Permanent Chairman or CDS

Ironically, whether a CDS or a Permanent Chairman of COSC is appointed, he would be little different from his Pakistani counterpart – without much power. This is because when HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was sanctioned, an innocuous addition had been made by the bureaucracy saying that as and when a CDS is appointed, he will have equal voting rights on any issue as the service Chiefs and in the event of two Service Chiefs disagreeing with him, the arbitration will be done by MoD. How effective will he be without having the power to make a single point decision for the three Services is not difficult to guess. Even the US President would be ineffective in such circumstances. That is the reason President Obama recently said, “I welcome debate among my team, but I won't tolerate division.” So much so for the misnomer of CDS being a ‘single point advisor’ to the government. The situation, therefore, with a permanent incumbent too may not differ much from the present unless there is political will to do so despite bureaucratic resistance. Not without reason sometime back a Service Chief stated during the Unified Commanders Conference, “We have very good synergy between the three chiefs. We play golf together every month and follow it up with breakfast”. 

 

To say that the only recommendation of the KRC not implemented was appointment of a CDS is untrue. Other major issues glossed over / wrongly implemented were integration of HQ IDS with MoD (former actually came up as a ‘separate’ HQ), Chairman COSC gradually eased out from loop of controlling Strategic Forces Command, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) not permitted its authorized mandate of operating trans-border intelligence sources, Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) established without any teeth worthwhile teeth, Directorate General Armed Forces Medical Services (DGAFMS) and Directorate General Quality assurance (DGQA) not brought under HQ IDS.  

 

Notwithstanding the above, the major tasks (all herculean) cut out for the CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC, as and when appointed, besides routine issues will be:

 

• Establish jointness between the three Services.

 

• Advise and assist government in establishing requisite Politico-Military 

           Connect, imbibing strategic culture and initiating military diplomacy.

 

• Strategic Defence Review followed by a Draft National Security Strategy, 

           National Security Objectives and base defence procurement on these. 

 

• Assist government in establishing deterrence to asymmetric wars 

           being waged by China and Pakistan.

 

• Assist government launch a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

 

True jointness between the Services is absent as of now. General Padmanabhan, former COAS had gone on record to say, “There  is  no  escaping  the  military  logic  of   creating  suitably  constituted  Integrated  Theatre  Commands  and  Functional   Commands  for   the   Armed  Forces as a  whole.” This was followed by General VP Malik, another former COAS saying,  “It  is  not  my  case  that  the  Service  Chiefs  do  not  cooperate  in  war.  Were they not to do so, it would be churlish.  But in war, cooperative synergies are simply not good enough.”  Precious little has however happened even despite Prime Minister stating way back in 2004, “Reforms within the Armed Forces also involve recognition of the fact that our Navy, Air Force and Army can no longer function in compartments with exclusive chains of command and single service operational plans.”  

 

Being smaller compared to army, our navy and air force have better intra-Service net-centricity but we lack inter-Services handshake without which we cannot achieve Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities. Presently the military does not even have common data structures, symbology and interoperable protocols. True “system of systems” approach has yet to come. Radio communications are not interoperable to desired degree and radio sets differ in frequency bands, wave forms and secrecy algorithms. Interoperability is feasible though difficult since technologies differ and the process incurs avoidable additional costs. Common data applications are yet to be conceived, knowledge management is absent and a common unifying secrecy algorithm for the military not developed though technological solutions exist. No common enterprise GIS has yet been developed. For effective transformation from platform centric capabilities to network centricity, a phased shift in existing technology of the three Services and horizontal fusion amongst them at laid down hierarchical structure is must. We talk of the military switching from platform centric to network centric capabilities but nothing much is being done towards high quality fused data. The DIA is the central repository for all intelligence inputs pertaining to the three Services including Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) however; we are yet to integrate the aspects of topography with the DIA. Within the existing setup, adequate resources in terms of remote sensing, ELINT payloads and cartography are not available to produce high quality fused data.

 

CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC are not the panacea for required politico-military connect.  Military advisory cells (comprising serving and veteran military officers) should be established with the Prime Minister, External Affairs Minister, Defence Minister, Home Minister and NSA, which could be headed by two-three star level officers. CDS / Permanent Chairman of COSC and Service Chiefs should be permanent members of the CCS. Serving and veteran military officers should form part of NSCS and NSAB. Full integration of HQ IDS with MoD duly interfaced with MEA and MHA should be ensured.

 

As for RMA, there have been suggestions that only an Act of Parliament like the Goldwater Nichols Act / Berlin Decree or the political leadership can break usher it. It is difficult to identify a political leader who can push for this especially where bureaucratic advice is lacking. The fact is that bbureaucratic inertia prevents implementing even recommendations of various committee reports. Government being lackadaisical, the onus falls on bureaucracy that is not organized to think strategically, prefers isolation and uninterested in wider knowledge base. Therefore, the military must work double time to convince powers that be.

 

 

Views expressed are personal