Of Alliances, Partnerships and Alignments

On matters military or rather national security, India’s approach has traditionally been piecemeal or kneejerk when criticalities occurred. We don’t have a national security strategy and have not identified national security objectives, both of which should been preceded by not only a comprehensive defence review but also deliberate net assessments based on possible scenarios including the worst ones. A security strategy, as any other strategy, must clearly define objectives, courses of action to be adopted, means that need to be developed to achieve those objectives and most significantly ‘how’ those means should be developed. The latter would clear plenty cobwebs. To that end, Nonalignment 2.0 – a foreign and strategic policy for India in the 21st Century is incomplete on all these counts. Additionally, Nonalignment 2.0 states, “The fundamental source of India’s power in the world is going to be the power of its example. If India can maintain high growth rates, leverage that growth to enhance the capabilities of all its citizens, and maintain robust democratic traditions and institutions, there are few limits to India’s global role and influence.” While there are no apparent signs of any of these (high growth rates, leveraging them to enhance citizen and maintaining robust democratic traditions and institutions) being achieved in near future, power of example by itself is going to achieve little unless we can achieve finesse in optimizing DIME (diplomacy, information operations, military and economic power) regionally and globally. We could learn a lot from China on this count. Presently, we don’t even dovetail diplomacy with military but treat military strategy as strictly ‘military’, which is not in sync with current and future security requirements. Nonalignment 2.0 is silent on such issues. It is also surprising that despite extensive acumen within India of constantly switching political alliances, partnerships, alignments and excellence in breaking opposing alliances, partnerships and alignments, we have not thought how this stratagem could be applied to at least the regional security paradigm in India’s favour. 

 

It is time we get over the China Dragon syndrome. There are enough indications to suggest that China and Pakistan have been waging asymmetric war against us for many years and will continue to do so with the aim of balkanizing India notwithstanding their smooth talk and peace homilies. China’s quest for superpower status and her energy requirements are egging her to consolidate access to Indian Ocean via Myanmar. Her claims to Arunachal Pradesh and Doklam Plateau in Bhutan are extension of the same quest. With PLA soldiers sighted in Northern Nepal and possibility of Nepal breaking up courtesy China manipulated Maoists, what territory of Nepal China will usurp is anybody’s guess. It is a matter of time when China will develop surface links with Bhutan despite terrain constraints. 

 

Not for a minute would one suggest that we should become part of a NATO type alliance but can we not achieve our objectives through strategic partnerships that need not be restricted to bilateral levels. For example, talking of cyber war, ‘Stuxnet’ was developed jointly by the US and UK. Its successor, the much more potent ‘Flame’ would also not have been a single nation creation. Do we want to fight the cyber war alone? Strategic partnerships must be developed with countries similarly threatened. When China blatantly gives nuclear technology to Pakistan and supports the anti-India jihad, why are we scared of developing collective strategic partnership with Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Republic of Korea and other affected Asia Pacific countries?  

 

21st Century threats cannot be thwarted by militaries alone. National synergy will be required in entire ‘Security Sector’ encompassing MEA, MoD and MHA besides all security forces, other departments, organizations and agencies. Yet, Nonalignment 2.0 only talks of the requirement of integrating HQ IDS into MoD and posting civilians and armed forces personnel in MoD. It does not address lack of politico-military inertia in India, the requirement to redouble efforts to build political will and what methods should be adopted for moulding national opinion and decision making. Trefor Moss wrote in The Diplomat (25 March 2012), “The problem is the incoherence of India’s defense establishment, from industry through to government – therein lies the inferiority. It’s a danger to Indian security that has nothing to do with China, and that’s within India’s own power to put right.” The bane of our problem is that the onus of strategizing on security falls on bureaucracy that is not organized to think strategically remains isolated and is hardly interested in wider knowledge base. Ironically, India has 122 think tanks compared to 73 in China, yet largely ignored other than few that are government funded. 

 

Correcting the void in politico-military connect requires not only appointment of a CDS, integrating HQ IDS with MoD and integrated commands but also senior military advisors (both serving and veterans) with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister, NSA and similarly in NSAB and NSCS besides energizing military diplomacy. The thought that CDS is only required a single point military advice to the hierarchy is only half the truth. Jointness in the military will remain a misnomer in absence of the CDS. Presently the military does not even have common data structures, symbology and interoperable protocols. True “System of Systems” approach has yet to come. A revolution in military affairs is actually required but impossible without requisite politico-military connect.  

 

 

Views expressed are personal