The Governance Conundrum in AFSPA

The absence of governance and development act as catalysts in situations of civil unrest, insurgency and terrorism. While governance and development are foremost the responsibilities of the government, the army plays an important role in this dynamic relationship between the government on the one hand and insurgency and terrorist movements on the other.

The political system of our country has three main institutions – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. However, both in terms of governance in the country and its international standing, the role of the Armed Forces is critical. Public perception of the Armed Forces is of a distant reality, worthy of great regard and respect yet mostly unknown. The regard and respect is because of the sacrifices the soldiers make to protect the nation and its citizens. The civil society learns about these sacrifices through the rare reports which media carries. On the other hand, the distance and the unknown quality make it seem too imposing and even fearsome. 

It is crucial to reiterate that the macro environment in which the army operates is characterised by this disjoint between the army and civil society. It is in this context that the present paper wishes to draw attention to a crucial issue in the whole debate on the implications of continuing with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in areas affected by insurgency and terrorism.

In states where the army is called to tackle insurgents and/or terrorists, the AFSPA is promulgated to enable them to operate in an unhindered manner. However, accusations of misuse of powers by soldiers under protection of AFSPA continue to be leveled against the Army, most of which are motivated. This has led to many individuals and groups in the civil society to take up cudgels against the Act. To assume that in every instance of CI/CT operations under AFSPA, soldiers would misuse their powers is like assuming that almost every doctor would be negligent or driven by greed while performing his/her duties. This is grossly wrong. But because of the skewed reporting this is the image that stays in public memory.

It is useful to understand how the process begins. The decision to enforce and then later to extend AFSPA in any area/state is of the Governor of the state and the Central Government. Thus, it is entrenched in the legislature and the executive. The Army is not involved in the decision making process. At this point, it is useful to quote from the recent and very illuminating Manekshaw paper published by CLAWS:

“It is quite apparent that in the face of modern security challenges and in the light of the wider international experience, India’s civil military relationship (CMR) framework is heavily skewed in favour of the civilian bureaucracy. If the defence services, the key players in the national security matrix, are excluded from the decision-making process, the discourse is bound to be troubled.” (Raj Shukla, 2012, p.28) [1]

The decision to enforce AFSPA is often criticised by the general public, intellectuals and opinion makers because of cases of misuse. Thus, although by obeying this decision the Army is simply doing its constitutional duty, it often becomes the target for all negative reactions. This adds up to quite an unsupportive environment for the Army to operate because as pointed out earlier even in normal circumstances there is little knowledge about the functioning of the Army within the civil society. Often the views of the opinion makers in the country spread internationally adding to the pressure the army faces.

Several authoritative studies argue that one of the fuelling factors for the rise of insurgency in states in the northeast and other regions has been the government’s manipulative tactics. The lack of development and neglect of key development issues by the Centre are other significant factors that have exacerbated the problems in the states. For instance, there are in recent times many development programmes by the Centre to address this imbalance. However, the indicators tell a different story altogether. Poverty ratio, one of the key indicators has shown an increase in many of these states from middle to the end of the decade 2001-10[2]. Further, many of the development initiatives and commitments made are never consistently followed. Added to this is the rampant corruption in these states particularly with respect to implementation of development programmes.

It is lamentable that after so many years of independence and continued insurgency in many of these states there are no concrete steps taken by the government that can give a major impetus to economic development. This would lead to more employment, livelihood opportunities and better economic status of the local populations and reduce the sense of alienation and frustration. An absence of appropriate development initiatives further fuels insurgency and terrorism. The government thus plays a critical role in creating an environment that breeds insurgency which leads to the deployment of the Army to restore peace through promulgation of AFSPA for which the Army is viewed in a negative light. Extending AFSPA indefinitely and continuing with it without the recommendation of administrator/governor further fuels alienation.

If the government decides to enforce or extend the application of AFSPA then it must more openly explain and justify its stand. The Army is simply following orders and cannot be portrayed negatively for its continued presence in the ‘disturbed’ area.

To obviate the need of the Army we need to move towards solutions which fall in the realm of governance and development. The onus hence lies on the government and here lies the conundrum. Decisions about AFSPA are located within the larger ambit of governance but this fact is never publicly acknowledged. When an appearance is created as if AFSPA is independent of governance issues, the accountability of the government becomes minimal in the public eye.

For its part, the government does little in terms of building public opinion to facilitate the operation of the Army once it is inducted to restore the situation. This lacunae needs to be addressed. The responsibility of the political and bureaucratic machinery is twofold. Firstly, it needs to work in a multi-pronged way to tackle issues of governance to restore people’s faith in democracy and democratic processes. Deploying the army continuously to ensure peace in an area however goes against the tenets of democracy. Efforts therefore have to be made to bring peace and harmony and strengthen the focus on development. Secondly, communication on the various decisions and measures is indispensable.

There are at least two levels at which communication needs to be effectively undertaken. These are the national level mass media and within the local area in which the Army operates. The former lies in the domain of the government which must build a well-informed and positive public opinion on the role of the army in CI/CT operations and the need for adequate protection to the Army to enable it to perform its duties. This must be done both in the national and international contexts.

Presently, the Directorate of Public Relations within the Ministry of Defence plays a marginal role in building such a public understanding and opinion. Its initiatives rarely, if ever, target the civil society and continues to remain focused on the armed forces service personnel and their families. More effort has to be made in building the confidence and gaining the trust of the local population and the larger civil society for peace to be restored in the states. Clearly, the need of the hour is a more proactive government that can create and strengthen the right kind of environment for the Army to operate and succeed in its missions.

The author is a sociologist and works on gender and human rights issues in the context of development.

Views expressed are personal