Need for a Chief of Defence Staff: It is unavoidable under the circumstances

There is timelessness about administrative reforms in India, which transcends the familiar cliché that all bureaucracies are conservative, but defence bureaucracies are the most conservative and resistant to change. India’s defence decision-making apparatus was inherited from the British. But they established several commissions of inquiry after World War II to review and reform their defence establishment. By tradition the recommendations made by Royal Inquiry Commissions are generally accepted and implemented. Not so in India, where the reports of Administrative Reforms Commissions, Commissions of Inquiry, Task Forces, Groups of Ministers and so on are treated as suggestions for the government’s consideration. Their reports are straightaway sent for comments to the very authorities that are to be reformed.

Little wonder that they have a loathing to change and find reforms to be anathema. Procrastination, therefore, is their first line of defence, followed by objections, preferably one at a time, to delay implementation. It is not surprising, since the bureaucracy is programmed to find a problem for every solution. The political leadership lacks commitment and is happy to let the difficult issues that underlie reforms to linger without decision. Therefore, these destitute reports languish until the efflux of time consigns them to gather dust in capacious cupboards.

These sad realities of the reform process in the sphere of defence were aired once again in a conference held recently in New Delhi. The occasion was the passage of a decade since the Group of Ministers (GoM) submitted their report to the Union Cabinet in 2001. The GoM was established by the Union Cabinet on the receipt of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report in August 1999. It would be recollected that the KRC was constituted immediately after the Kargil conflict ended to deflect national criticism that India’s armed forces were caught by surprise by the Pakistani intruders; only the valour and self-sacrifice of their younger officers had countered this failure of intelligence. Following the receipt of the KRC Report four GoMs were set up to study and make appropriate recommendations on intelligence, border management, internal security and defence.

Mercifully, no recommendations emerged from this conference to embarrass those who shall be arranging the next conference. Blame attribution too — civilians on the military, military on the civilians, and both civilians and the military on the political leadership — was kept to the bare minimum. A conscious effort was made to concentrate on the glass half-full rather than draw attention to the half-empty glass. This helped in reaching the unexceptional conclusion that much had been done, but much also remained to be done.

The centre-piece of the GoM Report on Defence, chaired by Mr Arun Singh, was its recommendation that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should be appointed to represent the collective views of the three Services, and provide single-point advice to the political leadership. He would also seek closer integration between the Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters, while simultaneously promoting “jointness” within the armed forces. Additionally, the CDS, assisted by a Vice-CDS, would directly administer the joint commands for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and nuclear forces, coordinate planning activities and so on. Something has, without doubt, been done in all these directions, but these efforts remain half-hearted and sub-optimal. For instance, an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) organisation has been set up within the Ministry of Defence, but its linkages with the ministry and Services Headquarters remain tenuous. The belief is rife that a posting in the IDS is only a stop-gap appointment before a more worthwhile posting becomes available. Similarly, “jointness” was designed to ensure effective combined arms operations. Little has been done, however, towards developing a joint operational doctrine, training and planning programmes, or even the culture to permit all this to happen.

Incidentally, the CDS was recommended by the GoM to replace the current Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), who is the senior-most among the Chiefs of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. This position rotates between the three Service Chiefs in terms of their seniority; in consequence, the Chairman, COSC, has no fixed tenure. In the matter of functioning, the Chairman, COSC, is only the first among equals, and is less than effective in dealing with the political leadership. Dark suspicions are voiced in the Services that the civilian bureaucracy has perpetuated this situation to keep the Services divided and unable to jointly represent the armed forces.

But this is an exaggeration, which became abundantly clear in the conference with the Indian Air Force strenuously voicing its objections to the CDS system. Their objections have a long history and have been traced back to the doubts expressed by Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal in the early seventies. These objections derive from a long-standing angst in the Air Force and the Navy that a CDS from the Army would be insensitive to their interests since they are much smaller Services. On the other hand, the Army believes that a CDS from either the Navy or the Air Force would hardly carry any conviction since the strength of the India Army is roughly four times that of the other two Services combined. The great wonder is that this debate has continued for nearly four decades without reaching any conclusion.

It is rumoured that a second Group of Ministers may soon be discussing these issues. This is a welcome move. No reform process can succeed unless it is periodically reviewed to take stock of what has been accomplished and why what remains unaddressed has not been done. Hopefully, this GoM will address the paradox that only military or ‘hard’ security issues were considered by the first GoM, whereas non-military and human security issues have gained ascendancy over the last decade. Instrumentalities are important for security exercises to reach fruition; hence, the imperative need for a Chief of Defence Staff to advise on and implement national security decisions. Without a CDS India would be hoping to stage Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.

PR Chari is former DG, IDSA

Courtesy: The Tribune, 28 May 2011

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110528/edit.htm#4

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).