Memogate: Sitting on a Precipice

Amidst this backdrop, the ‘Memogate’ controversy has erupted. The contents of the memo are undoubtedly explosive and suggest that the ruling Pakistan political dispensation was prepared to modify some elements of its foreign policy if US influence could prevent a military takeover and assist in restoring civilian political authority over the military. In return, the ruling political elite would revamp the civilian government towards a new strategic direction that would essentially involve replacing the National Security Adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that would include former military and civilian leaders favourably viewed by Washington. The new national security team would then, with the backing of the civilian government, order an independent inquiry to determine who harboured Osama bin Laden and other senior Qaida operatives. Those found guilty would have their services terminated including those serving in the Army. Al Qaeda leaders still on Pakistani soil would be handed over to the US or the latter would be given the green signal to conduct operations against them. The National Security Team would also develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear program to bring Pakistan’s nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime. It would eliminate Section ‘S’ of the ISI charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc, which action would in turn lead to a dramatic improvement of relations with Afghanistan. It would also cooperate fully with the Indian government on bringing all perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies. This would include handing over those against whom sufficient evidence exists of guilt to the Indian security services. 

 

The proposals by themselves are sensible and would if implemented, have undoubtedly led to an easing of tension in the region. But was the memo the brainchild of the Pakistan Government? Mansoor Ijaz, who delivered the memo, is categorical in asserting that it was texted to him by Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US via BBM (Black Berry Messenger) exchanges. As Haqqani is a close confidant of President Zardari, the needle of suspicion, based on Ijaz’s testimony inevitably points to the highest civilian authority in the land.  On the other hand, Ijaz is known to have strong views against the Pakistan Army and the ISI and enough evidence exists which shows his animosity against them. To rely solely on his word to make out a case against President Zardari would be foolish, but nevertheless is a handy whip to beat the government with. The matter is under investigation but the truth may never be fully revealed. The question to ask is why the Americans did not accord any level of seriousness to the memo which gravely indicts the Pakistan Army?

 

Let us for a moment take the hypothesis that the memo is genuine. The refusal of the Americans to support Pakistan’s civilian administration proves one of two things. The Americans either lack the capacity to influence Pakistan’s military, especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden or they view the role of Pakistan’s Army as essential to their wider aims in Afghanistan and would not like to exacerbate the tensions which exist between the two countries. These relations are perhaps at their lowest ebb after NATO forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in a recent operation mistaking them for Taliban fighters. In retaliation, Pakistan has closed the Shamsi air base and blocked the supply routes from Pakistan for ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan also refused to attend the recently concluded Bonn conference on the future of Afghanistan. But these at best are tactical ploys designed to placate public opinion at home. In the long term, instability in Afghanistan is not in Pakistan’s interest and we could see a rapprochement in the near future.

 

If the memo is a plant, then the timing of its release points to American support for the Pakistan Army whose credibility has seen serious erosion in the eyes of the public ever since the killing of bin Laden on 2 May 2011. The Army now has a whip to beat the Government and keep it on tenterhooks. Charges of treason are being freely bandied about, Husain Haqqani has resigned and Zardari has moved to Dubai for treating a heart ailment which few were aware of till date. While the Army’s credibility may not rise, in the absence of alternatives it will still be viewed by the public as being the best bet for Pakistan. 

 

On a different plane, the ‘memogate affair’ has thrown up in the public domain, fissures which exist in Pakistan between the elected government and the Army. It shows that Pakistan’s elected government is prepared to move on the path of peace, improve relations with India and Afghanistan and take on the Taliban, if somehow the Army could be confined to the barracks. That is a hope which is unlikely to see fruition in the near future nor perhaps for quite some time to come.

 

Four decades ago, Pakistan was faced with an unprecedented crisis on its Eastern Wing. Then, conflict resolution was sought through suppression of the Bengali people in actions which could best be described as genocide. That led to the breakup of the country and the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan is once again facing a decision point of unprecedented importance. General Jim Jones, Obama’s former national security adviser who took Ijaz’s memo to Mullen, did not mince his words when he said that Pakistan was a country bent on self-destruction. Internal contradictions within Pakistani society and the stranglehold which the Army has on the levers of power are moving Pakistan inexorably on that path. The memogate affair is thus not about endangered national security. That security was not under threat. What was endangered was the preeminent position of the Pakistan Army in the country - something which the Pakistani military leadership finds unacceptable. The Army still has no answers for the multiple failures of Abbottabad. Nor does the Army have answers for its sustained support to the terrorist networks which it continues to promote as its strategic assets. Its inability to tackle the Pakistan Taliban indicates a lack of military capability but is rationalised as reluctance to fight their Muslim brethren. The Pakistan Army thus has much to answer for but no authority exists which can do the questioning. ‘Memogate’ simply put the cards on the table for public viewing.

 

Today, Pakistan is on the edge of a precipice, just as it was four decades earlier. Its survival will depend to a large extent on the ability of its people to manage their destiny and force the Pakistan Army to yield control to the civilian government. Otherwise, a scenario which could usher in Balkanisation of the state is not as far-fetched as some may like to think.

 

 

Views expressed are personal