No breakthrough: Chinese Premier wraps up India visit

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s recently concluded visit to India can be ascribed to as being bland, in that, it failed to provide any tangible breakthrough to a list of irritants in the India-China relationship However, it did manage to successfully achieve what China apparently had on its agenda—intentions to focus exclusively on the ‘economics’ of the bilateral relationship between Beijing and New Delhi and choosing to pay no heed to the other contentious aspects of the relationship. Premier Wen’s visit to India also marked the 60th anniversary Indo-Chinese diplomatic ties. During his previous visit in 2005, both nations decided to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.

Despite the fact that both China and India have made efforts to a sort of acceptance towards peaceful co-existence and growth in Asia—the existential reality is that both are leading engines of economic growth with China being the fastest-growing economy in the world followed by India. This naturally leads to aspirations towards greater power, both within and beyond Asia, often foretelling the possibilities of a clash of interests. The long-standing strategic divergences between the two nations, both of whom combined, account for nearly 37 per cent of the world’s population needs to be addressed if at all both countries truly desire to work towards cooperative peace and security in the region.

The interminable territorial and boundary dispute between India and China is the principal irritant. Adding to the misgivings is a series of developments undertaken by China which could only attribute a negative connotation for India. New Delhi has always been at unease regarding the rapid and robust infrastructure build-up embarked upon by Beijing in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), especially in the border areas with India; continuing support and assistance to arm Pakistan, both by conventional weapon systems as well as by drawing parity to the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal with its latest twin-nuclear reactor deal at Chasma III and IV; supporting Pakistan’s diplomatic position on Kashmir by issuing stapled visas to Kashmiri residents in India—thereby questioning the status of Jammu & Kashmir with respect to the Indian Union; and its well-planned military modernisation programme, which certainly remains in stark contrast to its proclaimed policy of a ‘peaceful rise’.
 
Premier Wen’s visit to India claimed to “…strengthen high level contacts to enhance strategic mutual trust and expand bilateral trade…” according to Hu Zhengyue, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister. However, the visit also coincided with reports of China nearing completion of a 3.3 km Galongla tunnel that will connect TAR’s Metok County bordering Arunachal Pradesh to China’s national highway system. Metok holds special significance in that it is TAR’s last remaining county which is remote and remains cut-off for a major part of the year owing to rough weathers condition and in addition is also the point from which the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) enters India.

China’s intent of securing maximum economic benefits from India was more than clear during Premier Wen’s visit, reflected deftly in the huge trade delegation comprising more than 300 leaders/representatives of leading Chinese business houses.

Bilateral trade between the two is touted to touch $60 billion this year. By virtue of sealing trade deals with New Delhi worth $16 billion, China has made sure that the ‘economics’ of China’s relationship with India will be a key precursor especially in light of the fact that China feels a greater need to enlarge its share of the market in India. New Delhi, on its part needs to take cognisance and tread cautiously towards Chinese business overtures given that New Delhi mainly exports only primary commodities and imports finished products. On the contrary, China seeks greater access to the Indian markets for its goods and services. When it comes to minerals, China is known to have deposits that are two-and-half times that of India. Yet it is safeguarding its own reserves and in turn, importing iron ore from India. Trends such as these could prove to be detrimental in the long-run from an Indian perspective. Besides, India suffers a swelling trade deficit with China—that touched approximately $16 billion in October 2010, largely since the Chinese exports to India are nearly double of India’s exports to China.

On the issue of India’s candidature for a seat in the UN Security Council, it is about time that China reciprocates India’s gesture when it principally supported the Chinese candidature at the UNSC ever since its inception in 1945. In what could be interpreted as a very discernible Indian diplomatic retort, the joint communiqué following Premier Wen’s visit does not contain an Indian commitment to a “one China” policy—as opposed to many such earlier instances. Significantly, this move comes following India’s participation in the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony at Oslo to confer the honour to jailed Chinese dissident leader Liu Xiaobo. China condemned the ceremony as a ‘political farce’ urging nations to boycott the ceremony—a request which India chose to ignore.

Given China pursuing a subtle yet lucid policy of keeping India pinned to the sub-continent—widely manifested in its activities in India’s neighbourhood, it is about time that New Delhi gets into a realist stock-taking mode. Though there seems to be sizeable section of analysts who feel that the economic facet in the bilateral ties would constitute the key to the success of the future relationship between India and China, we certainly cannot disregard the existential strategic divergences that could prove to be a spoiler in the the relationship.

Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).