China Deploys DF-21 Missiles Against India: Bolstering Strategic Positioning

In what could be deduced as bearing a belligerent strategic stance, China reportedly has placed advanced Dong Feng-21 (DF-21/CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) along the borders it shares with India. The move has been reported by the Pentagon in its annual testimony submitted to the US Congress, which also suggests development of plans to shift airborne forces at short notice to the region in the eventuality of a conflict.

China appears to be strengthening its deterrent capabilities in the region by replacing the earlier liquid-fuelled, nuclear capable CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles with the upgraded CSS-5 missiles. The CSS-5 is a road mobile, solid-propellant, tactical missile system with payload and accuracy sufficient enough to target key civilian population centres and thus can, in effect, be effectively used as a deterrent against India. The basic variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod-1) is capable of delivering a 500 kiloton nuclear warhead over a maximum range of 1,800 kms. The new GPS-based guidance system facilitates it for precision-strike missions making the accuracy of the missile comparable to that of cruise missiles.

The CSS-5 is a variant of the CSS-N-3 (Julang-1) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which started development in the mid-1960s. It holds an edge in comparison to the earlier versions owing to the fact that it is a solid-propellant system—thereby ensuring longevity of its service life and mobility and consequently decreasing costs of maintenance and launching time frame.

The DF-21 was initially intended for strategic operations but its later variants have been designed with a view to cater for nuclear as well as conventional missions. The DF-21 have usually been positioned in areas close to China’s borders to guarantee adequate target overage of these areas.

Originally developed as the two-stage JL-1 designed for deployment aboard China’s SSBN, the development of the DF-21/CSS-5 began way back in 1967 with the first successful test coming about in May 1985.

According to various sources, over 100 DF-21 missiles have been built with some of them being reconfigured with conventional warheads that can be put to use along China’s southern and northwestern borders—thereby targeting areas throughout northern India. Significantly, according to the July 2000 Japanese White Paper on National Defence, China had 70 operational guided missiles capable of reaching Japan and other Asian countries. The White Paper noted that China has been steadily replacing the older CSS-3 missiles with more accurate and advanced CSS-5 systems.

Earlier, according to a 1997 report by the US Air Force National Air Intelligence Center, the CSS-5 were deployed in Chinese border areas to provide coverage of Russia, India, Central Asia, Japan, Korea and the Philippines. The CSS-5 and CSS-2s are deployed at Tonghua, near North Korea; at Lianxiwang, near Taiwan; at Jianshui, near the China-Vietnam border; and at Datong in central China. In addition, the Taipei Times reported in July 2002 that China had test-launched two CSS-5 missiles from mobile launchers in Jiangxi province, in south-central China, to target sites in Gansu province in northwest China.

Noticeably, the Chinese appear to be pursuing a well-orchestrated and crafted strategy of positioning themselves in a situation of advantage. The aim is to have an upper edge against India especially by means of building and sprucing up logistics infrastructure in the border areas. By virtue of constructing roads right up to the LAC in Arunachal as well as Ladakh, Beijing has ensured a smooth chain of supply over India. A study of the development of the logistics infrastructure along the China-India frontier reveals that there is an increase in the logistics and infrastructural capability of the PLA that could be brought to use in order to induct and sustain a larger quantum of force against New Delhi in case need be.

It was in this reference, that a commentary appearing in Guogji Zhanlue stated, “Beijing should not adopt any hasty step or make big compromises on principles” because the border issue, “if approached in a hurry, could impact the respective rise of the two nuclear powers.” A significant Chinese concern is that a border settlement, without major Indian territorial concessions, could potentially augment India’s power position and thus impact harmfully upon China’s rise within Asia and beyond. Therefore, notwithstanding the economic convergences that gain primacy at bilateral and multilateral fora, it is the strategic divergences including the seemingly ceaseless border and territorial dispute that always has been a prime source of conflict between Beijing and New Delhi.

As the PLA seeks to pursue a robust military modernisation campaign to project its clout in Asia, nuclear and missile supremacy surely accentuate that aspiration. With recent instances of frequent border violations and aggressive border patrolling by the Chinese soldiers, it seems palpable that deployment of the CSS-5 missiles has been carried out with a view to bolster China’s military presence against India particularly signifying Beijing’s intent of keeping a preemptive and coercive option on hand in case of a regional crisis.

Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)