The Taliban, and the Dilemma of Peace Talks in Afghanistan: An Observation

Torment over Pain

The civil war persisted, and a new form of disaster arose. In the guise of purification of the nation, and putting an end to the internecine conflict, a Pakistani backed Afghan group terming themselves the Taliban (Students of Islam), embarked on their seizure of Afghanistan in 1994. Using the vulnerable situation, they took over Kabul in 1996, and ruled until their fall (2001), nearly ninety percent of Afghanistan. As the proponent of the movement, Pakistan sought its national interest in them, hoping to influence its control over the region, and ensure strategic depth against its ever rival India.

Questions might have flicked as, why the Taliban had to chase Afghanistan with an extremist version of governance. Their leadership was aware of the fact that, if provoked, Afghans would fight for religion to death. To ground their assertion of invasion, and justify their killings before unaware sects, they emerged with a deleterious practice of extremism to get their quixotic mission fulfilled. They legalized annihilation of their opponents, blaming them of distortion and deviation from Islam.

However, their evil agenda was soon unveiled. Brutal execution of Najibullah (1996), unreasonable assassination of Iranian diplomats (1998), devastation of Buddha Statues (2001), and a severe standoff against the principles of human rights, which is by no means acceptable in a religion like Islam, were their primary inhuman acts they committed. The bombing plots on World Trade Center, and elsewhere, demonstrated their ties with al-Qaeda, and ghastly might in Afghanistan that in fine, led to their downfall in late 2001.

Karzai's Weakness

With a hope, full of determination, and commitment to do away with terrorism, and build democracy, a new government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai was formed (late 2001). Sadly, inability, and weakness predominated Karzai, and he could not maintain his anti-Talibanic strategy that, had to constitute the backbone of his governance. With an unset mechanism, and unclear agenda, he called upon the Taliban to reconcile. This leniency encouraged the insurgents to get momentum, and widen their operations.

In addition to his earlier calls for reconciliation, Karzai inaugurated the High Peace Council in October 2010 to start formal peace negotiations. The Council however, did not make the situation any better, and it even took the life of its Chairman, Professor Rabani, while welcoming two suicide bombers for a peace talk in September 2011.

Now What?

Now that ten years have passed by, and in the process, nearly 3,000 international troops, and thousands of Afghan civilians and soldiers have been killed, and billions of dollars have been spent to eliminate the Taliban and the terrorists, and to build democracy, yet quite the contrary of the USA's so called defined mission, Joe Biden (15 December 2011) says “Look, the Taliban per se is not our enemy”. This means as, The Weekly Standard, aptly sums up - America is “Fighting” the Taliban, but the Taliban is not America's Enemy.

After several secret meetings with representatives of Mullah Omer, since early 2011, mostly in Germany and Doha, a U.S-German sponsored idea to establish a Taliban political office  in Qatar, was revealed (September 2011). It might be early to examine whether, this initiative unlike previous ones, will ultimately bring peace, but looking at its start, its future seems complicated and challenging.

Initially, Karzai contradicted the idea of establishing the Taliban office in Qatar. He argued that he was not consulted with over the potential venue of the office. He even recalled his Ambassador in Qatar (14 December 2011) to protest at Doha for secret negotiations with the US and Germany over this issue. He first, suggested Saudi Arabia, and or Turkey to be the host, but later (27 December 2011) agreed for Qatar.

The Taliban for the first time accepted to negotiate (3 January), but with the U.S, and not with Afghans, that too with a precondition to transfer five Talibs from Guantanamo to Qatar. This totally, marginalized the Afghan Government and led to Karzai's further frustrations, but yet again, Karzai expressed his consent (5 January) for letting the negotiation be between the Taliban, and the U.S. His consent cost the principles of London (January 2010) and Bonn II Conferences (December 2011), that had emphasized on an Afghan led peace process. Later on, the government resumed its concern and wanted to be involved, and suggested the Taliban to ceasefire before peace talks begin (9 January).
 
Multi-sided diplomacy of Karzai, has left his subjects skeptical. Karzai has recommended the office to welcome all opponents. There are chances, that the opponents will have different expectations, as they have various groups within them, as Hizbe Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), has come out some with conditions. Different conditions by different groups are likely to rise, which will not be acceptable for the Afghan political parties, women's groups, and civil society. Thus, the office if functions, will either create a new phase of disaster for Afghanistan, or it will eventually collapse.

If the U.S, and its International Allies, along with the Afghan Government are sure, that they will be able to change the doctrine of the Taliban groups, and will bring them under the chamber of the Afghanistan of what it is today, that means, without any deal, or threat over the Afghan constitution, they must guarantee their nations that their sacrifices in the last ten years, have not gone down the abyss, and that they still see light in the murk.

Aqil Zahirpour is a DAAD Scholar at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, Erfurt University, Germany

Views expressed are personal