China and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

The People’s Republic of China was approved as a participating government at the 14^th plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May 2004. The NSG is a voluntary export control group of nations agreeing to coordinate export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and technology. The original mandate of the 46 nation-NSG is to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. It has been clearly stated that supplier states under NSG guidelines are not permitted to sell reactors to states that do not adhere to full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

By joining the NSG, China demonstrated its willingness, at least on paper, to undertake necessary steps for combating nuclear weapons proliferation and also put its updated non-proliferation and export control policies into practice for nuclear and dual-use technology transfers. Established in 1975, the NSG, inclusive of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have agreed to voluntary restrictions on nuclear commerce in order to ensure that benign exports do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. China’s addition was viewed as a positive step for the NSG in its endeavours to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

China’s State Council announced updating of Chinese export controls on nuclear technology in December 2006, originally issued in 1997, intending to give the government “more control over the end use” of exported nuclear technology. The revised regulations also provided more explicit guidance for importers and exporters of Chinese nuclear technology and spoke of specific penalties for export control violations. Recipients of Chinese uranium-enrichment technology are now prohibited from using it to produce uranium containing more than 20 percent uranium-235. Significantly, the regulation also has the provision allowing Beijing to “suspend” nuclear exports to a recipient in case there is a danger of nuclear terrorism. Besides, in 2002, Beijing adopted regulations governing the export of missiles and related components, as well as chemical and biological materials and related equipment.

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing adopted a series of measures to strengthen its export control mechanisms including more comprehensive regulations on export control and an improved legal system for non-proliferation export control. It appears that Beijing wants to balance its non-proliferation objectives with efforts to provide access to emergent nuclear technologies. In December 2003, China issued a White Paper titled, “China's Non-proliferation Policy and Measures,” in which the three principles governing China’s nuclear exports were outlined. These principles stated that a client must: (1) guarantee any technology transferred from China must be intended for peaceful purposes only, (2) accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and, (3) agree not to re-transfer technology to a third party without China’s approval. The Chinese government acknowledged that nuclear and dual-use technology supplied to client states should not be used in an illicit manner.

While Beijing claims that it has improved its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, an equally established reality is that Chinese entities continue to aid the nuclear programme of Pakistan, as has been testified by US intelligence officials. Despite obligations that need to be adhered to as per international norms, China’s transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to Pakistan continues unabated.

The latest case in point comes in the form of a Washington Free Beacon report regarding a deal signed in secrecy between Beijing and Islamabad during the China visit of a delegation from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, February 15-18, 2013. The deal is regarding construction of a new 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plant at Chashma, located in Pakistan’s northern province of Punjab. On being questioned about this deal, China did not publicly deny the report with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, stating, “China has noted the relevant report”— thereby acknowledging the agreement in an implicit fashion and not rejecting it outright. Beijing knows fully well that this nuclear deal is a clear violation of its obligations as per the NSG guidelines— a primary reason as to why it has chosen to keep this deal in wraps, in order to avoid international opposition. When China joined the NSG in 2004, it had agreed not to sell additional reactors to Pakistan beyond the two reactors sold earlier, namely Chashma 1 and Chashma 2

Although governments are not obliged to follow NSG standards, the Sino-Pak nuclear deal has been controversial because it is thoroughly inconsistent with the NSG guidelines. If such deals concluded outside of the NSG framework without IAEA safeguards become a common practice, then the flow of nuclear fuel will certainly become less secure and increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. More importantly, other nuclear exporters could take home the message that it is acceptable to ignore NSG guidelines, which would seriously undermine international norms that are essential to keep nuclear proliferation in check.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal