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April 06, 2012 | ![]() | By Brig Gurmeet Kanwal | ||
The abduction of two Italian nationals in Orissahas once again brought to the forefront the fragility of the situation alongthe maoist belt in central and eastern India and the inability of the statepolice forces to deal with it, even as a debate is raging about the structureand powers of the proposed National Counter-terrorism Centre. In May 2006, prime minister Manmohan Singh described the maoist/ naxaliteinsurgency as India’s most serious internal security challenge. Maoistincidents, which have accounted for almost 60 per cent of terrorism-relatedviolence in India over the last decade, include intimidation, killing ofinnocent civilians, reprisal killings, kidnappings, extortion, IED blasts andthe destruction of government and private property, and that of grassrootslevel political institutions. In many of the areas of their influence, themaoists have been collecting taxes and dispensing instant and brutal justicethrough kangaroo courts. Maoist attacks on the security forces and the symbols of state power arecharacterised by meticulous planning, systematic preparation, near surgicalexecution and a high degree of coordination. For the maoists, besides waging aprotracted people’s war with the ultimate objective of capturing or seizingpolitical power, participating in a peace process and talks is a ‘tactic’, andis considered ‘war by other means’. Reactive response The response of various state governments and the Centre has often, if notalways, been reactive and has been found to be lagging behind the maoists.While they have been expanding to newer areas, gaining ground, consolidatingthemselves and have steadily been enhancing their military capabilities, theapproach of the state governments has often been to ignore the maoist movement. The reasons for this apathetic approach were, firstly, that naxal terrorism isnot an emotive issue at the national level like the insurgency in Jammu andKashmir (J&K); secondly, there has been some confusion whether thenaxalites are terrorists or not as they have a ‘social justice’ tag attached tothem; and, lastly, am impression has gained currency that the naxal menace isnot “as bad as the media makes it out to be.” Coordination between the police and intelligence agencies of various affectedstates has been generally unsatisfactory. The acquisition, compilation,collation, analysis, synthesis and dissemination of intelligence are still agrey area. The naxalites are continuing to spread their tentacles and it iscrucial that intelligence about their activities, arms and equipment, training,sources of funding and future operations is shared on a daily basis so that ittrickles down in near real-time to the functional level. A great deal moreneeds to be done if the states are to coordinate anti-maoist operations acrosstheir borders. State police forces as well as the Central police and paramilitary forces(CPMFs) need to be better equipped and better trained to successfully combatthe serious threat posed by the naxalites. At present they lack the army’sorganisational structure and cohesiveness, the army’s institutionalisedoperational experience and ethos and its outstanding junior leadership,qualities that are mandatory if the naxalites have to be defeated on their ownturf. Calling in the army to tackle the rising tide of maoist violence will bea grave mistake for a number of reasons. The army is already managing the border along the Line of Control (LoC) withPakistan and parts of the border on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with Chinaand is deployed in large numbers for counter-insurgency and internal securityduties in J&K and the north-eastern states. These prolonged commitments arehampering the army’s preparedness for conventional conflict, gradually butperceptibly affecting morale and wearing down its equipment and transportfleet. Calling on the army to commit additional troops for anti-naxaliteoperations would be a retrograde step. What the army can do and has been doing for some time now is to provideadvanced training to the state police forces and the CPMFs to enable them toacquire the necessary skills. To cope with this serious threat, India needs a well-deliberated and finelycalibrated response strategy with matching operational doctrines and thenecessary civil and military resources. Only a skillfully coordinated responsebetween the Centre and the states, with all concerned pooling in theirresources to achieve synergy in execution, will achieve the desired results.Above all else, a comprehensive socio-economic strategy must be evolved totreat the root causes of this malaise that is gnawing away at the nation’sinnards, along with a skillfully drawn up plan for perception management. Courtesy: Deccan Herald, 22 March 2012 http://www.deccanherald.com/content/236319/maoists-pose-huge-challenge.html | ||||||||
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