Failure of intelligence coordination - Did we learn anything from 26/11

By Mohan Singh

The terrorist strike at Mumbai, the economic capital of India, in November 2008, killing 164 people and wounding at least 308 had exposed the loopholes in India’s security architecture. Most analysts felt that it was a clear case of failure of intelligence co-ordination. Thus, a number of steps were announced by government to improve intelligence coordination and assessment. Give the fact that there have been no serious attacks of the kind seen on 26/11, the government may justify the effectiveness of the corrective measures taken. In fact, the situation post 26/11 has been under control due to the tough diplomatic stand taken by the government of India and the fact that our neighbour to the west have had to deal with their own internal turmoil. At this point, a review and analysis of the state of intelligence coordination is called for and mid-course correction undertaken where found necessary.

Shortcomings of Present Intelligence Coordination

Refurbishing the terror combat infrastructure after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the government made the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) the nodal agency for intelligence assessment as well. However, it also got embroiled in the ‘turf war’ between intelligence agencies. MAC is perceived to be a stepping stone for Intelligence Bureau (IB). Being part of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the IB calls the shot there. Initially, the functioning of MAC was supervised by the Home Minister himself. However, it has lost the steam now, with meetings attended by lower rank officers now. Earlier, meetings were attended by nominated nodal officers of intelligence agencies besides Central Paramilitary Forces (CPOs). Intelligence agencies share generic inputs with MAC, once they cannot use it themselves for gaining credit. Thus, such inputs are vague, lack specificity and time frames and do not lead to any relevant assessment. MAC doesn’t deal with inputs related to Naxalism which could be a grave mistake. The Naxal menace and their reported attempts to forge alliance with other dissident groups should not be taken lightly. Intelligence cannot be focused only on terrorism.

It is a much larger issue, conceptually and functionally. MAC like all other intelligence agencies is under-staffed. It is supposed to be functional round the clock and handles on an average 200 inputs every day. Again, like other intelligence arrangements it is mostly staffed by ad hoc posting/recruitment which suffers from a lack of institutional imagination to make timely assessment. It cannot “connect the dots” because it is not sufficiently imaginative. Bright officers and operatives have still not been posted or sent on deputation as each agency wants to retain its best manpower with them. It needs requisite incentives to send their best men to intelligence-based appointments. Intelligence assessment and the coordination mechanism refurbished after 26/11 is still not proactive. Even today it is not in a position to make timely and holistic assessment and assist in swift and coordinated response. It still lacks the teeth and unambiguous authority over Subsidiary Multi Agency Centers (SMACs) and state intelligence machinery.

Role of National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) post 26/11 has not been amended even though MAC was made the nodal agency. In fact, same issues are discussed in MAC as well as in NSCS meetings, leading to duplication of efforts and confusion. 

Effective response to any unforeseen security challenge necessitates three prongs; namely intelligence, decision-makers and reaction elements to read the situation continuously and react within shortest possible time. Even today, the intelligence gathering and  assessment making infrastructure, decision-maker and reaction element have not been meshed into one single point of contact. This will reduce the reaction time of our response to any such attack. National Investigation Agency (NIA) and National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) created in the aftermath of 26/11 have yet to fully establish themselves on the ground. 

A plethora of intelligence agencies in the country today continue to function in their watertight compartments and fight their turf-war. The intelligence set up today is like a hospital full of specialists with no attending physician to ensure unity of effort. The intelligence community is therefore unable to “connect the dots” not only due to a failure of imagination but a failure of coordination.

Over reliance on technical intelligence has blunted the sharp edge of intelligence operatives. Enough emphasis is still not being paid to sharpening human intelligence. The data bases of NATGRID whenever completed can be useful tool but the assessment cannot be left to the computers.

Accountability is another important aspect which continues to be given the short shrift by quoting secrecy, leading to loss of efficiency. A greater degree of transparency without sacrificing national security needs also to be defined.

Recommendations to Improve Intelligence Assessment and coordination

A single point of decision-making needs to be to be establishedand a coordinating agency with requisite authority and universal acceptance needs to be put in place at the earliest. The MAC, NSCS, NIA, NCTC needs to be put under one authority with powers to assess, decide and act within a minimum timeframe. The selection of manpower in intelligence agencies needs total revamp. Shortage of manpower, their training, grooming and morale need immediate attention. There is a need to encourage free thinking and grant academic independence to intelligence operatives. It is recommended that we must make use of both various private institutions and think-tanks for analytical study of national and security issues. We need to look for indicators for a likely event and connect the dots to draw the complete picture and take requisite measures to avoid re-occurrence of such incidents. The intelligence operatives have to be proactive and anticipate likely events.

The steps announced by government post 26/11 have not yet been implemented .Fortunately, in spite of this; no major incident has been taken place. It should not allow complacency to set in. We must bring pressure on government through requisite forum to fast track the setting up of NIA, NCTC and NATGRID to give impetus to intelligence coordination and assessment at National level. Political will and an end to turf wars will bring greater cohesion and innovative thinking.

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).