In Pakistan, who wields authority?

Thomas Hobbes, the English political theorist, in his magnum opus Leviathan (1651) defined sovereignty as a monopoly of coercive power. Though he advocated that sovereignty be vested in the hands of a single ruler, he even preferred an oligarchic group or a democratic assembly as the form of government.

Andrew Heywood, in his Political Theory (Palgrave, 2004), asserts that “sovereignty means absolute and unlimited power”.

The term sovereignty is derived from the Latin word superanus, meaning supreme. O. P. Gauba (Macmillan, 2005) says that the sovereign—be it a monarch, chief executive or an assembly is able to declare law, issue commands and take political decisions which are binding on all individuals and associations within its jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, without getting involved in the definitional aspects of the term, it can be safely stated that the concept of sovereignty is in jeopardy in the nation-state of Pakistan. Why is one led to such an inference?

The answer does not lie in one incident or the other, but in the chain of events since the loss of Tora Bora. The gradual withering away of sovereignty in Pakistan commenced once the US-led NATO forces lost sight of Osama, who was believed to have crossed over to Pakistan allegedly still resides there, may be in North Waziristan or in Quetta or even in Karachi.

From the harsh rhetoric of ‘being bombed to stone age’ to Hillary Rodham Clinton’s present fiats, Pakistan has had to go through a string of dictates by its dominant partner in this ‘war on terror’ which, interestingly it has joined reluctantly.
However, a recent comment by Hillary Clinton ignites the dormant debate regarding the government’s authority in Pakistan. Hillary Clinton speaking at a NATO meeting at Brussels on 14 October said: “It's absolutely unacceptable for those with means in Pakistan not to be doing their fair share to help their own people while taxpayers in Europe, the United States and other contributing countries are all chipping in.” Moreover, she added that “the government must require that the economically affluent and elite support the government and people of Pakistan.”

She was, in essence, hinting that the Pakistani establishment should encourage their their elite to garner funds for relief work in the wake of the devastating floods. Her rhetoric probably also hints toward US dissatisfaction regarding the lackadaisical approach of the Pakistan Army in counterinsurgency operations in North Waziristan. Moreover, the recent closure of a NATO supply line by Pakistan in retaliation to the air strikes by the former may have deteriorated the US-Pakistan bonhomie.

Whatever be the case, the very next day and at the very same venue, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi asserted, albeit with a façade of authority; “Regardless [emphasis added] of what Hillary Clinton says, we are going to do what is right for Pakistan and I think the tax system has to be more equitable.”

Are Hillary Clinton and the Obama administration framing laws for Pakistan? Is the Zardari-Gilani duo a mere US stooge? What is the role of Pervez Kayani and the ISI? We can very well forget the people of Pakistan in this regard as hardly Rosseau’s concept of sovereignty lying with the people can be affirmed in these circumstances.

Nevertheless, this is not an isolated incident. The frequent incursions of the US-NATO forces inside what is de facto Pakistani territory in search of the Taliban-Al Qaeda insurgents and the killing of some Pakistani forces in the process raises serious doubts on the level of legitimacy of the present civil dispensation in Pakistan. Furthermore, presence of private American militia like “Blackwater” dilutes the very concept of sovereignty in the six-decade old nation-state.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the military-ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) nexus has always been a powerful coterie in Pakistan. It has in fact held the reins of government, either overtly or covertly. So, has the military-ISI combo been subjugated by the Americans? Or is it simply lying dormant for the time being and pushing the civilian administration toward the American guillotine?

A year back, the Pakistan Army had launched a major ground offensive in South Waziristan, to flush out militancy. It also got entangled in Swat and presently is consolidating its position in those regions. But the US-NATO forces are pressurising them to conduct a major operation in North Waziristan where the kingpins are supposedly hiding. As Pakistan is not exhibiting much resolve to go ahead with offensive operations in the area, citing commitments in South Waziristan and Swat, the Americans have taken up the cudgels,  going ahead with their ‘hot pursuits’ across the Durand Line.

Actually, the indictment of the ISI in the ‘war on terror’, the revelations by WikiLeaks in particular and several American think tanks in general, set the tone for difficult times for the civil-military combo. However, the ISI went on playing the ‘double game’ unabated. The reasons were obvious.

Any punitive measure against the jihadis implied more fidayeen attacks on its major cities and hence destabilisation. Pakistan was on the uncharted trajectory of a ‘failed state’. Thus, it was sheer existential compulsion which forced the military-led ISI to double-cross the Americans.

However, at present, Pakistan is definitely at the cross-roads. On one hand, it has an uncomfortable ally: the US. On the other, it will be difficult for it to alienate the Haqqani or the Taliban and consequently the Al Qaeda. Furthermore, the paranoia of an Indian threat is almost pathological with the Pakistani establishment.

In such a scenario, it becomes imperative for the civil-military complex to set the house in order. Nonetheless, to do that, one serious issue needs to be resolved. Who wields the real authority in Pakistan?

Dr Uddipan Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor based in Kolkata and writes on security issues.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).