Jasmine Revolution: Bahrain the Test Case

The so-called ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in the Middle East, which has impacted the popular perception of the Western World, particularly amongst the uninformed, seems to have hit a roadblock in Bahrain. Ironically, in India too, the revolution has caught the imagination of some people, who tend to see international events in black and white.

The sincerity of the West, particularly the US, with regard to the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ is on test in Bahrain and by extension to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and UAE have deployed 1000 and 500 personnel respectively to Bahrain under the banner of Gulf Cooperation Council. Interestingly, the UAE has committed to deploy 12 aircraft in support of the NATO to patrol the No Fly Zone over Libya. Incidentally, none of these countries have any democratic credentials.

Bahrain accentuates the strategic importance of the Gulf Region and falls in Shia Sunni fault line. The vital strategic interests of the US are at stake in the region. If the US and its allies in the region cannot calibrate the developments, there will be far reaching geopolitical consequences in the region and impact on the global energy security, particularly India.

It is therefore imperative that the dynamics of the region as such with particular reference to Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is put in perspective.
Bahrain, the 665 sq km island nation, located centrally with respect to the Arab part of the Gulf region is an ideal location for force projection in terms of air and naval power. Its strategic location in the Persian Gulf is such that it commands the sea-lanes of communication through which the region’s sea-borne petroleum exports must transit. It is for this reason that the US has maintained a strong naval presence in the country since 1949. Military bases provided by Bahrain were crucial for the conduct of the Gulf Wars by the US led coalition, both in 1991 and 2003.

On the other hand, Bahrain’s small size and large neighbours also engender a strategic vulnerability. Sunni rulers have traditionally ruled this Shia majority country. Ironically, oil reserves, discovery of which in 1932, vested Bahrain with its importance, are now past their prime, forcing Bahrain to diversify its economy in other areas like international banking and petroleum refining.

Amongst the regional maritime powers in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain has historically felt most threatened by Iran, which was the main reason that prompted it to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This threat perception is not without reason. The recent deployment of GCC troops has been vehemently opposed by Iran. It may be mentioned that the Shia factor exerts an Iranian pull on Bahrain. Iran has often laid claim to Bahrain based on historical arguments.

Even though Shia Muslims constitute 70 per cent of the population, they are severely under-represented in the Armed Forces. There have been resentments at subterranean levels over the perceived socio-religious discrimination amongst the Shia population. The government has tried to bridge the Shia-Sunni cleavage by appointing Shias to a number of ministries and senior civil-service posts, although generally not in security related positions.
 
The discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932, caused the economic, social and geo-political metamorphosis of that part of the Gulf Region, which today constitutes the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. It was oil, which was responsible for setting geographical limits of each of these countries. Until the discovery of oil, these states were without fixed frontiers and boundaries in which various Arab tribes felt loyalty to the tribe or Sheikh and roamed across the Arabian Desert according to the needs of their flock. Organised authority was confined to ports and oases. The tribal chiefs i.e. the Sheikhs are the present day rulers of these relatively nascent countries.

Historically, Britain exercised a protectorate over each of these states. After World War II due to severe economic constraints, Britain had to bequeath many of its strategic interests to the US and abandoned its protectorate commitments in 1971. The Bedouin mooring of these countries is rather strong and is evidenced in their dress, customs, and most importantly political institutions. The countries combined with Saudi Arabia to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981.

Even though Islam plays a dominant role in each of the Sheikhdoms, it provides only a tenuous unifying link. These countries represent a collage of various shades of Islam. While Kuwait and Bahrain are characterised by a greater secular influence than the other states, the puritanical Wahhabi Sunni sect prevails in Qatar. Bahrain has a majority population of Shias and the people of Oman represent primarily a minor sect within Shia Islam, the Ibadi.

In the face of the Iranian revolution in 1979, all these states experienced fears for their security. These apprehensions led to the formation of the GCC together with Saudi Arabia in 1981. The limitations of the GCC were exposed during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The GCC members did provide generous moral and financial support but the military support was inherently inadequate.

Consequent to the military intervention by the US-led coalition by way of ‘Operation Desert Shield’ to protect the other GCC countries from further Iraqi onslaught, and subsequently, ‘Operation Desert Storm’ to evict Iraq from Kuwait; these countries realised that the GCC alone could not guarantee their security.

The strategic equations altered drastically after the war. Most of the GCC countries developed intimate defence relationships with the US. These countries signed new military agreements with the US in the wake of the Gulf War.

The period following the 1991 Gulf War also witnessed hectic arms purchases by the GCC countries from western sources. In some measure, strategically and logistically, the stage for a US-led coalition attack on Iraq in 2003 was already in place. The map of the southern part of the Persian Gulf is presently dotted with US presence in terms of troops and other military facilities. Some of the important US bases are Camp Doha in Kuwait, Camp Sayliyah and Al Udeid in Qatar, Manama and Sheikh Isa in Bahrain, Seeb and Masirah in Oman, and Al Dhafra and Fujairah in the UAE.

All the GCC countries are characterised by dispensations based on ruling families such as Al Sabah in Kuwait, Al Khalifa in Bahrain, Al Thani in Qatar, Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, Al Nuaimi in Ajman, Al Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, Al Muktum in Dubayy, Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, Al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn and Al Said in Oman. The heads of state of these countries, with the exception of Oman where the ruler bears the title of Sultan, are called Sheikhs, and owe their position to their leadership of various tribes, which are settled in different areas. The low population base of these countries precludes the formation of effective Armed Forces.

In the absence of proper democratic institutions and political culture, the ruling families in each of these countries hold the most important cabinet posts and governmental appointments. The indigenous population of these countries is rather low and the majority of the work force is made up of foreigners.

The main threats to the smaller Gulf countries emanate from their larger neighbours and Islamic fundamentalists who are fiercely antagonistic towards the ruling dispensations on religious grounds. The threats posed to these countries cannot possibly be overcome individually or even collectively. However miniscule the smaller Gulf countries may be, the destabilisation of any one of them can flare up into a crisis of international dimensions, given the criticality of the Persian Gulf for global energy security.

RSN Singh is Associate Editor, Indian Defence Review (IDR)

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).