Victory in Fourth Generation Warfare

The concept of victory in today’s changing global security environment remains inconclusive and non-absolute. The time-tested idea of a decisive victory is still very much embedded and important to people and governments alike, but the definition of victory requires very careful design in this modern day world of conflict and chaos.

The current rein of nuclear weapons defeats the idea of ‘decisive victory’ and is only concerned about minimising the risks of any escalation that might lead to a nuclear holocaust. This view however does not concern the non-nuclear states and does not fit well into the ideologies of non-state actors. What is important to state is that decisive victory has lost its charm, because the definition of war has changed forever. The enemy of the day is unknown, unseen and resides in the realms of the city walls or in difficult terrains. In today’s fourth generation warfare – two concepts have evolved and victory as its genesis requires them to supplement its true meaning.

The complexity of fourth generation warfare requires a magic formula conducive to the type of enemy you are fighting, the asymmetrical threat that you face and knowing the concealed weakness and strength of your own men. It is very important to include men, weaponry and technology designed to fight a typical non-state actor in a designated geographical setting. In enabling victory in a fourth generation war setting, the concept of ‘Strategic Success’ and ‘Strategic Advantage’ plays a critical role.

French scholar, Raymond Aron once wrote, “Strategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose”. The events of September 11, 2001, are a proof to this testimony. Today’s asymmetric conflicts have made ‘Strategic Success’ a term of importance. In order to attain ‘Strategic Success’ the paradigm of ‘Preclusive Victory’ has come to the forefront. Philip Bobbitt, an American best known for work on military strategy, law and constitutional theory, describes the concept as “anticipatory, precautionary attention to possible futures” requiring an expansive and integrated approach to modern diplomacy, defence, and development. A strategic thought designed to produce preclusive victory will include conflict prevention, successful negotiation, deterrence, the preparation for conflict, should all else fail. It will also involve efforts to establish order, ensure stability, and promote political and economic pluralism after conflict.

Andrew Mack, Director of the Human Security Report Project (HSRP) at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver and a faculty member of the university’s new School for International Studies, argues that today’s non-state actors’ relative resolve or interest explains ‘Strategic Advantage’ or failure in asymmetric conflicts. In essence the actor with the most resolve wins, regardless of material power resources. It is important to assess the structure of the conflict relationship to derive a resolution. Mack contends that greater the gap in relative power, the less resolute and hence more politically vulnerable strong actors are, and the more resolute and less politically vulnerable weak actors are. Thus it remains open for discussion what constituted ‘Victory’ for the US in Iraq, now that they are talking of withdrawal. Consequently in the context of Afghanistan, General David Petraeus rightfully stated, “This is not a case where… you go home to a victory parade”.

So what exactly decides ‘Victory’ in fourth generation warfare? Luck? Fervent ideology? Preponderance of material resources? Or is advantage achieved by superior manpower and morale? In today’s asymmetric modern day conflict, is victory found largely in lethal cutting-edge military technology or information or social media networks? This remains an ultimate aim of today’s politicians, strategists and military commanders. However, what remains certain is that no one can anticipate what course would today’s conflicts or a continued group engagement battle would take, but it should always be made sure that the objectives, engagement rules and exit strategy are drafted, changed, adapted and concluded at every stage of the conflict.

Gaurav Sharma is a Research Associate at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

Views expressed are personal