Undermining the Spread of Talibanisation in the FATA

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Samarjit Ghosh

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Different approaches towards the problems of increasing Talibanisation and militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are being widely debated in the light of successive failures in the recent past. Whilst the Pakistan Army conducts its operations in the area, it is prudent to remember the merits of differential treatment for the multitude of agencies and tribes of FATA. In different degrees, all agencies and tribes are suffering from the fallout of the situation in the Trans-Durand region. However, they are not quite homogenous and there is a multiplicity of both actors and factors in the conflicts in the tribal areas. In South Waziristan, for example, the Wazirs and Mehsuds are unlikely to form anything more than an ad-hoc, distanced alliance and this condition would hold true for most of the other agencies as well. The Sunnis and Shias of Orakzai and Kurram are constantly at each other’s throats, and the Deobandis and Barelvis (both Sunnis of Khyber) have been feuding for a long time now. Varying geographies, sentiments and events have led to different trajectories of violence in different agencies. This very fact would imply that a custom approach would be useful in dealing with each tribe and agency.

Tracing the origins of the insurgencies in different tribal areas could shed some light on why some areas have proved to be doughty in the face of militant violence. However, conceiving and implementing an inclusive strategy in an environment such as the FATA has difficulties founded in distinguishing between various tribal groups and to focus efforts on specific areas. Although a specific area may be divided into several tribes, which are completely antagonistic towards each other, they will band together against an external actor as they have against the Mughals, the British, and now, the Pakistanis. Therefore, the idea of a differential approach holds only up to a particular point.

Additionally, the problem of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) has taken on new proportions. Pashtun populations are not keen on resettling in battle-torn areas and other parts of Pakistan, in Punjab and in the Sind, are unwelcoming of them for apprehensions of ethnic discord and Taliban infiltration. This issue is further complicated with ‘religious’ groups having ties/sympathies to militants setting up base in the ad-hoc IDP camps and gaining support with the aid they offer. Some analysts are of the view that these aid efforts may lead to recruits/sympathisers among the displaced, most of whom are forced to live outside government camps. But others are not as certain, and believe that these ‘religious charities’ must be appreciated for their services. The Taliban and associated militants have a history of exploiting grievances amongst the Pashtun, whom the government has failed to provide for in veritably every aspect of development. While some evidence of recruitment efforts in official/non-official IDP camps have been reported, support for the militants amongst the Pashtun is weaker than in Pakistan as a whole. However, host parties are rightly concerned that if the conflict is prolonged and corrective measures not taken soon, the IDPs may soon establish permanent structures within these camps, and settle for longer stays, like the Afghan refugees did in the 80s, which may evolve into sanctuaries and recruiting grounds for militants and criminal syndicates.

The host communities have been placed under tremendous strain as a result of the mismanagement of the IDP issue. Traditionally, the Pashtun community has always had a large influx of asylum seekers with families in transit from both sides of the border seeking shelter with other families. These ties are based in tribal affiliations to a certain degree, but are generally part of the larger Pashtun culture of khedmat. In fact, this culture is so strongly rooted that Members of Parliament, especially in Afghanistan often complain that they are expected to extend this service to members of their constituency. In electoral politics, this service-giving and service-taking has had a very strong influence in bringing people to power. Even though it seems like a highly unsustainable system of patronage and service, the khedmat system has not waned in the least in the past few years and is unlikely to in the future.

This is even truer in the case of IDPs because they are not moving from one destination to another, but are homeless. Even where the possibility of security or shelter exists for these IDPs in relief camps, reports of government mishandling are such that the homeless prefer to seek shelter with members of their tribe or known family connections. Of course, with the large and increasing influx of IDPs, this doesn’t seem like a tenable solution. In fact, during the recently concluded Operation ‘Raah-e-Rast’, the total number of IDPs increased manifold and the international community was called upon to make larger contributions to the aid diverted towards the relief of IDPs.  As more and more IDPs seek shelter, the levels of hospitality will be simply unsustainable.

All in all, increasing insurgency, the instability of relief camps for IDPs and their multiplying numbers are placing the already fragile state apparatus in the region under tremendous pressure. Nevertheless, the current crisis in Pakistan’s western borderlands cannot be resolved by military means in isolation, and any military action willy-nilly employed must be in concert with a transparent effort at advancing the socio-economic and political development of the region. Almost three million refugees have had to flee their homes because of the battles taking place in the tribal areas and while the government has proposed full resettlement, which has had only limited success in past conflicts, there doesn’t seem to be a comprehensive framework for the same. It is now crucial for the Pakistan Army’s counter-insurgency operation in the FATA to reach its tipping point.

Swapna Kona Nayudu and Samarjit Ghosh are Associate Fellows at CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).