In what could be described as noticeable diplomatic embarrassment for India, Foreign Minister SM Krishna was forced to cancel his visit to Tehran scheduled to take place in the last week of March 2010. Following an invitation extended by Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, it was the reported unresponsiveness of the Iranian authorities that apparently resulted in the cancellation of the visit. This incident primarily underscores the complexity of Indo-Iranian ties having been caught in the wrangling of ongoing international politics over Iran’s purported nuclear quest.
The strong civilisational ties between India and Iran seem to have hit a rough patch since the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear pursuit reached a tipping point. Although India has put its best foot forward to tackle this very sensitive issue with Tehran, its repeated votes against the Islamic Republic at the IAEA speak otherwise. As the world debates Iran’s nuclear programme and the possibility of Tehran building a nuclear weapons programme that could well be diverted for military purposes, the existing geo-strategic equations in the politically volatile Middle East could stand to be altered forever. However, the other side of the debate is Tehran’s right to the use of peaceful use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes that flows from being a signatory to the NPT.New Delhi’s stated position on the issue is that while Iran had rights as an NPT signatory, India would not countenance another nuclear power in the West Asian region.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions went centre stage yet again as the Iranian government declared its new uranium enrichment facility, in Qom, southwest of Tehran to the IAEA in September 2009. By virtue of this declaration, Iran has violated its treaty obligations given that way back in the early 1990s, the IAEA modified its Code 3.1 according to which, a state was required to report on a new facility ‘as soon as’ the decision to construct it was undertaken.
The facility situated in Qom generated concern in the international community as Tehran intends to use new types centrifuges that enrich uranium at a faster pace. In late 2009, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, Ali Akbar Salehi said, “We have put our effort on research and development of new machines in the past two or three months so that we would be able to produce machines with high efficiency and completely indigenous… at the (Qom-area) Fordu site.”
Following this revelation, India voted against Iran at the IAEA in its latest resolution in November 2009 that demanded halting uranium enrichment and subsequently allowing international verification. In fact, this was the third time in four years that New Delhi voted in favour of a resolution against Iran at the IAEA.
India voted in favour of the resolution since it could not ignore the findings of IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, who stated that there had been “no movement on remaining issues of concern” which needed to be clarified for the Agency to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Concurrently, the resolution demanded that Iran immediately suspend construction of its newly-revealed uranium enrichment plant at Qom.
In a statement that sought to clarify its position, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reiterated that the conclusions of ElBaradei drawn in his report were “difficult to ignore”. Seeking to pacify a visibly upset Iranian regime including Iranian Foreign Minister, Mottaki, who communicated his discontentment to SM Krishna, the MEA stated, “We do not believe that the adoption of this resolution should divert the parties away from dialogue… This resolution cannot be the basis of a renewed punitive approach or new sanctions.”
This latest vote followed the previous IAEA board resolution that was slapped against Iran in February 2006 whilst IAEA governors referred Tehran’s dossier to the UN Security Council over its refusal to suspend enrichment and open up completely to IAEA inspections and investigations. In the midst of this imminent contest that displays arguments and counter-arguments, the veracity of a looming American angle cannot be ignored altogether. Is there a whiff of US diplomacy at play here as New Delhi walks a tightrope with the US on the one hand and its relations with Tehran dwindle on the other.
As India hopes to converge with Tehran over numerous issues including the gas pipeline, as also the existing situation in Afghanistan, the ongoing nuclear impasse surely is emerging as the key spoiler. Both New Delhi and Tehran by and large are in agreement that radical extremist elements (read the Taliban) should not have any role to play in an eventual administration in Kabul. Nevertheless, unlike India, Iran demands an immediate withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. This especially comes in wake of the fact that as New Delhi foresees a greater role for itself both in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the Iranian role of being an instrumental player in this set up consequently stands to provide unique access to New Delhi in the greater Middle East. This fact cannot be negated by India.
Although India has made subtle efforts to project the Iranian case as symbolic of the sovereignty of New Delhi’s foreign policy orientations, it needs to carefully orchestrate its decision-making on this delicate issue without any diplomatic threads binding the same.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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