Kayani�s extension, WikiLeaks and the situation in Afghanistan

On July 22, 2010, the Pakistan government extended the tenure of Army Chief, General Ashraf Pervez Kayani, by three years beginning November 29, 2010. The official reason for the extension given by Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani was General Kayani’s key role in prosecuting war against terror in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and the requirement to continue the effort under his leadership. Three days later, on July 25, 2010, a website called WikiLeaks released a document set called the Afghan War Diary, an extraordinary compendium of over 91,000 reports covering the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010. While the released documents pertain to reports written by soldiers and intelligence officers and mainly describe lethal military actions involving the United States military, they also include intelligence information, reports of meetings with political figures, and related details.

Of special interest are reports relating to the complicity of Pakistan’s army under General Kayani and its infamous intelligence wing, the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) in sponsoring a large- scale covert war through its proxies in Baluchistan and Waziristan against the US- led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Understandably, the leaks have created a furore in the US and other nations engaged in the war against terror in Afghanistan. Questions are now being raised about the massive aid flows from the US to Pakistan being used clandestinely against American interests in Afghanistan. 

The timing of the extension given to Kayani just a few days before the leaks hence assumes significance. Despite Pakistan’s duplicity in support to ISAF forces, Kayani remains the best bet for the US in prosecuting its war in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been informed by US agencies about the leaks a few days before they were put out in the public domain by WikiLeaks and prudence dictated that the extension be accorded before the leaks became public knowledge. This has once again put the Army at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. Accordingly, the hope that post- Musharraf, the role of the army would stand diminished and democracy would be strengthened has been belied. Kayani has played his cards astutely and brought back the army to an even higher level of pre-eminence through his handling of operations against militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and through successful conduct of Exercise Zarb-e-Momin earlier this year.  These two factors have done much to restore the credibility of the Army in the eyes of the public.

The army is now firmly in control and is the key driver for all security and diplomatic related affairs in Pakistan. The way different organs of the state in Pakistan have reacted to the ongoing havoc created by the most serious floods in over eight decades is indicative of the state of affairs in Pakistan. In this critical period, President Zardari has been ridiculed for going ahead with his visit to the United Kingdom when millions were rendered homeless in the floods. Prime Minister Gilani has been exposed visiting a fake relief camp set up for the flood-hit victims. But the Army Chief was seen at the Sukkur barrage with the chief minister of Sind, effectively taking charge of the situation.

Pakistan’s Game Plan in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, Pakistan will forcefully pursue its military’s concept of ‘strategic depth’, for which it needs Afghanistan as a kind of proprietary hinterland, free of Indian or other outside influence. Pakistani interests in Afghanistan would be served by a weak pliable government in Afghanistan, playing down of Pashtun nationalism and keeping India out of the loop. We can thus expect the following: -

 •         Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks against Indian personnel in Afghanistan will intensify.

•         Attempts by Pakistan to see an end to all Indian influence in Afghanistan including the closure of its consulates. This fits in with General Kayani’s offer to President Hamid Karzai that he can broker a peace deal with the Taliban only if Indian consulates in Afghanistan are closed.

•         Pakistan will continue to sponsor albeit with plausible deniability, a large-scale, covert rebel war through the Pakistan based ‘Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, – the official name for the Afghan Taliban and its allies which have their strongholds in Baluchistan and Waziristan. At the same time, Pakistan will resist US pressure to launch military operations in these areas.

•         Pakistan military will continue to combat elements of the Taliban inimical to the state. Action against such elements will be aimed at convincing the US and its allies of Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terror. Simultaneously, Pakistan would aim to fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of ISAF, as and when it occurs in pursuance of its interests in Afghanistan.

 Indian Options

Afghanistan is critical to Indian interests and is best maintained by a strong and stable friendly government in Afghanistan, free from Taliban control. It is difficult to foresee the future in Afghanistan but if the US withdraws prematurely, there is no doubt that the Taliban will step in. Hamid Karzai’s government and the Afghan National Army do not yet have the ability to stave off the Taliban. The portents for India are thus grave and must be addressed. On the economic front, India must continue with its current levels of economic and development assistance to Afghanistan and further strengthen that effort. The need to protect Indian personnel also cannot be overemphasised. At the same time, India needs to reestablish its linkages with the elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance to ensure that it is not left out of the loop in case the Taliban return to power. Certain actions which India could consider are: -

•         Upgrade diplomatic presence in all Central Asian Republics. Consider having an enhanced military presence in the above effort.

•         Train and support a portion of the Afghan National Army in the areas dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. While this will be opposed by Pakistan, avenues by which such an endeavour can be accomplished must be explored.

•         Attempt to unite all Pashtun tribes on either side of the Durand Line through economic, diplomatic and moral support for the creation of a larger Pashtunistan. In any event, the Durand line was an artificial construct of the British in pursuance of the ‘Great Game’ in the nineteenth century which artificially divided the Pashtun people.

•         The proposal by former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, of partitioning Afghanistan into two countries: An independent, Pashtun-dominated south and a northern and western section where Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras make up the majority has few takers as of now. But the animosity that exists between the Pashtuns and the rest of the tribes in Afghanistan may well lead to such an occurrence in future. India should be prepared for such an eventuality.
•        Maintain unofficial contacts with the Quetta Shura despite the difficulty of doing so.

The situation in Afghanistan is fluid and the ISI remains the main driver of the conflict. India needs to be proactive to ensure that its interests are maintained.

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)