Secure, govern and develop

Last year, these days in April saw animated discussions in the media and the press on the right strategy to be followed to tackle the Naxal menace in the aftermath of the annihilation of a CRPF foot column of seventy two troopers. 

 

Which of the three - security, governance or development - should come first engaged the pundits' minds. The debates remained largely inconclusive, although most were inclined to put development first in the event that all three could not take place, simultaneously. 

 

In a country as vast as India and given that huge swathes of land (approximately, 240 districts) are still in Naxal sphere of influence, it is wellnigh impossible for any government to muster adequate resources to achieve the ideal end-state in one simultaneous application of security, governance and development in all or most affected districts. So, the logic of the debate, as to which of the three should come first, remains cogent. 

 

In another scenario, this debate has been clinched in Afghanistan with an overwhelming vote for security to precede everything else. Although, there are no-onesize- fits- all strategies and insurgencies are each unique in their own environment, an article by Dr Mark Moyar , 'Development In Afghanistan Counter Insurgency: A New Guide' contains a few pearls of wisdom for our own counter insurgency efforts against the Naxals. 

 

Alluding to a seminal conference of experts, researchers, analysts and those who have spent time on the ground in Afghanistan, held recently at Sussex Downs , England, the author's deductions are relevant to the Indian context, as well. 

 

Some of the lessons learnt are: one, for the population, whether to support the insurgent or not, the key driver is security, governance comes second and development third ; two, support for the government increases with improved security, less sharply with improved governance and very little when development increases; three, by doing a better job than the government in making the population feel more secure, the insurgent is able to control more territory; four, where security and governance are effective, development does help the government significantly; and five, development without security and governance made the government more disliked by the people. 

 

In our context, we have known for long that there is an insurgent-bureaucrat-politician nexus which siphons off development money. This accounts for a key reason why the Naxal insurgency has flourished for as long as it has. Money so appropriated fills up the financial coffers of the insurgent which is then able to purchase arms and ammunition, rations and equipment and carry out recruitment. 

 

The corrupt officials who leech themselves on to such development money make the people turn away from the government and thus get sucked into the folds of the insurgent. Absent a credible security grid, both the contractors and officials executing development projects will remain at the mercy of the insurgent and the people will suffer. The key lesson, therefore, is that it is better to have no development where there is no security rather than to have development in the absence of security. 

 

In the year gone by since Dantewada happened , India has, by and large, muddled along with no clear-eyed strategy. For one, the central government has identified Naxalaffected districts for special financial allocations. It is hoped that these funds will be used in step with increasing security in these areas, absent which, it will be another exercise in futility. 

 

For another, some kind of military presence has been effected in Chhattisgarh with the army acquiring a 'training profile' with an ongoing debate on 'rules of engagement'. There have been some statements by CRPF 'brainers' that they will act only on specific intelligence. At the operational/ tactical level these are worthy 'battle' parameters. But it is hoped that this tactics will be adopted after a given area is flushed of Naxal presence. 

 

Allowing them to flourish in 'undisturbed sanctuaries' and yet maintaining an operational doctrine of actions on hard intelligence will only allow the Naxals to remain entrenched and undisturbed in their safe havens. Be that as it may, looking forward, the government machinery will hopefully craft a meaningful strategy to reach a credible end-state against the Naxals. Security and governance will deliver development and prosperity. 

 

That will be the way to lift millions out of poverty. That will be the way to save our governments' billions falling into wrong hands. Maybe, just maybe, there are bad days ahead for the corrupt and the Naxals who thrive on the money meant for the people but which hardly reaches them. 

 

The way to make the Naxals moribund is clear. It is for the government and the people to make the choice. Security first and good governance second is the way ahead. 

 

 

Courtesy: The Economic Times, 18 June 2011

 

 

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)