inter alia implosion-type’ nuclear warheads. Pakistan uses weapons grade uranium; it is trying to set up facilities now to obtain plutonium for its nuclear weapons. Some doubts must, therefore, attend Pakistan’s claims that its Hatf IX Nasr low-yield battlefield nuclear missiles are operational, unless China has provided Pakistan with the relevant warheads. Pakistan has declared that any attack by India across the India-Pakistan border would result in a nuclear riposte. Thereby, Pakistan is conveying that, being the weaker power, it would meet the challenge of superior Indian conventional forces with nuclear weapons, using theHatf IX Nasr in a battlefield mode. Of course, it could also utilize longer-range nuclear missiles. In truth, the distinction drawn between tactical and strategic missiles is quite artificial and meaningless in the South Asian context, given the proximity of ‘lucrative’ targets in either country to trans-border attack. It remains unclear, however, whether Pakistan has evaluated the likely Indian reaction during conflict to its using theHatf IX Nasr’ retaliation. Therefore, beliefs in Pakistan that an India-Pakistan conflict initiated with tactical nuclear weapons will remain limited in terms of time or space or weaponry is quite naive. Pakistan probably hopes that shifting the burden of escalation on India is a smart move since it would not risk moving up the ladder of nuclear conflict due to the risk of escalation. In that sense Pakistan probably also believes that a nuclear conflict can be fought and also won, fuelling the angst that South Asia has become a nuclear tinder-box. However, Islamabad should remind itself of General Musharraf’s miscalculation in 1999 when he initiated the cross-LoC intrusions that started the Kargil conflict, but ended in a humiliating military-diplomatic disaster for Pakistan.
P.R.Chari is Visiting Professor at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,New Delhi
Views expressed are personal
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