They Just Did Not Stand and Stare, They Did and Dared

“In a battle use the normal forces to engage the enemy, and SF to win”…….Sun Tzu   

The operations of “Chindits” and Merrill’s Marauders behind Japanese lines in Burma during WW II, Israeli Defence Forces’ daring rescue from the Entebbe Airport, the Dieppe Raid of the Allies in WW II, the destruction of the Argentine Air Force aircraft on the ground itself on Goose Green by the British SAS during the Falk-Lands War, and the Green Berets foul up in Iran in their attempt to rescue hostages are some of the glaring successes/ failures of the Special Forces from recorded military history by recognized men in arms, undoubtedly; however, the most vivid, the most unforgettable, the most spectacular, and the one that reaped results beyond its expectations ( both positive and negative from both points of view) special operation, of course, must be the 9/11 Al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, which along with the damaging of the USS Cole can be considered to be instances of types of successful special ops by the non-state actors, surely! 9/11 changed the world-scene like nothing else did! Nothing is the same after the gross damage it inflicted on the psyche of the US neo-cons. The direct, brash and tactless US interventions in Afghanistan & Iraq are a fallout of the Twin-Towers episode .The US is stuck in mess and mire of its own making only, unfortunately, up to their necks. And the continued presence of American troops there, and in the Arab lands, is not making things any better, by the day; as also is not the prolonged incarceration of people picked up on mere suspicion and held without legal sanctions in Guantamo Bay. 

If the United Kingdom; under the fiery leadership of its War-time PM Winston Churchill; is considered to be the leader in raising and employment of Special Forces (SF) units, then the eccentric British Army Officer, Brig Orde Wingate can be easily termed as their Messiah. His WWII Chindits, and earlier Force Gideon in Palestine, and the Long Range Penetration Desert Group of the British 77 Armoured Brigade, are the fore-runners of modern-day SF units like the para-commandos, the MARCOS, the Garudas, the SFF, TF121, the Delta Force the Russian Spetsnaz, the Green Berets, the German GIGN and the GSG9, the Italian GIS, the famous SAS, the Rangers, the Israeli Sayeret Matkal and the assorted ‘do or die’ units the world over. In the Indian context, Major Meghdoot of the 1965 embryonic Meghdoot Force fame merits a glance definitely. It was the precursor to the Indian Army Para Commando battalions and the NSG Black Cats. Amongst the bear-trappers and Dragon’s fist can be counted the PLA’s Quantoou Budui and the Pakistani SSG units.

Essentially, SF units are elite, dedicated and especially tailored to undertake specific small scale surgical missions, they rely mostly on surprise, stealth and deception. Their main claim to existence is the belief, that, they yield success many fold the effort, with a comparably short casualty list. Hence, they are battle-winning assets par excellence. Their employment is generally complimentary to the main operations in a conventional war scenario; how ever; with the perception gaining ground by the day, that, conventional war per se is out of the question, and terrorism and counter-terrorism operations, in a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) environment, the name of the new power game, SF are bound to come center- stage on the global podium. Hence, the emphasis on their creation on a war-footing, so to say. Be that as it may, raising of such units involves long periods of training preceded by finicky selection of the manpower, which invariably and conveniently is made available by milking the regular units of their best talents, thereby depriving them of their cutting edge at the grass-roots level. This is counter-productive. Hence the controversy on the SF. They are also resource-heavy financially, which in a developing country like is an additional burden that is generally considered best gotten rid off by the politicians who hardly appreciate their true value. Like Winston Churchill in the UK, it was President John F Kennedy, who understood their crucial impact on wars and battles, hence backed them up every time, with good results.  

The main reason on which the SF gets to get shot down badly, is the belief, that, the SF-type tasks can be carried out even by regular infantry-like troops, hence the need for the SF is really not escapable. In this context Op Zebra is very relative example. It was undertaken by 19 Assam Rifles; a para-military unit, that I had the honour to successfully command in an active Counter Insurgency scenario, in Mizoram. This operation is still a case study in India’s Counter-Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) School. It is an excellent example of the unorthodox special mission. It shows abundantly, as to how even highly motivated regular troops/ soldiers of a para-military force, can be pressed into service to execute a difficult but pressing assignment. These boys displayed an extraordinary sense of initiative, resourcefulness, doggedness, and plain common sense to hound out and liquidate noted self-styled MNF military commanders (read “Pu Sanglaina’s Zebra’s” on www.itgo.com ). This small band of six intrepid pseudo Self Styled-‘MNF couriers’, but actually head-hunters, bagged one Kirti Chakra, two Shaurya Chakras and several commendations from the Army Chief and DG AR for this daring enterprise of theirs ! Be as it may, and not in any way discrediting the excellent show put up by 19 AR, it will not be prudent to expect run of the mill infantry units to conduct SF-type missions round the clock, a role which only the SF can fulfill. 

These, and many other issue related to the SF, are the content matter of this heavy tome, which essentially minutes a seminar on the issue, held in Nov 2004, which was organized under the aegis of the Centre for Land Air Warfare Studies (CLAWS), a newly conceived think tank headed by a former retired Vice Indian Army Chief : Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi. 

The accent on joint-ness dictates that all indigenous ‘forces’ and all the three armed forces contribute in the think-tank type deliberations on the doctrine of the SF. The new practice of regular exercises between the Indian SF and their opposite numbers of even countries like China, the US, UK and Israel is a trend, that, is heartening to note in the given global reach of the LIC ops & pin-pricks of the non-state actors. In this context, the recorded interjection by a Green Beret is a good sign that needs to be encouraged. Restructuring in the interest of joint-ness, in the Revolution in Military (RMA) mode & in parity with the hi-tech environment in equipment, is an option, not escapable. Finding Rs 700 crore out of a total allocation of 70, 000 crore to the defence budget on this score should be a pre-supposed wind-fall. 

SF considerably add to the preferences available to a military commander. At the national level these forces can be employed with great affect effecting situations which are politically vulnerable. Moreover, strategic focus of militaries will increasingly be on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. This implies that the nations will have to contend with LICs to include the sub-conventional modes of insurgency, militancy, and terrorism. Hence, It has been rightly evaluated that the 21st century is likely to be an era of “ fewer wars and more conflicts”. This dictates small scale ops and a very high degree of inter-agency cooperation and coordination. India’s interests will be best served by joint tri-service vertically integrated and centrally controlled command, which has the complete support at the highest level; therefore, HQs Integrated Defence Staff must have access to intelligence at the top most rung. 

The presentation of the approach papers is impressive and this is reflected in the very intensive inter-active session with the audience. Though the conclusions of this seminar remain the views of the think-tank, CLAWS, and not those of the AHQ or the other service HQs or even government policy, yet these are not far from it in core-content, no matter if it is officially and formally stated to be so in so many words. This needs to be examined in the light of the requirement to disseminate, on as strictly on a need to know basis. However, since the intention of publishing this book is to make information on the SF available to the general public, it would have been so much better in style, had Col Rathore gone in the for the narrative format; like Ops Sabharwal’s book on SF, titled, “ The Killing Instinct”, or the USI’s ‘Beyond The Bayonet’ by Deepak Sinha . At present, the book under review is merely a blow by blow transcription of the seminar’s minutes. It is rather long-winded, hence, also unwieldy and meandering; the lay reader will easily get bored, and put it away with out much ado. Close editing will make the content compact and easily digest-able by the man on the civvie street, besides, I doubt if he has the time or the inclination of reading droll text on the nitty-gritty of the SF. All that they want is a book easy on the senses, with the quick and thrilling impact of books like The Day of the Jackal, and The Bridge at Arhnem or movies like Rambo, Platoon and Guns of Navarrone, A Bridge on the River Kwai et all. It is with stuff like this, that, they get to have the adrenalin shooting up! Retired Gen Dipankar Banerjee needs to be complimented for highlighting this in his high class interpolation. 

The end-notes are impressive, and lend to increasing the authenticity of research. The inclusion of ‘conclusions’ is a good idea, which the man in a hurry will love. Similarly, the listing of military acronyms is again a good idea, and will jell with the civilian. What about an index ? This should be incorporated in any future edition. This is a must for any research work centered around this book, in its present avatar, which evidently is a treasure trove on the SF. Scholars will love it. All security-issues oriented libraries must go for it.  

(The Writer Lt. Col A.K. ‘Sam’ Sharma is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, Kharakvasla. Col Sharma was commissioned into the 3rd Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army in Februray 1964, He retired in 1997 after serving for 33 years. A graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, he holds a MSc Degree in Defence Studies from the Madras University. This officer has been on the instructional staff of two of Indian Army’s premiere training institutes: the College of Combat; now known as the War College; (Directing Staff Junior Command Wing-1972-1975) and the Infantry School ( Senior Instructor, Platoon Commander’s Wing—1984-87) both located in Mhow (MP); where he taught tactics at the unit and sub-unit levels to students, some of who were from friendly foreign armies. He has also served at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun.)