Book Review: Indian Army Vision 2020

“History has worked in reverse thanks to nuclear weapons, the days of large scale inter state wars if not over are in their death throes, in their place we will witness the rise of ‘crummy little wars fought by terrorists , bandits, guerillas, drug cartels and criminal networks.”        -Martin van Crevald

Finding the chapters in this book replete with quotes, it gladdened my heart to see that Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal had also included the one given above by Martin van Crevald! It is very apt.  The author sagely forecasts that given the Indian security environment, it is most likely that the next war will be fought in the high altitude terrain of the mountains, or to deal with terrorism and insurgency, the ‘crummy little wars’ of the quote. Having said that, it is painful to see the author labouring on the lumbering mechanised formations, heavy mobility brigades et al.

The United States is now keen on engaging India; albeit on its own terms. India does not have much choice in the present energy-security-driven global order.  It has to profitably engage with the US Administration in order to meet its quest for technology. The US is pandering to India’s ambitions to be the dominant player in South Asia and Indian Ocean Rim region, and in the bargain, hopes to derive mileage for its own interests of having a reliable, friendly, local gendarme in the region. In short, India is being built up as a regional super-power. It, therefore, needs a blue water navy, air bases, a strategic arsenal, a quick deployment strategic Special Forces’ contingent, and ample well-equipped straight-legged infantry on the lines of “intermediary force” for tackling the militants in an increasingly low intensity conflict type scenario.

The content of the book is reasonable and thought provoking, and Kanwal’s perceptions are deep and meaningful; his deductions are logical, and his recommendations seem to be based on reasoned conviction. However, this treatise, sadly, has the flat taste and pale fare of think-tank merchandise in India. Hence, only the dons will bother to take a look at it, or perhaps the Army Headquarters’ Perspective Planning Directorate, in passing. Foreign think tanks and centres of learning, would order in bulk, since everybody is looking at India, very closely now.

In this book, the writer evaluates the operational commitments that the Indian Army may face around AD 2020, and offers comparative studies of other foreign armies, including those of China and European countries. But China’s force levels can never be matched by India. With Pakistan, we have a near parity. The J&K imbroglio, and the boundary dispute with China appear to be on the back burner, and the bailiff ‘s dictum “possession is nine-tenths of the law” will hold good. Conventional war, in any case, has been ruled out since the end of history in Europe (Fukuyama) to be replaced by the more humane and civilized mode of conflict, cyber war. Hence, this part of the book may prove to be purely of academic interest. Gurmeet Kanwal’s recommendations and requirements for the modernization of the Indian Army, which is generally perceived by Western armed forces, ‘as a first rate army with second-rate equipment!’ are noteworthy. Even the army of an island mini- state like Fiji, has superior personal web-equipment for its soldiers! Unfortunately, the procurement/out-sourcing of modern war-fighting hardware in India is bedeviled by the shadow of Bofors/Scorpene scandals. These impact modernization.

The author stresses the importance of a ‘lethal, light and wired army’. This makes for good and sound military commonsense, except for the fact that, ‘getting wired’ is easier said than done. It is a cost-prohibitive proposition, except for a country like the United States that has ample funds for armaments, and a strong culture that is proud of its scientific temper, research and technological development. We may have the proven prowess, but it will take us time before we can reach anywhere near the Americans. For example, despite the recently demonstrated missile interception capability; the successful placing in orbit of ten satellites in quick succession using the PSLV; the Cartosats of world-quality for high resolution remote sensing, do we have even the most primitive digital maps of our immediate neighbourhood? If not, then whence the domination by the Brahmos cruises missiles; and the precision guided Prithvis & Agnis? The alternative solution will be tie-ups with US for technology transfers, or utilization of their resources, which unfortunately, the Indian Left will always vehemently oppose. Elsewhere, Kanwal highlights ‘jointness’, an aspect of paramount importance in counter militant operations within the country and when helping other friendly ones too.

Other authors who have written on the modernization of the Indian Army with a measure of authority and purpose are Generals Vijay Oberoi and V K Shrivastva (“ Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure and General Doctrine for Emerging Challenges”,& “Indian Army 2020: A Vision Statement on Strategy, and Capability”, respectively). These may be read for making a comparative analysis. However, Kanwal’s book is a veritable gold mine of opinion and thought on the modernization of the Indian Army and a must read for scholars and students alike.