Need for a strong hostage rescue policy

The ongoing hostage crisis in Odisha has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the Indian state to succumb to the demands of anti-national elements. On 17 March, the Andhra-Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) of the CPI (Maoist) had kidnapped two Italian nationals from a forest bordering the districts of Ganjam and Kandamahal. The two hostages have since been released following protracted negotiations between the Odisha government and the Maoists amidst sustained media attention and pressure from the Italian government. The Maoists continue to hold captive MLA Jhina Hikaka who was abducted from Koraput district on 24 March. The Odisha government has by and large agreed for a swap of 25 prisoners which includes CPl (Maoist) leaders and sympathisers from the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS), a front organisation of the Maoists. The state government had previously drawn flak for its handling of the abduction of Malkangiri collector, Vineel Krishna in March 2011, especially for its inability to aggressively pursue the Maoists even after his release.

While taking hostages is a common tactic for insurgent/terrorist groups to meet their political demands or to exact ransoms, the track record of the Indian government in dealing with such situations has often been knee-jerked and submissive, earning it the infamous distinction of being a ‘weak state’. This approach is in sharp contrast with that of many western nations which maintain a policy of non-negotiation with terrorists. Only recently, US Navy Seal Team 6, operating out of a base in Djibouti, carried out a daring heliborne operation to rescue two hostages from the clutches of armed criminals in Somalia. The release of Kashmiri militants to secure the release of Rubaiya Saeed, the daughter of the then Home Minister in 1989 and the release of three dreaded terrorists for the passengers of IC 814 in December 1999 are a few such incidents which had grave ramifications on national security. The release of the five militants in 1989 proved to be a boost for the militant morale and helped in fanning the flames of insurgency. The terrorists released in Kandahar included Maulana Mazood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar and Saeed Omar Sheikh. Maulana Mazood Azhar went on to form the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist outfit which carried out a series of suicide attacks in India including the one on the Srinagar Legislative Assembly in October 2001 and the Parliament attack of December 2001. Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar based himself with the Al-Umar near Muzzafarabad in POK and sponsored acts of terrorism in Kashmir. Saeed Omar Sheikh was to gain worldwide attention for his role in the beheading of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002. The 9/11 Inquiry Commission also indicted Omar for transferring $ 100,000 to Mohamed Atta, the leader of the group of 19 hijackers one month before the attacks.

Following the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 to Kandahar, the government had strengthened the mechanism of the Crisis Management Group to immediately respond to terrorist situations anywhere in the country. Post-9/11, the Cabinet Committee on Security also approved a policy to deal with hijackings. Among other measures, it includes the option to shoot down a hijacked airliner if it is found to be approaching a sensitive zone. Despite these hard policy measures, little has changed on the ground and the state continues to suffer from a paralysis when it comes to dealing with hostage situations.

There is an urgent need to streamline standard operating procedures for hostage situations and allow a single-point authority to respond to such crises. Given the present state of under-preparedness of our state governments and their police forces, this role should be adopted by the Central government which has the necessary resources under its disposal to mount hostage rescue operations. It is imperative for state governments to view national security from a higher prism and not get bogged down in the debate of division of powers between the centre and the states. Although law and order is a state subject, non-traditional threats to national security in the 21st century have assumed global dimensions and linkages which are beyond the capabilities of the state governments alone to tackle.

The establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will pave the way for streamlining intelligence and information flows between the state and central government agencies. The NCTC should also link the home department of all state governments with the Ministry of Home Affairs. In case of a crisis, quick flow of information will activate the concerned department in the NCTC which can then provide real-time update of the situation to the Crisis Management Group (CMG). The CMG can then execute a hostage rescue operation depending on the gravity of the situation and availability of intelligence on the location and movement of the hostages and their abductors. The establishment of the four regional hubs of the National Security Guard (NSG) at Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad (regional centre) and Chennai puts them in a better position to launch a rapid and effective hostage rescue operation. These hubs should now be able to cater for eventualities in a rural insurgency environment as well, with pre-positioned assets for rapid movement and insertion of troops into the target area. In addition, there are other Special Forces assets available to carry out such missions even outside the country.  

Conducting a rescue operation in the dense jungle terrain of the Maoist hinterland is an extremely difficult task to execute due to the large presence of armed cadres guarding the hostages. Nevertheless, the state must have the capability and option of using the hard power in such crises to strengthen its bargaining position during negotiations and keep the insurgents under pressure. It is equally important to maintain a tight cordon around their suspected location during negotiations and launch a swift operation once the release of hostages has been secured.

In the coming years, terrorists and insurgent groups will pose a variety of challenges to the state and carry out spectacular incidents to gain attention. Hostage taking has been the favourite tool of terrorists worldwide to gain instant recognition. Therefore, the state must get its act together and draw the right lessons from the present crisis in Odisha to prepare itself to use the hard power effectively in future contingencies that may evolve both in the urban and rural landscape. Capitulating to the demands of the anti-national elements will only strengthen their resolve to carry out more such incidents to further their aims or gain a breather to re-group whenever they are cornered. Release of hardened insurgents or terrorists also adversely affects the morale of the security forces engaged in combating them and dents the image of the nation in the eyes of the world.

Rohit Singh is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal