Curing pitfalls in India�s Pak policy

One wonders if New Delhi should continue its traditional policy of peace and dialogue with Islamabad expecting it would lead to the termination of the Pak-sponsored jehadi terrorism. Generations of Indian citizens in general and Kashmiris - Hindus, Sikhs and liberal Muslims in particular have perished since Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan had his autumn 1947 Kashmir offensive planned and later, the tribal lashkars pushed into India  with the intention of  capturing its Valley.

Indian paradox

There are reports that the terror infrastructure is still intact in Pakistan and its old game of infiltration against India continues. Notwithstanding its occasional positive assurances to New Delhi in the post 26/11 landscape, Islamabad continues to shield the real accused in the Mumbai terror attack.  India has given Pakistan the names of the key players and a separate dossier on Jamaat-ud-Dawa ( JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed. But Saeed is roaming free. Accused Zaki-ur-Rehman-Lakhvi and others are having a good time in Pakistan's  jail. Pakistan has also failed to honour its promise of giving India 'voice samples' of the 26/11 terror attack case accused. Besides, Pakistan is yet to send its proposed judicial commission to India in connection with the 26/11 probe.

Paradoxically, New Delhi seems to be sticking to its traditional policy while being fully aware of the realities on the ground.  One could discern this stark truth clearly in what Home Minister P Chidambaram said in a recent interview to The Times of India (November 27, 2011).  Chidambaram has admitted herein that the establishment in Islamabad continues to deny whatever evidence New Delhi has given to it against Lashkar-e-Toiba chief and mastermind behind the Mumbai carnage Saeed.  The reality of the Indian paradox can be seen also in the government’s recent statements in our Parliament, according to which Pakistani spy agencies continue to support terrorist outfits including, LeT, JeM and Hizbul Mujahideen.

History bears out that actions of individuals or states follow their nature. Given the birth of the state of Pakistan under the fake pretext of ‘saving Islam,’ it is in its  nature itself that its politicians would survive and flourish only by misusing the name of this religion and creating conflict with secular India. It is well documented how father of Pakistan M A Jinnah would invent this brand of politics and all his successive  political heirs—civilian or military—adhere to the same competing with each other in demonstrating their allegiance to what they have portrayed as an Islamic agenda. In order to be seen closer to the powerful Islamic sentiments Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto even directed her then Director General of Military Operations Lt General Pervez Musharraf in 1996 to rehabilitate Osama bin Laden (who had then been expelled from Sudan) in the Pak Afghan border area.  Her successor Nawaz Sharif followed the same path  and repeatedly evaded US pressure to allow its special forces to mount an operation from Pakistani territory into Kandahar to kill or capture bin Laden.

In continuity with their predecessors’ policy the current trio - Pakistani PresidentAsif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani  and Army Chief Pervez Kayani - too have openly extended moral, diplomatic and political support to the secessionists in India’s Kashmir. 

New Delhi’s options

Viewed against this background, one finds little merit in the suggestion being voiced in a section of the public opinion that New Delhi withdraws its Armed Forces Special Powers Act from certain areas notified as disturbed in Jammu and Kashmir.  This option can be thought of only if we have credible guarantees that there would be no infiltration from across the border in future. An argument is that the Act is detrimental to human rights. It is not at all factual.  The current Act has an in-built mechanism for the protection of human rights.  The record of the Indian armed forces in the areas under the Act already shows that they are generally well aware of it while performing their duty and when they have erred – such cases have been rare - they have been strictly dealt with under the law of the land.    

The prevalent situation in the Valley rather demands that the role the armed forces have played in protecting  India’s unity and integrity is adequately appreciated and nothing is done that demoralises their  morale in fighting any anti-national elements. New Delhi may well continue the present dialogue with Islamabad but taking all appropriate measures on the ground. 

The government could also see to it that our armed forces are equipped with appropriate arms and ammunition and functional autonomy. This is a must especially in view of the growing violence in different parts of Pakistan today. The situation indicates how increasingly unstable the country is turning with every passing day. This may make its government, primarily army which has had the last word in foreign and defence policy matters, irrational in its political and military behaviour towards India. Islamabad’s behavior could be the same also towards Afghanistan after the proposed NATO pullout. The sobering US influence on the Pak Army has already been diminishing very fast since the elimination of Osama bin Laden.  Given the stakes India has had in the peace and stability of Afghanistan, New Delhi would have to checkmate Islamabad’s designs against Kabul as well in cooperation and with the consent of its government and people.

New Delhi requires to keep its armed forces adequately prepared with a high state of readiness also because a nuclear Pakistan that is adding fast to its military capabilities is increasingly in the danger of passing into the hands of jehadi forces. Given their ideological mind-set and obsession, such forces might be completely irrational in the use of power.  New Delhi could better act earlier than later.

Dr Jagdish N Singh is a Senior Journalist and Visiting Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies

Views expressed are personal