Keeping Pace with the transforming PLAAF

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) long march towards self sufficiency and power projection was on display for all to see late last year. In a series of events to mark the 60th anniversary of establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) there was a big military parade across and over Tiananmen Square which featured 52 types of weapons developed in China – from self-propelled guns to the KongJing 2000 airborne early warning aircraft, which is based on the Ilyushin Il-76 transport. A total of 160 aircraft from 12 regiments flew over the square. An impressive air show was also held to commemorate the 60th founding day of the PLAAF, which falls on 11 November. It showcased the indigenously built J-10 combat aircraft, which has been in service for two years and is being further developed for export. A forum of international air commanders were also invited to visit a division of the Chinese Air Force in Jining, east China's Shandong Province and for the re-opening after renovation of the extraordinary China Aviation Museum near Beijing.

A few days before the anniversary of PLAAF, its commander General Xu Quiliang had stated that PLAAF’s current development strategy is to become an air force with integrated capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations in the air as well as space. He further said that the focus would be on improvement of its detection and early warning, air strike, anti-missile air defence and strategic delivery capabilities. The air force over the past two decades has clearly been on the road of transformation and the results of their focused approach were visible for all to see. For several decades, the PLAAF had a traditional mindset. It thought of itself as a defensive force and recognised China’s technological disadvantage. It had a philosophy of quantity over quality and maintained a fleet of old and obsolescent aircraft in large numbers.

The role played by air power in the Gulf War 1991 was the turning point for changes in the PLAAF. It shattered the Chinese view of air force being a primarily air defence force. It called for a shift from a purely defensive posture to a combined offensive – defensive posture by adding more offensive forces. At the same time, the independence movement in Taiwan gained momentum and became a serious threat. The central military leadership made the proper readjustment to the air force’s strategic missions, requiring it to maintain not only strong defensive, but also strong offensive operational capabilities. It also made a new demand on the air force to be able to launch attacks against the enemy’s air assets on the ground in a potential local conflict along China’s coast.

The impact of a long established air defence oriented strategy was now felt. The development of avionics and precision-strike weapons had made the PLAAF even more “short-legged” and “short-sighted”. Chinese aircraft had short ranges and lacked airborne radars. With the Chinese defence industry offering no solution, Beijing turned to Russia for assistance. Beginning 1992, China bought three batches of Su-27s, a total of seventy-four, along with their accessories. In 1996, China entered into an agreement with Russia for the licensed production of two hundred Su-27s at a Chinese factory at Shenyang. The Su-27 was a modern aircraft with state-of-the-art weapon systems but a fighter with limited offensive capabilities. This symbolised the continued defensive mindset of the Chinese. The Kosovo air campaign was an eye opener for the Chinese. It drew their attention to the hitherto unrealised characteristics of the air strike which was that it was a “war of all dimensions” (air, sea, space, electronics and ground). Air and space assets played a leading role throughout the war, and control of information determined the victory.

It also caused a dramatic change in the Chinese view; any future conflict, especially with the US, would be dominated by long-range precision strikes preceded by intensive overhead reconnaissance and computer-network attacks. For the first time, the air force was regarded as a strategic armed service to play a critical role on protecting national sovereignty and security. In March 1999, Jiang Zemin, secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President of China, unveiled the air forces strategic objective, namely to transform from a homeland air defence force to one that is capable of both defensive and offensive operations. He then called on the air force to be able to “bear the brunt of and be employed throughout the entire course” of the conflict and “to complete certain strategic missions independently”.

The impact of these statements was a $1.85 billion contract with Russia to purchase thirty-eight Su-30MKK fighter bombers with upgraded avionics, larger weapon payloads, and air-refuelling capabilities for the PLAAF. Thereafter, China placed two additional orders for thirty-eight aircraft for the air force and twenty-four Su-30MK2s for the PLA naval aviation forces. The acquisition of these new Russian-made fighter bombers empowered the PLAAF with real long-range strike capabilities and has inevitably tipped the balance in East Asia. To have an even better precision strike capability, they developed the JH-7 fighter bomber. The first batch of JH-7s entered service in 2004 and PLAAF is quite enthusiastic about this multi-role fighter which as part of a rapid replacement programme, will phase out the obsolete fleet of Q-5 attack aircraft.

The effort to build an offensive and defensive air force has also focused on the development of early warning and control aircraft. In 1999, the US government successfully pressured Israel into cancelling a sale of Falcon AWACS to China. This inspired China to gather its resources and talents together to build its own airborne warning and control system. The Chinese AWACS was developed in a high-low combination with the KJ-2000 based on the Russian Il-76 MD airframe and KJ-200 based on the Y-8F-200 transport platform. They were handed over to PLAAF in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Simultaneously, five other types of EW aircraft, the High New series, the Y-8 version, were developed and have gradually entered service since 2004.

The J-10 fighter aircraft, over its eighteen year development period has been redesigned from an air-superiority fighter to the latest semi-stealthy design as a multi-role fighter. This fourth generation fighter (third generation in Chinese standard) can now be counted as an able adversary to the current crop of American F-15/16/18 aircraft. The JF-17 Thunder, also designated Chengdu FC-1 Xiaolong, is a modern light-weight multi-role combat aircraft. The Pakistani designation JF-17 and Chinese designation FC-1 stand for "Joint Fighter" and "Fighter China" respectively. The aircraft was developed jointly by the Chengdu Aircraft Industries Corporation (CAC) of China, the Pakistan Air Force and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). The aircraft is a small, light-weight fighter powered by a single engine. It has been developed to meet the requirements of the Pakistan Air Force and for export to other developing nations. The maiden test flight of the first prototype took place during 2003 and it was formally inducted in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in late 2009.The PLAAF is still evaluating the fighter for induction into its fleet.

On November 9, General He Weirong, deputy commander of the PLAAF, confirmed long-standing speculations that the PLAAF is developing fifth-generation fighters (fourth-generation in Chinese standard), which may be in service within 8 to 10 years, and certainly by 2020. During an interview with state-owned China Central Television (CCTV) two days ahead of the 60th anniversary of the PLAAF on November 11, Deputy Commander He announced that the next-generation fighter would soon undergo its first flight, closely followed by flight trials.

The senior military officer’s disclosure reflects the considerable progress that the PLAAF has made in force modernisation, which has exceeded Western expectations in terms of the pace of development and the capabilities of its defense industrial base. While China remains several steps behind the United States in operationalising its advanced fighter jets, the PLA’s rapid military modernisation has raised concerns among US allies in the region that the military balance is beginning to tilt toward China’s favour.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).