiefs and the Theatre Commanders and their inter se relationship will avoid personality orientation.
One of the responsibilities recommended for the three Service Chiefs is drawing up ‘Perspective Plans’. To be able to fulfill this role they would necessarily have to work in close cooperation with the Theatre Commanders. Though achievable, it presupposes tremendous understanding between them.
It has been recommended that the Theatre Commander of the Western Theatre be a General and an Air Chief Marshal in turn, and that of the Central Theatre be an Air Chief Marshal. Such an arrangement is likely to be resisted by the Army as the Air Force Commands would remain intact. Except for the Coastal and Maritime Security Zone, which should be commanded by an Admiral, all other Commands should be headed by Generals. Also in the Central Theatre the administrative responsibilities outweigh the operational responsibilities and hence it is more appropriate that an Army General heads the Central Theatre.
Reforms are undoubtedly overdue and Gurmeet’s thought process is well conceived. However, detailed planning and coordination between the three Services is a prerequisite for the process to be acceptable by the Defence Forces. Only then can the Services start asserting themselves about such reform.
For closer integration and cooperation between the Army and the Air Force, each Theatre Command ought to have a senior officer with adequate staff from the Air Force. His charter should include coordination between the Army and the connected Air Force Command.
The next hurdle to be crossed would be ‘bureaucratic hassles’ – or their inability to accept escalation in the ranks in the Services and their protocol positioning vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts. And the final hurdle will be the need for a determined political push.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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