Securing Our Homeland Against Terror

 

In response to 26/11, the Central government has gone into a characteristic post-event flurry of diplomatic activity -- urgently drafting diplomatic demarches, written responses to notes verbale etc. The West -- Rice, Brown, Admiral Mike Mullen and others -- have assiduously sweet-tongued our ‘leaders’ to avert India’s military option, as this could upset the US/ISAF apple cart in Afghanistan. However, a mature and professional analysis of the situation would have anyway concluded that overt military action is the last option. But professional assessments are not the forte of the Indian security establishment. The Americans know this and so do the Pakistanis.

 

Defence Minister AK Antony has announced the emergency purchase of maritime reconnaissance aircraft, fast patrol boats, radar cover over the entire coastal areas, and the establishment of a coastal authority. All these measures will only lock the stable after the horse has bolted! The first warning of the seacoast threat came in 1993, when RDX and other explosives were landed off the Ratnagiri coast and probably used in the Mumbai bomb-blasts that year. Coastal states had then been advised to set up marine police wings with fast patrol boats. But they did nothing for 15 years. Are the ISI-inspired terrorists likely to penetrate India the same way again? Analysis of past infiltration modes, targets attacked, and attack modes, would indicate otherwise.

 

The single factor common to all these attacks has been surprise. Each time a different infiltration mode has been chosen with various classes of targets, fresh methods and weapons. Therefore, while the belated buttoning up of coastal and seaward defences is no doubt welcome, this route for the next attack is improbable.

 

Foremost among other routes is infiltration from Nepal or Bangladesh and the exploitation of sleeper cells pre-positioned in the country. Like coastal security, which has over a dozen agencies/departments overseeing it, overland security too is in the hands of multiple police and paramilitary organisations. Suspects have often been apprehended on one border and have revealed information about terrorists having slipped in through another flank. Likewise, a plethora of intelligence agencies have overlapping responsibilities. The challenge is to overcome inter-agency rivalry and turf-wars. and evolve an enduring system that promotes teamwork and provides real-time processing and intelligence dissemination. 

 

Securing our land borders also needs multi-layered counter-infiltration to augment the thin line of border patrolling. Thus, modern surveillance means and police dogs must enhance the efficacy of BSF/ITBF/SSB patrols. Further, quick reaction teams with fast vehicles and helicopters are required to provide depth to the first tier. 

 

As regards sleeper cells, there are a vast number of illegal immigrants living in the vicinity of our borders with Bangladesh and Nepal. If we are serious, we need a massive drive to provide biometric ID cards to all border residents, including those aliens whose residence in India has been legitimised by vested interests, and to maintain police surveillance on such people. Obviously, this implies gearing-up and depoliticising the police. Most states have avoided complying with such a directive of the Supreme Court issued on 22nd September 2006.

 

Finally, can aircraft be used for infiltrating terrorists? The Purulia arms drop would indicate that civilian aircraft can easily intrude into our airspace – but presently, adopting an aerial mode appears remote. 

 

As regards targets for attack, these have been chosen with two basic objectives in view: to polarise the nation along communal lines, or to impede economic progress. Additionally, the 2001-Parliament attack, as well as 26/11, appear designed to provoke a military response, thereby compelling Pak Army to pull out from its US-mandated commitment on the Afghanistan border. Op Parakram facilitated calling off the hunt for Osama in Tora Bora, while now the twin heat from Taliban and US has become intolerable. We can thus identify the most prominent targets, which meet these criteria and guard these well.

 

In the past, terrorists have used bombs with timers, car-laden bombs (Kabul Embassy) and now, physical assault by well-trained terrorists. We have tried to detect the influx of explosives, but in a nation with enfeebled enforcement, this has achieved only limited success. Should terrorists attempt to smuggle chemical or biological agents, our police/customs would prove totally unequal to the challenge. However, there is no short cut to hard work and dedication in developing counter strategies.

 

For a vast nation with a billion plus people, it is not possible to secure every infiltration route or potential target. Hence, just as Musharraf described ISI as Pak’s first line of defence, so must our intelligence agencies, RAW and IB, in particular, be the same for us. The bane of our intelligence and security establishments is multiplicity of organisations that have sprouted through turf-tussles over the years. Hence, there is lack of coordination and diffusion of responsibilities, and accountability can never be pinpointed. Accordingly, no bureaucrat or policeman has ever been shown the door. In the present case, politicians have only been jettisoned to assuage public ire just as Krishna Menon was after the 1962 debacle. If 26/11 is to be taken as an opportunity to clean the Augean stables, we must rise above petty concerns and create credible organisations with single-point accountability at each level/function.

 

While nascent NIA is a defensive organisation, to unravel terrorist acts and secure convictions, there is need for a National Counter-terror Authority with a unified structure right down to the district level with special units for metros and major cities. This should be proactive in preventing terror and in dealing effectively with terror situations. Such an agency must have integrated counter-terror intelligence; comprehensive functional autonomy and unambiguous accountability. Only the Army has the experience of dealing with terror with an impeccable track record. The nation cannot afford to ignore this expertise any longer. Experienced Army officers must be inducted at the helm of counter-terror and security organisations of the nation.

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)