Different aspects of Maoist problem: How to handle it effectively

THE May 28 train derailment caused by Maoists resulting in the death of 140 persons, the April 6 massacre of 75 CRPF personnel, the blowing up of a bus near Sukma in which 44 civilians and special police officers were killed and the almost daily instances of disrupted communications and violence in the “red corridor” have brought the long-festering Maoist insurgency to the centre-stage of India’s internal security threats. It has also highlighted our hollowness and incompetence to deal with the problem at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Though the origin of the Maoists’ movement can be traced back to the 1960s when the Naxalites started operating in various parts of the country, the Maoists emerged as a real internal security threat when the Peoples’ War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre joined hands in 2004 and formed the CPI (Maoists) to fight against the Indian state.

The bane of our counter-Maoists strategy, even after watching what has happened in Nepal, has been a lack of lucidity in analysis and consistency in formulating and implementing a viable strategy. It is evident that the Central government has woken up now but the desirable synergy with the state governments concerned is yet to be achieved. Besides, there are many powerful NGOs and the media who still consider that the Maoists are nothing more than today’s avatars of Robin Hood.

As a nation, which has considerable experience of countering insurgencies and terrorism — in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, Assam, West Bengal, Punjab, J&K, and Sri Lanka — it is disheartening to see that our home security machinery has not been able to learn lessons from the past.

The root causes of the Maoist problem in tribal areas are the loopholes in the Indian Forest Conservation Act, the Mining Act, the land acquisition law, the power plant law, etc. Until the necessary measures are taken by the government to reform these acts, it will not be possible to uproot the Maoists’ movement or any other left wing extremist problem. Even more important is the need to address governance through good administration, prompt and fair judiciary, and the law and order machinery that inspires public confidence.

The development-versus-military action debate reflects political naivety. No one can deny that the long neglected tribal areas require comprehensive and accelerated development projects. But is it possible to carry out governance and development in an area where the writ of the state does not run and everyone in the state machinery fears for his life? And who is responsible for the developmental neglect of the tribal areas so far?

The quelling of Maoist violence has been rendered difficult because, according to the Constitution, law and order is a state subject. There is no clarity on more serious situations like across-the-states insurgencies. The policing authority is vested with state governments. This makes the Central government incapable of directly affecting the quality of policing, which is the cause for much of the problems in managing insurgencies. Unfortunately, the state governments devote little attention to this important issue and very often refuse to recognise the basic linkage between normal policing and insurgency. They have neither the resources nor the inclination to upgrade the quality of the state police nor the capacity to raise extra forces without substantial financial help from the Centre. They let the situation deteriorate till it blows out of their control.

Lately, the Finance Commission has allocated a huge amount to the states for the purpose of police training. But, as evident from the recent incidents, the police force is still in a pretty bad shape. In many areas, the actual number of police personnel is much lower than the posts sanctioned. A huge number of police posts lie vacant. There is far too much of political interference in the professional functioning of police organisations in the states. The law enforcement agencies across the country, without exception, are in a state of disrepair. Unless these are re-invigorated and energised, we cannot achieve the desired results. The responsibility without resources at the state level and the lack of accountability at the state and Centre levels need to be resolved quickly.

Three suggestions need to be made on the employment of armed forces against the Maoists:

One, military pressure alone cannot resolve matters unless there is good governance and a strong thrust on socio-political and socio-economic issues. Political leadership and civil administration have to govern the affected areas (and the rest of the country) with greater commitment and efficiency.

Two, protracted and excessive employment of the Army leads to the law of diminishing returns. The reasons are as follows: (a) Over-dependence on the Army reflects lack of trust and faith in the capability of the state and central armed police and para-military forces. Also, after a while locals start treating the Army as another police force. (b) The armed forces require legal cover under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to handle such situations effectively. (c) Such deployments and prolonged duties have an adverse impact on the Army’s discipline, morale and operational effectiveness. (d) During a war/war-like situation the Army needs public support. It cannot afford to alienate the local population as is currently happening in Manipur and to some extent in J & K and Assam.

The excessive use of the army in such situations is neither good for the Army nor the nation. As far as the Air Force is concerned, utilisation of their capabilities in jungle terrain has to be discussed with them first before we seek Cabinet approvals. It would be counter-productive to use the Air Force in any offensive role unless the situation gets totally out of hand.

The Home Minister in recent months has outlined a series of organisational and systemic measures for revamping India’s internal security architecture and greater synergy in internal security operations. But he has paid little attention to the human resource factor (the man behind the gun!) in the homeland security forces and its development. The following points need his immediate attention:

A police officer trained for town policing and protective duties is not oriented or trained to carry out search and destroy missions against guerrillas in jungles. At present, the senior hierarchy in all the state armed and Central police forces (CPOs) comes from such officers. The Central police forces when allocated to a state have to function under the Director-General of Police of the state. The direct entry cadre commissioned and brought up in these units has no role at the policy and planning level.

The state armed police and the CPOs on counter-insurgency/guerrilla operational tasks and missions require different rules of engagement, training, equipment, leadership and man management.

People who have worked alongside the CRPF are aware of the constant moves of their companies at short notice, non-existent command and control at the battalion level, their inhuman living conditions, poor physical fitness, and lack of the basic equipment like bullet-proof jackets, radio sets, bullet-proof and mine-protected vehicles. How can we expect high results from such psychologically depressed personnel?

Counter-insurgency operations against the Maoists require integrated operations because insurgents when pursued in one state manage to take shelter in the neighbouring states. Every major operation requires detailed planning, coordination, and follow-up on the intelligence and combat aspects. Inter-state coordination and disputes over the state or Central responsibility can be resolved if there are effective Unified Command Headquarters with clear-cut political, operational and coordinating responsibilities.

We need a synergised Centre-state strategy and doctrine to deal with the different aspects of the Maoist insurgency. This should cover the earlier mentioned internal security-related reforms as well as policies on accelerated economic development and social justice in the affected areas.

Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is a former Army Chief.

Courtsey: The Tribune, 31 May 2010

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100531/edit.htm#4

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).