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In an article, “Arms and the Missing Men” (Indian Express, 27 March 2008) Lt Gen Vinay Shankar highlighted the crisis that the Army is facing due to shortage of officers. The overall deficit is about 11-12,000 officers, i.e. 30 percent of the authorized strength. The deficiency is more in the junior officers up to the rank of Majors. The key impact of this is felt at the unit level – the cutting edge of the Army, which faces an average shortfall of about 50 percent of what is authorized. Perhaps, some studies may have been carried out to analyse how this shortfall can be addressed, but in the absence of any known or announced policy, one is unaware of the projected approach.
An attempt at a large-scale intake of officers could create more problems than it will solve. In any case, this hardly appears feasible given the low popularity of the services as a career option, as is evident in the small numbers joining the NDA, IMA or OTA. But, even if a large intake were possible, its impact would be felt when these officers are considered for promotion to the first select rank i.e. of a Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col). With no increase in the number of Lt Cols authorised in the Army, there will be extensive supercessions, leaving too many disappointed officers mostly at unit levels. This would prove to be difficult for a Commanding Officer to handle.
A major change in the terms of service needs analysis. In most armies of the world, about half to two thirds of the officers’ intake comprises temporary hands. Why can’t we adopt a similar pattern? This would mean having a part regular army while the bulk could comprise of short service commissioned officers. The exact proportion could be determined after an in-depth study. The short service officers could serve for 5 or 10 years and then retire. This would reduce the intake of regular officers. The yearly intake into the regular cadre could be a factor of the level of satisfaction desired for promotion to the rank of Lt Col. A possible guide could be the number of Majors who should be considered for promotion every year so that at least two thirds of them get promoted.
To fill up the shortfall and to make up the existing deficiencies, a substantial increase in the intake into the support cadre would be required. Coupled with regular officers, these would fill up vacancies up to the rank of Major. It will take some years for the system to stabilize. For a smooth flow of the cadre, the same number of officers as the yearly intake into the support cadre would have to leave service every year. If this method is accepted in principle, the number of officers to be taken into the regular and the support cadre could be worked out. However, this system would be successful only if an attractive exit policy, which is currently non-existent, is drafted for the support cadre officers.
Various exit options have been contemplated from time to time. One of the most talked about has been the lateral absorption of officers into Para-military forces or central police organizations. This was also recommended by the Kargil Review Committee. However, the unpopularity of this scheme is evident from the fact even the present quota of 10 percent absorptions into the BSF and CRPF and 5 percent into the CISF remain unfilled. The main reasons for this are the terms and conditions offered for absorption, as also the resentment of the direct entrants into these services. The yearly intake into these services is also limited and given the current authorized quota, this transition will not make a dent into solving even a part of the problem. Only if the establishment of such services is increased, or some units are designated to be manned only by retired Army officers can this be a worthwhile option.
Expertise developed in the technical arms and services and in the field of management by officers can also be utilized in public or private sector undertakings or in the ITC. Strengthening ties between these organizations and the services could lead to absorption of some short service commissioned officers into such organisations. Also the expertise of the officers in dealing with natural disasters, makes them eminently suited for absorption in the National Disaster Management Agency and its units.
A slightly relaxed entry examination, coupled with age relaxation, could also enable some disciplined and devoted officers to be absorbed into different government jobs every year. Such a scheme would possibly face opposition from such services and bureaucrats. But as was done for Emergency Commissioned officers, this could be an option worthy of consideration. Another option could be the grant of two years paid study leave on termination of active service. This would allow officers to attain qualifications more suited for their entry into civilian jobs. Similarly, the grant of a financial package would permit retiring officers to start a small venture on their own.
The will on the part of the government to adopt a fresh approach to the subject, including an appealing exit policy for short service commissioned officers, would certainly increase the popularity of not only the support cadre, but also the Army as a whole and hopefully reduce the shortage of officers over the years.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.
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