Xi Jinping Coagulates Control over PLA

By taking the first major decision of promoting Wei Fenghe to the rank of full general status after taking over as General Secretary of the all-powerful Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s leader Xi Jinping has signalled that he would waste no time in asserting and thereby cementing his control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Belonging to the Shandong Province, Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe is a member of the Central Military Commission and Commander-in-Chief of the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps—China’s strategic missile force. The Second Artillery Corps is China’s strategic force under the direct command and control of the CMC, and forms the core of China’s strategic deterrence. China is among the largest land-based missile force in the world comprising both ballistic and cruise missiles spanning 38 operational missile units spread across the country.

Moreover, speedy modernisation of the Second Artillery Corps has turned out to be a viable operational deterrent for the PLA. This is reflected in that with the introduction of the latest conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and CJ-10 Ground Launch Cruise Missiles (GLCM), the Second Artillery Corps does not get limited to being a nuclear missile force alone.

Given that Wei became a member of the CMC a day following which China’s 18^th Party Congress drew to a close, it was expected that he would be elevated to the highest rank, since, going by the regulations of the PLA, all members of the CMC must necessarily be generals. General Wei’s promotion was much anticipated also because he had served as Chief of Staff of the Corps between 2006 and 2010, and was closely involved in intercontinental ballistic missile testing during late 1980s.

With the order signed by Xi Jinping soon after taking over China’s political and military reigns, the announcement was made by the Vice Chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission, Fan Changlong, and attended by other CMC members namely Chang Wanquan, Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, Zhao Keshi, Zhang Youxia, Wu Shengli and Ma Xiaotian, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

It is widely speculated that Xi Jinping is gradually demonstrating his firm control over China’s political and military corridors. Xi is a “princeling” son of revolutionary leader and former vice-premier, Xi Zhongxun during the time of the Cultural Revolution. Owing to his political capital, his association with the PLA and having witnessed military diplomacy up close, it is being considered far and wide that Xi will constitute to be a much stronger military and political head than his immediate predecessors.

In fact, in comparison, both Hu Jinato and Jiang Zemin had struggled to coagulate their authority in the backdrop of the lasting influence of their respective predecessors. It is apposite to argue that in comparison to the tenures of Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping’s ascension has not faced as much factionalism especially since neither Hu nor Jiang had the benefit of as much support at least during the beginning of their respective terms. In order to find success in the processes of weeding out corruption and instituting military reforms, Xi will undeniably need political support in the aforementioned context.

Besides, Xi is also the youngest leader in the past few decades to take over command of China’s 2.3 million strong armed forces and Wei’s elevation can be considered as a symbolic transition that marks the beginning of Xi’s tight grip on political and military power in China. It can be stated that timely promotion of senior military officers to significant positions is an effectual way by means of which a civilian party head tends to secure his control over the PLA, as it persistently works towards narrowing the military gap with the West, especially the US.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS.

Views expressed are personal