North Korea Nuclear Halt: Hard Bargain for Total Disarm

North Korea eventually appears trudging towards halting the advancement of its nuclear programme, with Pyongyang officials handing over a dossier to China, the host nation of the six-party talks since 2003. This latest development is one in a long series towards the scrapping of the nuclear weapons programme of the cloistered Northeast nation in exchange for aid and diplomatic concessions and to ensure a non-nuclear and peaceful Korean peninsula.

In what was widely presumed as a gesticulation of its intent at bringing the nuclear weapons programme to a standstill, North Korea blew up a 60-foot cooling tower at North Korea’s largest nuclear facility at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang on Friday last. The destruction of the tower ended as the structure collapsed into a large heap of debris, which was being witnessed by both international and regional television broadcasters, in effect the world.

North Korea’s handing over the inventory of its nuclear programme, paves the way for its removal from the US’ terror blacklist and Washington has responded to the same after receiving confirmation that North Korea had indeed, handed over the details of its nuclear facilities to China. Commenting on the developments, White House spokesperson Dana Perino said, “The United States welcomes the North Korean declaration of its nuclear programme and will respond to North Korea’s actions by announcing our intent to rescind North Korea’s designation as a State sponsor of terror.”

Subsequently, this statement was stamped with the final approval by US President George W. Bush, while he addressed the Press at the White House and stated, “North Korean officials submitted a declaration of their nuclear programme to the Chinese government as part of the six-party talks and thereby I am issuing a proclamation that lifts the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to North Korea.” “Secondly, I am notifying Congress of my intent to rescind North Korea’s designation as a State sponsor of terror in 45 days. The next 45 days will be an important period for North Korea to show its seriousness of its cooperation. This can be a moment of opportunity for North Korea. If North Korea continues to make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the international community—much as Libya has done over the past few years,” Bush added.

Just as news of the announcement by Washington trickled in, Pyongyang welcomed its deletion from the US’ terrorism list and removal of sanctions. Its Foreign Ministry promptly issued a statement through the official Korean Central News Agency stating, “The US measure should lead to a complete and all-out withdrawal of its hostile policy toward [North Korea] so that the denuclearization process can proceed smoothly.” Obviously, Washington appears wary of North Korea and is approaching the entire process with caution, given the endless history of sporadic and fitful deliberations on the North’s nuclear programme. And, thus detailed verification of the disclosures made by Kim Jong II’s regime would be particularly vital in the near future.

The North Korean nuclear crisis has continued unabated especially since October 2002, when Washington confronted Pyongyang on breaking the terms of a 1994 agreement (Agreed Framework) by reprocessing uranium and more prominently, the admission by founder of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, AQ Khan that he was involved in proliferating nuclear technology to North Korea in 2004. After having been involved in the six-party (the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) negotiations aimed at bringing about a breakthrough to the nuclear impasse for three years, Pyongyang stunned the world on October 9, 2006 by testing a plutonium-based nuclear weapon and becoming the latest entrant to the world’s nuclear club.

The North Korean nuclear issue constituted the first major nuclear nonproliferation crisis of the post-Cold War era, when Pyongyang faced stringent economic sanctions for numerous years in addition to political isolation. Yet, North Korea not only existed, but also attracted global prime time coverage, with its nuclear and missile brinkmanship diplomacy. Even though there is reason to believe that the Kim Jong II now seems ready to go ahead towards disarmament, there are numerous questions that remain unanswered and several possibilities that still are under a thick realm of uncertainty.

These include the fact that although the sanctions under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act have been lifted, sanctions that North Korea faces for its human rights violations, the conducting of its nuclear test in 2006 and its weapons proliferation will all stay in effect. In addition, all United Nations Security Council sanctions will too be firmly in place. The US and other nations involved in resolving the nuclear stalemate would have to address various significant realities on ground vis-à-vis Pyongyang’s nuclear journey. These include resolving outstanding questions on its highly-enriched uranium and proliferation activities as well as relinquishing its already separated stock of plutonium.

Crucially, North Korea possesses a total estimated plutonium stock of between 46 and 64 kg, of which about 28-50 kg is estimated to be in separated and usable form. Therefore, it would not be prudent to be too optimistic about the sealing and shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and the destruction of the cooling tower. North Korea would certainly not give up its nuclear card simply. It would be unwilling to take the road to disarmament unless and until it secures massive economic bargains as well as security guarantees for itself from the nations that have been in deliberations with the Northeast Asian nation.

It appears cogent that any likely solution would fall into the category of a grand barter and expectedly, Kim Jong II would repeat the pattern of hard bargaining. Pyongyang’s march towards complete disarmament and renouncing its entire nuclear capability palpably entails a heavy price tag.

(India News and Features, July 4, 2008)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)