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Optimising Teeth to Tail Ratio

The concept was first applied to the US forces during World War II to highlight the enormous expenditure being incurred on logistic infrastructure to maintain supplies to the Allied Forces from production bases in the US. The term soon caught the fancy of military thinkers the world over and came to be used loosely to indicate how streamlined the structure of a military was.The concept was not meant to be a measureof combat effectiveness but was used primarily to demand downsizing of armed forces by reducing surplus manpower to affect savings after World War II. Today, the concept is being variously applied to buttress skewed demands for pruning of different elements of the armed forces.Despite the fact that the expression has been in use for over half a century, there has never been an agreement on its classical definition. Different commentators use it differently to suit their argument. This in fact is the biggest weakness of the concept. At the base level, it is considered to be the ratio between the bayonet strength and non-bayonet strength in a combat unit, implying thereby that the effective fighting potential of a unit is totally dependent on the number of personnel it can field with bayonets. All other personnel form part of the tail.

It has been universally experienced that more intricate and sophisticated our weapon and communication systems become, more is the number of technical personnel required for keeping the equipment ‘battle worthy’. Thus, we are faced with a real dilemma of a need for creating a logistics organisation, which is both flexible and highly responsive to the operational requirements, both in peace and war and is also compact enough to subscribe to the theory of a small tail. The logistics chain of the Field Force is an area where some reduction in manpower numbers is still possible, combined with corresponding reductions in stocking levels of FOL, rations and spares with arrangements to push forward the required stores quickly when necessary. The inventory of some equipment like ‘B’ vehicles could also be reduced to some extent as these are now being mainly procured indigenously directly from the manufacturers. As these companies also sell similar models in the market, it should be possible for them to commit stepped up production at short notice to meet rising demands of the armed forces during national emergencies. Similarly, various other aspects of logistics support must be critically examined so as to cut the flab and streamline the supply chain. It is encouraging to note that the Army HQ has taken several initiatives to improve the archaic logistics system that goes back to World War II. In response to a question regarding the steps that the army proposes to take to enhance logistics support and reduce costs, the then Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen S. Patabhiraman, (Retd), stated “There is always an effort to improve the teeth-to-tail ratio of the army by reducing the logistics tail. Dependence on dedicated logistics units needs to be reduced gradually by deploying logistics nodes and centralised repair and maintenance facilities on a grid basis. Further, due to induction of more and more COTS technology equipment, infrastructure and facilities ex-trade have to be made use of to cut down   the size of logistics units. The fruits of development are reaching the fringes of our border states resulting in availability of better infrastructure, which the army too can harness for its logistics needs. The availability of medical facilities in border areas could help in reducing the size of integral field medical units. Similarly, today the trade is even prepared to maintain and repair equipment well forward under most difficult conditions; this could help in reducing the size of integral engineering support workshops. Better rail and road communication infrastructure in forward areas will also help in reducing the logistics tail. This concept of teeth to tail ratio unfortunately has been misinterpreted at times and tail is misunderstood as indicative of the supporting services only. In the real essence the tail encompasses the large number of personnel deployed for administrative duties other than the bayonet strength. There is also the need to optimise the tail of each teeth and thus reducing the administrative footprints. There is a need to evolve a method to prune down the administrative manpower by outsourcing duties especially in peace establishments. The following needs to be done: -

 

  • The first and perhaps the most difficult action to take is to categorise all functions into ‘core functions’ and ‘non-core functions’. Logistic activities within an area of operations are also core functions. Mission-criticality must hence be the sole criteria for consideration. Even the definition of non-core functions may have to be changed from support functions to a much larger spectrum to include all non-combat functions.
  • Carry out objective identification of core and non-core functions. Provide maximum resources for core functions to re-engineer the military to acquire new capabilities. Reduce expenditure on non-core functions.
  • Outsource maximum non-core functions. Outsourcing of non-core functions has come to be accepted as the most prudent way to affect savings. Outsourcing in its broadest sense refers to contracting out to external agencies certain services and tasks which were earlier performed with internal resources. Outsourcing facilitates enhanced focus on key functions, restricts size of support elements in the military and saves resources. It also utilises facilities and expertise available in civil sector.
  • Review and right size Ministry of Defence (including all departments), service HQ and subordinate HQ. All entities paid for by the defence budget must be assessed for their need and value. They must be made accountablefor the expenditure incurred by them.
  • Modernise the Defence Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.
  • Implement activity based costing and management throughout the Defence Department.
  • Exit all non-defence activities like military farms and stud farms. Employing civilians in lieu of uniformed personnel does not reduce tail. It merely shifts it elsewhere as they continue to consume defence resources.
  • Upgrade technology and infrastructure.

 

With the aim to optimise the teeth to tail ratio it is appropriate that only the non-core competencies should be outsourced and not the entire services which may affect the combat efficiency of the field force.

 

 

 

The author is a Senior fellow at CLAWS.

 

Views expressed are personal

 

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Sanjay Pande
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