Pakistan's Decline

It has become difficult to identify positive trend lines in Pakistan, where growing nuclear stockpiles provide no protection against bad governance and great misfortune. Two positive indicators in recent years were a vigorously free media and the lawyers’ movement that prompted the departure of the last military ruler who stayed too long, Pervez Musharraf.  These hopeful developments now appear in a different light.  Many media outlets constantly drip poison into Pakistan’s political bloodstream.  Progressive voices are few in number and under great strain.  Lawyers do not leap to the task of prosecuting Muslim assassins and those who plan bomb blasts in markets and mosques. The central government fails badly at delivering public services.

The country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, rightly complained that England bequeathed Pakistan a moth-eaten state due to its odd geographical boundaries. Rampant corruption eats away at what’s left of the state’s fabric, most evocatively in the detention of the former Minister of Religious Affairs, Hamid Saeed Kazmi.  Kazmi, a member of President Asif Ali Zadari’s party, is accused of ripping off pilgrims during the Hajj.

Pakistan’s strategic culture feeds on grievances and threat inflation.  Its political culture has devolved into little more than point scoring and deflecting responsibility. The case of the recently released Raymond Davis, alleged robbery victim turned deadly avenger, fuses all of the above.  U.S.-Pakistan ties are worst I can recall in almost two decades of visits, and are likely to deteriorate further.  Washington is enmeshed in counter-productive tactics in pursuit of a muddled strategy, as is evident by the drone attacks on Pakistani soil along the Afghan border.

Will Pakistan go the way of Tunisia and Egypt? There is, after all, a demographic time bomb happening in Pakistan as in other Muslim countries. Young people have many reasons for bitter resentment.  And still, Pakistanis persevere. An off-the-books economy keeps the country going, even though inflation is above 15% and rising, few pay taxes, and the avoidance of hard choices is foreclosing economic growth and foreign investment.

Almost everyone consulted on a recent trip (admittedly a very narrow sampling) dismissed the possibility of a popular revolt.  The only well defined unifying national impulse is dissatisfaction with the status quo; almost everything else – including the role of religion in the state – divides.  There are many outlets to let off steam.  Stifling autocracy isn’t the problem in Pakistan: different governments, civilian and military, have been tried. Governments change after failing, but familiar faces and terrible problems endure. Mass protests in Pakistan are usually not spontaneous. Catalytic, nation-wide protests would make it very hard for any government to keep the country stitched together.

Pakistani military officers told me that, like their Egyptian brethren, they would refuse to fire on protesters. Presently, it seems unlikely that they would face this dilemma.  There appears to be widespread resignation, not anger, directed at the current government, and recognition that there are no quick and simple answers to the country’s plight.  Pakistan feels to this outsider like a country in depression, not on the brink of upheaval.  Then again, I’m in no position to sense a bottom-up revolution in Pakistan.

Might this mood of depression pave the way for a government led by religious extremists? Voting blocks in Pakistan tend to be very well defined, although as a result of the current rot, voting preferences might change.  As is evident from the current government’s back-peddling on reforming the blasphemy law, religious zealots have less of a need to assume high office: even if religious parties remain a distinct minority, they have good reason to believe that the authorities will not push back against their favored causes. Extremism in the defense of Pakistan is becoming less of a vice.

Many groups are well armed in Pakistan.  Some fight each other.  Some fight U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some fight and do deals with the Pakistan military.  Some, most notably Laskhar-e-Toiba, remain linked to the security apparatus, serving as unconventional reserves in the event of a war with India – a war that the LeT might spark by attacking iconic targets on Indian soil.  With the renewal of Indo-Pakistan dialogue and the possibility of modest agreements, the likelihood of another high-profile attack within India grows, especially if the Pakistan Army leadership opposes meaningful steps toward normalization.  India is the proud possessor of three new airports in New Delhi, Hyderabad and Bangalore. They are poorly secured, and there are many other targets to choose from.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center.

A longer version of this essay appeared on armscontrolwonk.com

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).