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March 04, 2011 |  | By Dr Monika Chansoria | ||
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As West Asia continues to be on a political simmer, the ripple effects of the ‘Jasmine fever’ are far from being over, with nations such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya falling prey in quick succession. The populist revolutions have not only managed to uproot/shake the decades-old despotic regimes in the said countries, but also appears to be altering existing power equations in the Arab world in particular and West Asia in general. A nation which undoubtedly is keeping the closest tab on these developments as they unfold rapidly is the Islamic Republic of Iran. An apparent manifestation of the changing strategic goalposts became visible recently when two Iranian warships were allowed to pass through the Suez Canal by the new Egyptian military leadership, for the first time ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979. This is clear indication of the fact that that the rumblings in the Arab world stoked by the ‘Jasmine revolution’ seem to be taking a Shia-Sunni twist, with an aggressive Shia posturing towards a quest for superior regional influence. Iran is clearly looking at an increasing and more prominent role for itself in the region, as it senses the shrinking regional influence of Saudi Arabia amidst the recent turn of events. The ouster of the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, discontent in Jordan and the struggle of King Abdullah to keep it under control and protests in the Kingdom of Bahrain are all indicators of the shrinking influence of Saudi Arabia. By virtue of this chain effect, the Saudi regime is likely to be under pressure amidst Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen—countries which remain pretty volatile in itself. Significantly, the bigger apprehension among the region and its players is that whilst Iran is keeping an eagle’s eye on the ongoing political turmoil in every nook and corner of the region, it would not let go of even the remotest possibility of extending its sphere of influence given the current volatility of the situation. This would especially hold true in providing support towards clamping authority of radical groups like the Hamas and Hezbollah which have deep penetrations into the political corridors of Lebanon, Iraq and with a new set up in line, even in Egypt. Iran, however, cannot afford to be all complacent about these developments in West Asia primarily because its repressive policies could become a serious source of discord and dissonance for its own internal stability. The power struggle among the ruling conservatives in Iran is already out in the open with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s decision to fire Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. Depicting bitter power play in the political corridors of Tehran, President Ahmadinejad sought to delay signing legislations passed by the Iranian parliament, an apparent attempt to signal that it is he alone who holds primacy in Iran’s multi-layered political system. An existential pragmatic conservative bloc within the Iranian polity consisting of leaders like Ali Larijani and Mottaki has often blamed the radical agenda being pursued by President Ahmadinejad for Iran’s isolation and consequent susceptibility. While it addresses incessant domestic issues such as a troubled economy, growing unemployment and political opposition to what is being described as dictatorial and tyrannical form of governance, the Iranian leadership already has its plate full with domestic issues to contend with. The recent revolutionary demonstrations all across West Asia are only going to raise alarm bells for the Ahmadinejad administration—lucidly manifested in the form of protests by thousands of Iranians in the past week at Tehran’s Revolution Avenue. In what could be interpreted as a cautious and precautionary move by the Iranian regime, two key opposition leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karroubi have been placed under house arrest, thus showing the wariness in Tehran and that the Ahmadinejad government does not seem to be leaving anything to chance, which could be a potential trigger to unrest and protests in Iran. The tightening of President Ahmadinejad’s hold over Iran and the conservative radical tenor of his administration could prove detrimental for his support base within the country. Even the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has come out in condemnation of President Ahmadinejad over recent comments in which he proclaimed that the Iranian parliament was not on top as far as managing the country’s affairs were concerned—labelled as an offence to the thought and ideals of Iran’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Ahmadinejad’s condemnation by the IRGC is believed to have the backing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is attempting to clip Ahmadinejad’s wing and provide some sort of an offset to the President through the IRGC. Given that Ahmadinejad’s fundamentalist ambitions do not seem to be going down very well with the Guards, the recent statements only seem to reflect that Ahmadinejad’s support base within the IRGC is fast eroding. Therefore, realism that the absence of a united reformist group, by and large represented by Mir Hossein Mousavi helps Ahmadinejad to pursue his agenda unabated is confronted with an equally forceful reality that fissures within the conservative hardline factions are simultaneously beginning to appear. And the populace in Iran might just get up and unite against what they would describe as a “call for change”. For President Ahmadinejad to infer his “victory” at the ballot box in 2009 as a vindication of his policies and hardline position on a range of issues, could now face the ultimate litmus test in a West Asia that finds itself embroiled in ground-breaking events unfolding so swiftly, that it is hard to keep track of. The question remains, whether the tulip would do the same for Iran, what the jasmine did to Tunisia?
(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies). | ||||||||
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