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Is India feeling the Chinese heat? At least, this is what one may infer from the deluge of articles appearing in Indian media, taking its cue from the country’s political leadership on China’s assertive behaviour after a recent high level meeting in New Delhi to review the Chinese threat. But those who know the recent trends in Chinese military modernisation and its strategic behaviour would not be surprised, since only last year, India’s Ministry of Defence Annual Report (2008-09) had acknowledged, for the first time, Chinese strategic consolidation in Tibet near the disputed Sino-Indian border. However, while New Delhi is aware about the strategic challenges from China and the resultant unpredictability in the Sino-Indian engagement process, it is yet to explore the entire basket of choices to meet the Chinese challenge.
Despite significant progress in the bilateral relationship since former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historic visit to Beijing in 1988, Sino-Indian relations have been turbulent in recent times. It all began with Chinese attempts to block an Asian Development Bank (ADB) project in India’s Arunachal Pradesh, which was successfully contested by India. Then, there were reports of China’s massive integrated water resource management scheme on rivers emanating from the Tibetan plateau. In addition, China is also extending the road-rail network in areas bordering India and intends to extend them to Nepal on the one hand and Pakistan on the other hand. Reports that China is moving closer to establishing a 111 km direct rail-road link to Bangladesh’s port city of Chittagong via Myanmar have also recently surfaced. Since last year, China has also rediscovered India’s Jammu & Kashmir as another ‘disputed’ area, as evident from a series of visa related issues. The Sino-Pak nuclear deal, contents of which leaked early this year, was widely interpreted in India as another step by China to enhance Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. China’s cooperative instincts towards other South Asian countries backed by its ‘near’ permanent base in the Gulf of Aden, add further weight to what The Economist calls as the ‘contest of the century’ while visualising Sino-Indian relations.
While the recent developments are true, the future may not be that bad, as hypothesised by The Economist. First, the history of Sino-Indian relations in the last five decades is replete with numerous examples of border violations, diplomatic and military brinkmanship involving other South Asian countries, and even a threat of military intervention in the Indo-Pak war of 1971! However, China could not repeat the experiences of 1962 and rather responded to diplomatic overtures from India. Second, as the two countries undergo a power transition process, mutual competition and rivalry will be spoilers in many cases, as was witnessed at the ADB platform. Such diplomatic pricks from China should be read as an indication of its increased confidence and ability to create a sphere of influence penetrating India’s own backyard.
So, does this portend a military conflict between the two nations?
One must take note that policy makers in India have not allowed troublesome issues to dilute the process of Sino-Indian engagement. Chinese leaders, too, would do well to realise that. Besides, China and India have been able to build an intricate relationship that makes war unlikely and costly. To a large extent, it is this investment that has kept the contentious issues between the two countries under the carpet.
Further, the policy makers in South Block have a well designed engagement policy spanning over major areas like politics, military and economics. At international levels too, India has been expanding the engagement basket with China, some of which have led to rather tangible outcomes, be it WTO, G20 or UN climate talks. Both the countries have spearheaded the BRICS initiative making it an influential group in international relations. Overall, the engagement game has paid off in having manageable relations with China and a (relatively) peaceful border. Moreover, the dialogues on the border are in crucial stage that require peaceful atmosphere to run through. Therefore, it is only logical that India expand the engagement game and make it more intensive without subjecting it to peripheral irritants in the bilateral relationship.
After the recent Chinese jabs, many in India are mulling and perhaps, rightly, that dealing with China is a tough game and calls for exploring other strategic options. There is a feeling that China is slowly emerging as a dominant partner in the bilateral game and needs more balancing from India. While balance of power games like supporting Taiwan or rediscovering the Tibet card may not bring tangible results, India can certainly follow a vigorous South Asia policy and match Chinese presence in smaller countries in the region, military or otherwise. Policy makers in India also need to encourage the study of Chinese military modernisation and strategic behaviour from the Indian perspective and strengthen India’s military capacity vis-à-vis China.
What can clinch the game for India, however, is further investment in diplomacy. One area could be the principle actors and institutions in the Chinese decision making system such as the People Liberation Army (PLA). India should also encourage communitarian relations between the two sides. In dealing with China, India must explore and use all options that can enhance its confidence and help it manage relations with an unpredictable neighbour.
Bhartendu Kumar Singh is Deputy Director, National Academy of Defence Financial Management, Pune
The views expressed are personal.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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