China�s Political Propaganda Campaign in Tibet

Firstly, in an obvious attempt to score a political point, Beijing’s handpicked 11th Panchen Lama arrived at the Labrang Monastery situated in a town named Xiahe, situated in the north-western Gansu Province in August 2011. Given the heavy Chinese police presence and security cover around him, the arrival was reported to have caused much uneasiness among the local monks. According to sources, the presence of troops outside Labrang Monastery included hundreds of armed police coupled with surveillance cameras set up all around the palace.

 

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made every effort to raise the profile and acceptability of its chosen candidate, Gyaltsen Norbu, ever since 1995. In fact, while covering events during the visit, China’s state-run media reported that Gyaltsen Norbu had “expressed satisfaction with the degree of religious freedom enjoyed by people in the region.” Having spent a considerable faction of his life in Beijing, Gyaltsen Norbu has been appointed to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference— one of China’s highest political bodies. The motive behind the visit of the Chinese Panchen Lama is a broad understanding within the cadres of the CCP that a stint at one of the prominent monasteries would result in greater acceptability and legitimacy.

 

The seat of the Panchen Lama is considered the second most significant religious figure in Tibetan Buddhism. As of today, the 1,000-strong Labrang monastery's loyalty rests with the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, chosen by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1995. Not much is known regarding the latest whereabouts of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, since he was whisked away by Chinese authorities under the garb of providing "protective custody" many years ago. The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile has urged the Chinese Government to show him to the international community and allow representatives to meet him. Moreover, the 17th Karmapa Lama, who presently resides in India following an escape from China way back in 2000, has expressed hope that the 11th Panchen Lama would be allowed to freely practice his spiritual role.

 

According to the Deputy Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, “…under Chinese control, Tibetans in Tibet are not even allowed to speak about human rights, let alone implementation of their basic rights.” This only further underscores the plight of Tibetans within Tibet as they struggle to survive amidst constant apprehension while being denied their basic rights to freedom of speech, expression, and to practice their religious faith.

 

The political contest vis-à-vis Tibetan future is only likely to intensify with newly-elected Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay asserting his resolve to reach out to the Chinese authorities to resolve the Tibetan issue peacefully, based upon "mutual interests.”

 

The second significant development comes in the form of appointment of the new Party Secretary of the CCP for the Tibet Autonomous Region. The person named for the position is Chen Quanguo, succeeding Zhang Qingli. Zhang has drawn considerable international limelight for his scornful remarks against the Dalai Lama. The despicable rhetoric included a statement wherein he described the Dalai Lama as "a wolf in monk's clothes, a devil with a human face” and that he was engaged in a "life and death struggle with the Dalai Lama.”

 

Being an economist by background, Chen might not come across as a hardliner like his predecessor, but this in no way should be interpreted as an indicator of a potential policy shift by Beijing on Tibet. The CCP’s larger game plan of securing its political and economic objectives in Tibet includes elaborate plans of completely integrating Tibet into the Chinese state and economy. The hardline policies put to practice under the reign of Zhang Qingli, sidelined the Tibetan elites in the region and further eroded Tibet's religious, cultural and national identity. The primary focus of Chinese government policy towards the TAR is making optimum use of the resource and mineral-rich region, including deposits of copper, gold, silver, electricity and water. Zhang’s tenure as Party Secretary wherein he managed absolute social and political control by virtue of his autocratic style of functioning was interpreted as an extension of the Chinese state policy to uphold political control of Tibet.

 

The future of Tibetans, in, and outside Tibet, remains precarious with the Politburo in Beijing well on its way to cement the structuring of its policy formulation and implementation by using the instrument of political extremism.

 

Dr Monika Chansoria is Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).