Demilitarisation of the Siachen Conflict Zone: Challenges and Prospects

The death of about 150 Pakistani army personnel in an avalanche at the battalion HQ at Gyari in the Siachen conflict zone has once again brought to the fore the dangers of the continuing deployment on both sides of the Actual Ground Position Line despite the fact that an informal cease-fire has been holding up quite well since November 25, 2003. Earlier, in mid-March 2007 also five Pakistani soldiers had perished in an avalanche.

Even at the peak of fighting in the 1980s and 1990s, maximum casualties on both the sides occurred because of the treacherous terrain, the super high altitude – which affects the human body adversely, and the extreme weather. The lack of oxygen at heights between 18,000 and 20,000 feet and prolonged periods of isolation are a lethal combination and result in pulmonary oedema, frostbite and other serious complications. Besides, prolonged deployment at such heights takes a heavy psychological toll. While these casualties are now better managed due to early evacuation, improvements in medical science and the establishment of forward medical facilities, they can never be completely eliminated.

The economic cost of maintaining an infantry brigade group at Siachen to guard the desolate super-high altitude mountain passes and approaches leading to them from the western slopes of the Saltoro Ridge has been estimated to range between Rs 3.0 to 3.5 crore per day – Rs 1,000 to 1,200 crore annually. The costs are high because the logistics tail is long, the only road ends at the Base Camp close to the snout of Nubra river where the almost 80-km glacier ends and a large number of infantry posts can be maintained only by light helicopters that air-drop supplies with attendant losses, as recoveries are often less than 50 per cent. The frequent turnover of troops adds to the costs as a battalion can be stationed at the Saltoro Ridge for a maximum of six months.

Though the Pakistanis are relatively better off due to the lower heights on the western spurs of the Saltoro on which their troops are holding defensive positions and their shorter lines of communication to Dansam and Skardu, the weather Gods have been equally unkind to troops on both the sides of the AGPL. Dr. Stephen Cohen, a well-known and respected Washington-based South Asia analyst, has described the Siachen conflict as a fight between two bald men over a comb. In his view, “Siachen… is not militarily important… They (Indian and Pakistani armies) are there for purely psychological reasons, testing each other’s ‘will’.”

Both the sides have been finding it difficult to overcome deeply entrenched negotiation mindsets and are unable to look for innovative and creative approaches. India insists that the present forward positions of both the armies on the Saltoro Range along the AGPL should be demarcated after a joint survey so that there is a reference point in case a dispute arises in future. Pakistan’s position is that by suddenly occupying the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier, India violated the 1972 Shimla Agreement and must, therefore, undo its “aggression” without insisting on legitimising its illegal occupation through the demarcation of present positions.

After Pakistan’s treachery in Kargil in 1999, the Indian Army’s advice to the government that the AGPL must be jointly verified and demarcated before demilitarisation begins, is operationally sound, balanced and pragmatic military advice. However, if Pakistan’s military capacity to grab and hold on to vacated Indian positions after the demilitarisation agreement comes into effect is carefully analysed, it will be found that Pakistan is in no position to occupy any of the posts vacated by India.

At a recent India-Pakistan Track 2 meeting at Bangkok, organised by the Ottawa University jointly with some think tanks, it was agreed by both the sides that the present military positions should be “jointly recorded and the records exchanged” as a prelude to the disengagement and demilitarisation process. While this falls short of the Indian demand for demarcation, it is a workable via media and should be acceptable.

However, India should insist on building a clause into the demilitarisation agreement that in case of the agreement is violated, both sides reserve the right to take whatever action they deem fit, including offensive military measures. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of its troops from the glacial heights, India should create and maintain suitably structured reserves for counter-action across the LoC at a point of its choosing. These reserves would also be handy for intervention on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the border with China should it ever become necessary.

On the completion of the demilitarisation process, an international “Science Park” could be established at Siachen Glacier to promote the study of Himalayan glaciers and to take regular measurements for monitoring climate change. Dr. Saleem Ali of the University of Vermont, USA, the originator of the ides of the Karakoram Peace Park Initiative, has done some seminal work in this regard and both the governments could benefit from his writing and activism. The Siachen Glacier zone could also be opened up for international mountaineering expeditions in a step by step manner as both the militaries gain in confidence in monitoring and verification. International help would be necessary to clean up the environmental damage caused over almost three decades of conflict and the dumping and disposal of warlike stores in the area.

The demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone will act as a confidence building measure of immense importance. For India, it is a low-risk option to test Pakistan’s long-term intentions for peace. It is, therefore, an idea whose time has come. Indian and Pakistani leaders need to find the political will necessary to accept ground realities. Trust begets trust and it will be well worth taking a political and military risk to give peace a chance. It is time the Indian government began the process of building a national consensus around this important bilateral measure.

The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst

Views expressed are personal