Recalibrating India�s Afghan Gamble

Much has been written about India’s subtle attempts at a slow recalibration of its Afghan policy, edged on in particular by the decision at the London Conference to reconcile elements from the Taliban in Kabul’s power structure and an acknowledgement of Pakistan’s central role in the process. What has accentuated New Delhi’s worries is the fragile character of the Afghan state institutions, which it fears could buckle under diverse pressures, as the date for a phased scaling down of foreign troop presence nears. The most significant manifestation of a recalibration underway in the opinion of several strategic analysts has been the recent reinvigoration of ties at the ministerial level with Tehran.

However it would be naïve on New Delhi’s part to assume that it could rekindle its alliance with Tehran, Moscow and the Central Asian Republics (CAR) in the Afghan gamble. Over the past decade both the rules as well as players of the game have undergone many changes. First, the erstwhile Northern Alliance, backed by India, Iran, Russia and the CAR, appears fragmentary and lacks a politico-military leader of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s stature. Furthermore, recent reports indicate that a few key commanders of the Jamiat-i-Islami—a key constituent of the alliance—who were not suitably accommodated in the government have defected to the Taliban. Second, the insurgency has acquired momentum in Northern Afghanistan not merely through the recruitment of local Pushtuns in the region but also a slow but steady increase in the rank and file of non-Pushtun recruits in regions such as Takhar and Badakshan once considered impregnable fortresses of the the Northern Alliance. It should also be borne in mind that over course of its ascent to power, the Taliban did strike deals with a number of local strongmen from ethnic minorities and in fact was confident enough, in some instances, to garrison Tajiks not just in non-Pushtun areas but also in Pushtun provinces such as Paktia. Thus, policy stalwarts in the South Block and strategic circles might find it worthwhile to revisit their conception of the Taliban as a Pushtun dominated, fundamentalist movement. Third, there has been a qualitative shift in India’s relations with Washington over the last decade, which has had a bearing on India’s equation with Tehran. Despite public posturing to signal cordiality in relations, the trust deficit between India and Iran has persisted, perhaps widened following India’s vote against Iran’s nuclear programme.

India’s entry as a non-permanent member into the United Nations Security Council—and aspirations to eventually graduate to a permanent status—is likely to exacerbate its dilemma in dealing with Tehran. New Delhi would be expected to take clear and firm stand on a range of issues—nuclear; human rights to situations requiring ratification of military intervention—which could potentially further unsettle relations. It must also be remembered that in spite of cooperation on Afghanistan, it has hardly been a smooth sail. First, Tehran or elements in the state apparatus have sought to back the Taliban—a tactical manoeuvre likely to be pursued so long as the US retains a military presence in Afghanistan and Tehran’s relations with the West remain strained. Second, the North-South trade corridor which was developed jointly, to bypass Pakistan, as an alternate access route to both Afghanistan and Central Asia has till date not quite realised its potential, owing in large measure to political inertia on both sides.

While rekindling old alliances and public posturing on Afghanistan with Tehran would provide New Delhi with a potential bargaining option vis-à-vis Washington’s Afghan strategy, marked by a seemingly growing accommodation of Islamabad’s demand to whittle down Indian influence in Afghanistan. However this by itself will not help New Delhi get very far. There is a need to display much greater dexterity if India wishes to remain a player of some consequence in the Afghan endgame.

To begin with, India needs to moderate its rhetorical and rigid position of non-negotiation with any elements from the Taliban. Its current stance defies political realities as they exist. India’s own experiences in tackling insurgencies of various ideological hues should help foster greater reflection on the issue. Second, it must engage with and cultivate consequential players outside the rank and file of both the Kabul government and the erstwhile Northern Alliance. Third, India must also factor in limitations on the leverages it wields in the Afghanistan—a point poignantly underscored by President Hamid Karzai’s statement, “India is a close friend of Afghanistan but Pakistan is a brother of Afghanistan. Pakistan is a twin brother ... we're conjoined twins”. Given Rawalpindi’s seminal role in mediating dialogue between Afghan Taliban and the Kabul government, coupled with Afghanistan’s high degree of economic integration and dependence on Pakistan as well as cross ethnic linkages squeeze space for significant political manoeuvre by Kabul  vis-à-vis Pakistan.

While India has succeeded in cultivating and perhaps even expanding to an extent, constituencies of goodwill in Afghanistan, what it now needs is to demonstrate greater imagination in transforming this into political leverage. For this to fructify, New Delhi needs to broaden the scope of political engagement and imagination which would entail thinking beyond cobbling together old alliances.

Raghav Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany and Research Analyst, Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, Kabul

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).