India Needs to be Proactive in Space

 

On December 18, ISRO successfully conducted the Flight Acceptance Hot Test of an indigenous cryogenic engine. This test is important since ISRO proposes to use this first indigenously developed cryogenic engine in the next Geosynchronous Launch Vehicle mission (GSLV -D3) likely to takeoff by around June 2009. On December 21, a ‘made in ISRO’ communication satellite, W2M, was launched from French Guiana. This state of the art satellite is built by ISRO on a commercial basis in partnership with EADS-Astrium of Europe. This satellite, weighing 3,463 kg at lift-off, is the heaviest satellite built by ISRO and is capable of operating for over 15 years.  

 

India was denied cryogenic technology in the early 1990s when the then US administration prevailed over Russian President Boris Yelstin. Subsequently, Russia had delivered cryogenic engines to India but no technology transfer per se had taken place. Now, India has almost succeeded in indigenizing this technology. On the other hand, on the commercial front, until now India was mainly involved in making launching facilities available for other states. But now, it has successfully entered another arena -- that of manufacturing state of the art satellites as per customer requirements. The successful launch of W2M has demonstrated that the Indian space programme offers cost-effective, commercially viable options and that ISRO has emerged as a foremost space organization which could design and develop various space technologies and also bring in significant business. 

 

However, when viewed against the backdrop of 26/11, such success raises the question of the utility of India’s space programme for its security, particularly when other space faring nations are successfully using space technologies for military purposes. It is obvious that the potential of ISRO could not be directly used for security purposes because of the inherent ‘civilian’ nature of India’s space programme. ISRO has been under the technology denial regime for a long time. The issue is that will India’s policy of ambiguity fetch dividends to address the 21st century threats. One view, which has emerged in strategic circles, is that India has essentially suffered for many years because of its ambiguity in the nuclear field. It took many years for India to bifurcate its civilian and military nuclear capabilities. To avoid an action replay of ‘nuclear agony’, India needs to decide the ‘military’ status of its space programme. 

 

This particularly becomes important when terrorists are found using satellite based gizmos like GPS and satellite phones. Today, terrorists can study any target in detail before launching an attack because of the easy availability of google images. On the other hand, in the current India-Pakistan standoff, Indian options are limited because of nuclear and economic realities. Does this mean that India is left with no option except the diplomatic one? Maybe not. The time has come to look for options like bloodless battles that are fought in the outer space/cyber space. This is not to argue that India should immediately start jamming satellites in space and launch cyber offensives. But, there is a need for India to look at such options seriously.

 

A law abiding state like India needs to articulate well defined policies in sync with universal norms in space. India has debated the importance of space command in the last few years. The government has already established a space cell to look at matters related to military. There is a need to factor in issues related to internal security as well as external security while configuring the military space architecture.  21st century threats demand different approaches. Looking at satellites only for the purposes of communication, navigation and reconnaissance is not sufficient. It is essential to develop ‘methodologies of denial’. 

 

India has faced threats to its computer networks many a times in the past as a means to intimidate or coerce. Should India remain satisfied with technological solutions only to thwart such attacks? Or must it be proactive and develop deterrence to convey its capability to damage the digital environment of the adversary. A view on Indus water treaty may make changes in the water levels but a view on information highways and communication networks could actually leave a state in the lurch. Various options like jamming technologies, developing ground based lasers to blind satellites etc. exist and there is a need to exploit them. 

 

Such acts are mostly done in secrecy. But, for a state to conduct information blockade, it must have a properly articulated policy and structures on ground that allow the development of defensive and offensive options. States like US and China have a space command and cyber command. There is need for India to look beyond diplomatic offensives and use the in-house expertise available in space and IT sectors to respond efficiently and rationally to various security challenges. 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)