Political Upheaval Brewing in Iran: Ahmadinejad Working towards Strengthening Grip

The power struggle among the ruling conservatives in Iran is out in the open with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s decision to fire Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. This is the latest in a series of events depicting the bitter power play in the political corridors of Tehran. Earlier too, President Ahmadinejad sought to delay signing legislations passed by the Iranian parliament—an apparent attempt to signal that it is he alone who holds primacy in Iran’s multi-layered political system.

Mottaki and Ahmadinejad have been political rivals for a long while, especially since the time when Mottaki was the campaign manager for one of President Ahmadinejad’s arch rivals during the 2005 Presidential election, Ali Larijani. Both Larijani and Mottaki are believed to represent the pragmatic conservative bloc which is critical of the radical agenda being pursued by Ahmadinejad, often blamed for Iran’s isolation and consequent susceptibility.

By virtue of firing Mottaki, President Ahmadinejad in all probability is strengthening his hold and indicating a hardening of Iranian foreign policy. The spearhead of the nation’s much-debated nuclear programme, Ali Akbar Salehi, who is the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency has been named the temporary caretaker Foreign Minister.

However, the steps being taken by the President to consolidate his position could result in the potential waning of his domestic political clout. In a series of scathing criticisms being launched against the President, the latest has come from none other than the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). In a recent commentary published in its monthly publication Payam-e Enghelab, the IRGC has condemned President Ahmadinejad over his recent comments in which he proclaimed that the Iranian parliament was not on top as far as managing the country's affairs were concerned—labelled as an offense to the thought and ideals of Iran’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Speculation has been rife that since coming back to power with a second term in office, President Ahmadinejad seems to be making efforts to consolidate his hold with his nationalist stance. President Ahmadinejad’s insistence that, “…the executive branch has to run the country and other branches have to support it" is not being received very well by his political opponents, including the hardline allies and conservatives since the Parliament is predominantly conservative dominated.
 
Ahmadinejad’s condemnation by the IRGC is believed to have the backing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is attempting to clip Ahmadinejad’s wing and provide some sort of an offset to the President through the the IRGC. Ahmadinejad’s fundamentalist ambitions do not seem to be going down very well with the Guards and latest comments only reflect that his support base within the IRGC is fast eroding. This becomes even more understandable in the absence of a united reformist group that could offer resistance to the conservative hardliners. It should be recalled that both Khamenei and the Guards had supported Ahmadinejad’s candidature during the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. However, with the passage of time and President Ahmadinejad failing to deliver on the economic and foreign policy plank, the Guards who are regarded as a symbol of power in Iran are increasingly getting divided over approaches to deal with Ahmadinejad and his policies.

The 2009 presidential election in Iran was interpreted as a fierce struggle between the religious radicals and the reformists. Given that President Ahmadinejad’s popularity seems to be losing ground in wake of his radical hardline politics and policies coupled with a crackdown against social freedoms, promoting a nationalist Iranian school of thought is an effort by President Ahmadinejad to secure the bedrock of support in the rural pockets of the country, war veterans (shaheeds) as well as a sizeable section of the conservative population.

Since the June 2009 election, not only has the rift between the conservatives and reformists (then represented by Mir Hossein Mousavi), within Iran’s political establishment further widened, but fissures within the conservative factions also are gradually beginning to appear. The fact that the speaker of the Majlis, Ali Larijani and President Ahmadinejad have divergent approaches is a known fact. According to the Khaleej Times, “While Ahmadinejad nominally is ‘President’ of the Security Council, in reality, Larijani receives his orders from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei whose confidence he is believed to enjoy.”

The domestic struggle within the conservatives came to the forefront when in September 2007 Khamenei appointed Mohammad Ali Jafari as the new commander of the IRGC and subsequently within a week elected former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani as President of the Assembly of Experts. Both Jafari and Rafsanjani are considered moderate conservatives with affiliations to factions that have been critical of the radical elements allied to President Ahmadinejad. Earlier, Jafri had stated in October 2007 that the primary mission of the Guards was fighting ‘internal’ threats.

Ahmadinejad appears to be interpreting his victory at the ballot box as a vindication of his policies and hardline position on various issues—the most significant being his government’s tough posture and defiance of the West over pursuing the nuclear programme. This could be his justification of trying to bend rules and institutions in a manner that would suit his future interests well. President Ahmadinejad has managed to sideline opponents who pose a threat to his authority including both the reformists and pragmatic conservatives from the domestic political scene. In this reference, the latest disapproval voiced by the IRGC with patronage of Khamenei, are part of a long-term means to nullify any potential plan by which Ahmadinejad tries to cement his position in the Iranian political system in an absolutist mode.

Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)