Home Maoists and the Odisha State: Age of Capitulation

Maoists and the Odisha State: Age of Capitulation

It took precisely 20 days for Sabyasachi Panda, Secretary of the Odisha State Organising Committee of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and 12 days for another set of CPI-Maoist abductors belonging to the outfit's the Srikakulam-Koraput Divisional Committee of the Andhra-Odisha-Border Special Zonal Committee (ADBSZC), to bring the Odisha government on its knees.
 
On 4 April, Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik announced his government’s decision in the state assembly to ‘facilitate the release of 27 persons’. The 27 persons would include 15 members of the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha (CMAS), a front organisation of the CPI-Maoist and eight CPI-Maoist cadres in exchange for the release of the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Jhina Hikaka. Four more persons would be released in return for the release of the abducted Italian national Paolo Bosusco. The names of the persons to be released would be announced on 5 April. It remains to be seen whether the decision would derive the intended result, for the number of persons the Government plan to release is far less than what the Maoists had initially demanded.
 
There is every reason for the commentators to come down heavily on the Naveen Patnaik Government's capitulation to the Maoist demands. It is sad to see the Governments pathetic attempts to rationalise their decision when it is becoming increasingly evident that abduction for the release of jailed Maoist cadres/ sympathisers is becoming a trend in India's Maoist theatre. More importantly, fuelled by the almost habitual surrender of various state governments to the extremist demands, this tactic will be regularly, and perhaps increasingly used by the extremists. 
 
The following are few of the recent cases underlying the trend.
 
In October 2009, Maoists released the officer-in-charge of Sankrail police station in West Midnapore district in West Bengal, in exchange for the freedom of 24 tribal women arrested for aiding the extremists.
 
In February 2010, Maoists released abducted Jharkhand block development officer after keeping him as hostage for six days, after the then Chief Minister Shibu Soren agreed to free 14 arrested cadres.
 
In September 2010, Maoists released three policemen in Bihar, eight days after they were abducted from Lakhisarai district, after unknown number of Maoists were released. The Director General of Police, however, claimed that the released was forced on the Maoists ‘after the police sealed the escape routes of the ultras in the forests and hills’.
 
In February 2011, Odisha released Maoist ideologue Ganti Prasadam to secure the release of Malkangiri district collector Vineel Krishna and a junior engineer.
 
The dilemma of the government to maintain a ‘no negotiation and no release’ stand, when civilians are in the custody of the extremists and face a real danger of being harmed is understandable. In the instant case the government appears to have acted under tremendous pressure from New Delhi, the Italian government, the family members of the abducted MLA and also from the opposition parties, who missed no opportunity to run down the government. But such pressures are not unnatural in such settings and have to be handled in a manner that acts as disincentives to extremists to persist with such courses of action. The projection of ‘state power’ would require a strong police capability to identify the location of terrorists, seal their routes of egress and thereafter neutralise them through application of force. This capability is conspicuous by its absence in all the affected states which thus makes kidnapping an attractive option for the extremists to force the state government to accept their demands. It is hence vital that state governments devote some time and attention to this aspect.

Governments also need to have specialists in their ranks that function as negotiators. The aim is to buy time to either force the extremists to change their position or enable a climate where the option of the use of force can be exercised. Surrendering repeatedly to the terrorists demands undermines the power of the state and leads to a loss of confidence in the government and its administrative apparatus.
 
In Odisha, the government's strategy appears to have gone astray in its initial assessment of the strength of Sabyasachi Panda and his relationship with the CPI-Maoist top brass. In its wisdom, the Odisha Home Department decided that a 'difference' exists between the 'rogue' Panda and the 'rational' CPI-Maoist leadership, without having a reasonable basis for such formulation. This resulted in a belief that the latter would force the former to release the abducted persons sooner than later, since the outfit would not sanction the abduction of foreign nationals. While Panda did release of one the abducted Italians after 10 days, he could hold on to the other one for the rest of the duration, thereby vastly increasing pressure on the State government. The CPI-Maoist did not release a single press release on the Italian's abduction. This meant that either the so called schism between Panda or the CPI-Maoist senior leadership did not exist or was not that serious as believed by the security forces. The outfit certainly appeared comfortable with the idea of using foreign nationals as trophies to achieve their objectives. The 23 March abduction of MLA Hikaka, belonging to Naveen Patnaik's own ruling party, this time by the 'real Maoists' belonging to the ADBSZC appeared to have tilted the balance decisively in favour of the abductors. The stand of the second group not to negotiate with the government broke the will of the government and made them succumb. Here too, the option of acceding to one group while not doing so for the other was an opportunity to create schisms between the Maoist ranks but was not tried out for unexplained reasons.   
 
The state government has no choice but to ride the moral high horse and justify its decision as having led to saving the lives of innocent people civilians. But by its abject surrender it has conceded a morale boosting victory to the Maoists. And in the stalemated fight between the state and the extremist outfit, each victory counts. Kidnappings are now likely to be the norm.    
 
The author served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi

Views expressed are personal

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Bibhu Prasad Routray
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