Defence University: Many Challenges Ahead

A decade in waiting, the Government of India has finally approved the setting up of the Indian National Defense University (INDU). The proposal emanates from the Task Force set up by the government to review the management of defence in the country as an aftermath of the Kargil War in 2000. As a result of the recommendation of the Task Force, this fully autonomous institution will now be established in the national capital region (NCR) at Gurgaon at an initial cost of Rs 395 crore.

The need for INDU was felt to bridge the gap between academic research and policy formulation in the country. It is expected that this organisation will increase the level of debate on national security issues, and in the process influence the awareness of citizens. With formation of INDU, major defence training organisations scattered all over the country having recognitions from different national universities will come under one umbrella. INDU would also be mandated to impart training to civil services and para-military organisations. Towards conception of this idea Indian officials have already visited defence universities in the US and China and it is expected that INDU would follow the US model and tailor it for India. 

The mission of the US National Defence University (NDU) is to train military and civilian officials towards making them capable enough to evaluate national and international security challenges. INDU is also expected to develop itself as a premier ‘think-tank’ in the field of defence and strategic studies apart from performing its standard university functions.

At this juncture a basic question needs to be asked and that is ‘what is the status of “strategic culture” in this country and is strategic thinking taken seriously’?

India is number two in the world, only next to the US in terms of number of think tanks, many of them studying strategic subjects, and some newer institutions are coming up. Also, there are few universities which teach these subjects at the post-graduate level. They undertake research on subjects dealing with defence and international relations. Unfortunately, the academic community and think tanks in India mostly carry out their work based on secondary sources, since they simply do not have access to various government documents and files. Old records have also not been made public so that even historical research becomes difficult. Foreign language expertise is very rarely to be found within this ‘thinking community’, and thus most of their work is based on available western sources with obvious biases in their output. Most importantly this community is not taken seriously by the policy makers in the country and hence think tanks are generally found directionless in regard to their agenda.

More importantly, following the footsteps of western think-tanks has become the benchmark for strategic studies excellence in our country. Researchers get trapped within western formulations, which has ‘impression’ value but do not really offer solutions to real life problems, particularly in the Asian context. Seminar-hopping, networking and free lunches have become a common trend for Indian think tanks. The ratings of a think thank depend more on the big-ticket speakers (both Indian and foreign) present at the seminar than the actual quality of discussions and the value additions to the issues discussed. Besides, the thinking in strategic studies tends to be Delhi-centric, the issues framed within the capital’s power-elite influencing the national strategic direction. And, then there is the ubiquitous Power-Point presentations thrown at the audience at every other seminar. To top it all, we have the Indian electronic media, too immature to address the national security issues. They frame issues within 30-second capsules, short bursts of news which hardly study the issues in depth, and yet has a tremendous power to influence because of their reach.

It is important that INDU factors in all these and many more limitations of the existing think tanks before starting operations. It is essential that this think-tank should not become an organisation to parrot government views but should offer constructive critique on the policy whenever required.

The US model is not very difficult to follow but it is important to understand its limitations. For example, the US does have the so called ‘strategic culture’ but what is the end result? All these years they have mainly attempted to ‘trade’ various ideas  within newer and newer attractive prisms – Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Star Wars, Missile Defence, and 4th Generational Warfare – just to name a few.

But, what’s the use of NDU’s and Rand’s and Carnegie’s if you enter Afghanistan and Iraq with faulty game plans? Terrorism rules the roost and the Americans seem to be helpless in the theatres they police and expect to set right. It is well appreciated that it is not possible to predict events like 9/11. But, still what is the use of a ‘strategic culture’ which gives high-end training and  ends up producing only Abhimanyus, those who know how to enter a conflict without an exit strategy in place? This is not to say that all these US structures are worthless. But, it needs to be understood that these are not an end in itself as believed by few.

The proponents of INDU envisage it to become a multi-disciplinary centre of excellence in the country in education and research on national security issues. Today, when INDU has become a reality, the onus will lie with the people involved in giving it its final shape and make it relevant. 

Ajay Lele is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).