The return of terror

Three bomb explosions in South Mumbai on 13 July marked the return of Mumbai’s dalliance with terror that has haunted the city since 1993. The peak hour explosions in packed market places left 20 dead and more than 120 injured.

The pattern of the blasts, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) packed with ammonium nitrate and ball bearings, alarm clocks/mobile phone alarm as triggering mechanism, and near-simultaneous explosions in crowded areas during rush hour resemble the pattern of similar serial blasts orchestrated by the Pakistan-trained terrorist outfit Indian Mujahideen (IM) in the year 2008 and serial blasts across Uttar Pradesh since 2007.  A marked difference this time, however, has been the absence of any e-mail to media organisations claiming responsibility for the blasts. Also, the electronic sweep of mobile phone communication and other electronic chatter in the immediate aftermath of the blasts have not revealed any concrete lead. The perpetrators of the blasts have learnt from past mistakes and have refrained from using electronic communication devices to avoid detection by Intelligence agencies. A large number of IM operatives were arrested post the series of explosions across the country in 2008 due to interception of their e-mail and mobile phone chatter. Another difference this time has been the use of TNT and fuel oil along with ammonium nitrate in preparing the cocktail of the explosives.

It may be recalled that the IM primarily consists of Indian youth affected by the post-Godhra riots of Gujarat, followed by a sizeable presence of alienated muslim youth from Eastern Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh (primarily areas adjoining Indore and Ujjain), Karnataka and Kerala. The IM led by former SIMI member, Riyaz Bhatkal and Amir Reza draws heavily from the cadre base of the now banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The initial batch of close to 200 Indian youth of IM was closely trained by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan and POK. These men were trained in basic handling of firearms, explosives and evasion skills to avoid detection by security agencies. Subsequently, these men recruited more local Indian youth and passed on their training skills to them. A series of training modules were also held in the forested areas of Karnataka, Gujarat and Jammu & Kashmir between the years 2007 and 2009. The IM enjoys close operational links with the Bangladesh based HuJI. It is believed that the top IM leadership of the Bhatkal brothers and Amir Reza are based in Karachi. IM was founded by the ISI to give an ‘indigenous’ tinge to the terrorist attacks in India and in this it has somewhat succeeded as it has managed to draw a proportion of disgruntled muslim youth into the folds of the IM. Since 2007, at least 200 people have been killed in explosions attributed to the IM.

Use of Indian operatives and locally available explosive substances help minimize the risk of detection on the land borders. It also absolves Pakistan of any blame for the attacks. More so, use of IEDs without military grade explosives like RDX is a low-cost option to ‘bleed India with a thousand cuts’. Although Indian operatives carry out the blasts, the directions are received from the IM leadership based in Pakistan.

The IEDs were placed under an umbrella, on a scooter and on top of a bus stand. Preliminary analysis of CCTV footage at Zaveri Bazar have identified a man moving suspiciously for at least three hours before the explosion took place. Initial reports also suggest that the explosives were ferried from a location in Karnataka and placed in a safe house in Mumbai before being planted at the site of the explosions. All this suggests that a module of at least 2-3 persons were involved in placing a single IED,with at least one used for reconnisance, one ensuring safe passage of the bomber and the third being the perpetrator himself. Therefore, at least 12-15 persons in the least would be involved in placing the three IEDs. Add to this, the number involved in procuring the explosives, assembling the IEDs and then transporting them to Mumbai,the entire operation would have required the involvement of no less than 30-40 people. It is being suspected that the bombers had crossed the borders from Nepal and or Bangladesh to reach Mumbai. The use of a safe-house, spotters and recce-party at the blast locations indicate the involvement of a local module which provided reception to the actual bomb-planters.

Post 26/11, the Maharashtra Government raised an ‘elite’ Counter-terrorist force called ‘Force One’ to counter a fire-assault attack by terrorists. However, such reactionary measures as the use of Quick Reaction Teams (QRT), armour cars, etc proved futile in the instant case as these can never prevent terror and can come in useful only after certain amount of casualties have already occured. Given the burgeoning profile of population and infrastructural development of India’s mega cities, terrorists would prefer the low-cost option of IED explosions. It is easier to infiltrate cities and mingle in a high population density neighbourhood with migrant population.

Therefore, it would be prudent for the Government to invest in low-cost measures such as raising the awareness levels of the citizenry, investing more in human intelligence resources at the local level and improving inter-operability of the myriad intelligence agencies such as the IB, R&AW, MI, NTRO, JIC, State level IBs and the police agencies like the state CID, ATS and Crime Branch. The establishment of SMACs at the state level should hasten this process. Agencies like the NIA also come into play only after an incident has occurred. Their functioning is also hampered due to lack of cooperation with and  resources at the state level.

In this day and age of terror, the common man has to be ever vigilant and take care of his own security instead of looking over the shoulder for the state to secure them. The police to population ratio of India’s metropolitan cities is in any well below the UN mandated 222 policemen per 100000 population. In the time frame that the bombs were planted and activated thousands of people would have passed through the target sites. And yet neither the people nor the scores of CCTVs could find anything suspicious.  All this point towards a general disinclination towards basic security consciousness among the urban population in India. Low-cost and micro-level measures would be more effective than wasting resources on procurement of armour vehicles for police forces and raising so-called ‘Police Commando units’. For countering a fire-assault attack by terrorists specialised forces like the NSG and units of the Army are stationed all across the country and could be deployed in the same time-frames as these police units.

Finally, the Government as is evident from the blasts, is still grappling with an effective response policy to terror attacks. The murmurs of ‘punitive strikes’ always come to a naught after an attack actually takes place. Also, ‘retribution’ will be an option on the table only after the casualty figures in a terrorist attack is sizeable.

As the news of the 13/7 blasts were trickling in, I along with a friend were enjoying a quiet stroll among whispering pines in a military station close to the Indo-Pak border. Going by the initial frenzy of reporting one assumed that the scale of casualties from the blasts would have been enormous and wondered whether finally, India would retaliate with punitive strikes at least in POK. As the mountain air became crisper with the passing hours, a general alert was sounded with the Battalion’s adjutant ordering out the mobile station QRT generating the only frenzy. Yes, life goes on in a rapidly emerging India but it is high time the Government took a hard look on its post-attack response options. The terrorists have tested the waters once again post 26/11 with no response. Maybe just the beginning of attacks all over India as in 2008 and even earlier. Maybe the terrorists have probed the Indian state threshold level yet again.

Rohit Singh is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).