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The suicide attack killing of Dr Allama Sarfaraz Ahmed Naeemi, a renowned religious scholar and Head of Lahore's Jamia Naeemia on Friday, 12 June 2009 at his seminary in Garhi Shahu is an indicator that the frontiers of the ideological war have been stretched to dissenting voices within the clerical establishment itself. Dr Naeemi, who was also head of the Tahafuzz-e-Namoos-e-Rasalat Movement and secretary-general of the Tanzimat Madaris Deeniya, was well-known for his fatwa against suicide bombing dating back to 2005 and was seen by many as an opponent of the Taliban movement in the country. On the same day, a convoy taking a NWFP minister from his home in Karak to Peshawar through the lawless stretches of the Darra tribal area just south of the NWFP's capital city was attacked and the minister severely injured despite being heavily protected. Again, the same day in Peshawar, four people were killed and over a hundred injured when a suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into a mosque run by the military. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of Baitullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for these attacks as retaliation against the army’s Operation Rah-i-Rast. Coming soon after the suicide attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel on 9 June which left 17 dead and many injured, and the attack two days later on the residence of Lt Gen Masood Aslam, the Corps Commander heading the military offensive against the Taliban, these attacks have justifiably created a feeling of unease in Pakistan. The confidence that had begun to seep back amid reports of decisive military victories in Swat and other areas has dissipated as Peshawar plummets into what seems like all-out war. These attacks are also a grim reminder that despite loud sound bytes emanating from various quarters declaring victory in Swat and Buner, the war against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies, far from being over has perhaps just begun. It is not a territorial war or a war of ethnic separatists but a war for a modern Pakistan as opposed to a theocratic dictatorship. And while the battles may currently be raging in the NWFP and FATA, the battleground is the whole state of Pakistan.
The military operation in Swat has been characterised by the evacuation of close to three million people to confront a few thousand terrorists as also by the indiscriminate use of firepower to include aerial bombardment and artillery shelling. This will have negative long term repercussions and may further fuel the very insurgency it seeks to control. But it is a sign of the precarious state in which Pakistan finds itself that such an operation has been welcomed by the general public outside the NWFP. In an article in the Daily Times, a retired Pakistani army officer, Kamran Shafi, recently wrote: “As for the present operations going on in Swat and Buner, I can only caution against the use of fighter jets and artillery. The cruel and criminal thugs aka ‘Taliban’ roam the countryside in their twos and threes and tens; they do not move in battalion or even platoon formation, and their numbers are hardly targets for the aforesaid weaponry which only spread fear and alarm among the populace. Good intelligence and God knows our ‘agencies’ are huge enough and powerful enough, and the correct use of the PBI, the Poor Bloody Infantry, will win us our war. And yes, the selective use of our much-vaunted SSG.” Such voices of dissent are however rare and in any case are perhaps not heard where policy decisions are made. In retaliation to the terror strikes of 13 June, the PAF carried out retaliatory air strikes on the same day against the HQ of Mehsud in Makeem area and flattened a school building which was presumed to being used by Mehsud. Such Rambo-like actions may induce a feel good factor and create a belief that ‘something is being done’, but in reality have little impact on the ground. The NWFP government while being fully committed to the war effort, also has the more important and vital task of dealing with IDPs, their return to their homes and the rebuilding of their lives. While it is working to the limits of its capacity, no government can defend every street corner and every public place in its cities. So the Government and the security forces have their task cut out. While public opinion as of now is firmly behind the operations, support could dissipate fast if the IDPs are not cared for and the terror strikes are not controlled.
For the United States, a viable exit policy from Afghanistan would require the Taliban to be defeated from its bases in NWFP and FATA. Here, both American and Pakistani interests converge. However, Pakistan would require a much larger infusion of infantry into the area which can only come from troops committed for deployment against India. Given the frigid state of relations between the two countries post 26/11, Pakistan is unlikely to thin out its troops from its Eastern border unless India reciprocates. While the US and its allies firmly believe that Pakistan faces an enemy not on its Eastern but on its Western Front and while many in Pakistan are now also inclined to this view, threat perceptions will continue to be based on capability and not on intentions. The US is hence keen for the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan to promote its agenda on the war against terror. The Indian Prime Minister has met with Pakistan’s President in Yekaterinburg, Russia on 16 June 2009, on the sidelines of the meeting of members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation where both countries have observer status. But here too, Dr Manmohan Singh made it clear to Pakistan that they must not allow their soil to be used by terrorists operating against India. While the ice has been broken, there is still a long way to go before a significant easing of tension takes place. Given the current situation existing in Jammu and Kashmir, where the Indian Army is deployed to combat terrorism as well as prevent infiltration, there is little likelihood of India pulling back its forces from the line of Control and elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir. The best that India can do which could also pass political muster is to carry out a token reduction of forces from J&K and give Pakistan reasonable assurance of not transgressing the International Border in a punitive strike against Pakistan. But whether this would be enough for Pakistan to remove one or two Infantry divisions which are committed for defence against India and use them for operations against South Waziristan remains to be seen. The US would have to live with this reality.
Another issue for India concerns American and Pakistani thinking of a ‘good’ Taliban versus a ‘bad’ Taliban and the possibility of dealing with the former to isolate the latter. For India, this concept has no validity as good and bad are relative terms depending upon the self interest of the parties involved. For three decades, Pakistan has been using jihadi groups as part of their flawed approach to national security and defence strategy, where the state patronised militant groups, trained them in guerrilla warfare, fed them on an obscurantist brand of religion and armed them with modern weapons funded by foreign money to wage an undeclared war against India. The ‘good’ Taliban is thus part of their creation. While Baitullah Mehsud, the chief of the TTP, becomes ‘bad’, Maulvi Nazir, another ranking leader of South Waziristan and the darling of Pakistan’s military establishment is ‘good’! By a similar analogy, the Lashkar-e-Taiba becomes ‘good’ which perhaps accounts for the recent release by a Pakistani Court of its leader, Mr. Hafiz Saeed, wanted by India for his role in masterminding the deadly terror assault on Mumbai in late November 2008. If Pakistan wishes to eliminate terrorism from within its soil, it would have to dismantle the jihadi infrastructure which it created to bleed India with a thousand cuts. Terrorism cannot be isolated or confronted in the NWFP, while the same ideology prospers in Waziristan, Southern Punjab and Muridke.
There is also concern in India of the aid promised by the USA to Pakistan, of US$1.5 billion every year for the next five years for the social and development sector, being funneled for military use against India as has happened with earlier aid packages given to Pakistan. This unfortunately is something India would have to live with. Money is fungible and infusion of a large portion of this amount into military expenditure directed against India would be hard to monitor and detect. However, the cost of the war which Pakistan is currently waging and the expenses involved in rehabilitating the IDPs is not inconsiderable. Also, the need to station troops for a long duration in the NWFP would require development of appropriate infrastructure which in turn would require a large transfusion of funds. To that extent, India need not have any major concerns over the sum being provided.
For Pakistan, this war will go on regardless of American involvement in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military has achieved success in Swat, Buner, Shangla and Malakand and has now opened two more fronts, one in Bajaur's Charmang area where aerial strikes and artillery shelling was followed by a ground offensive, and in Orakzai Agency and the adjoining Hangu district. But the real test will come when the Army starts its proclaimed offensive against the TTP in South Waziristan where they floundered twice earlier, once in February 2005 and then in January 2009. In the ultimate analysis, however, Pakistan is fighting an ideological war for the hearts and minds of its people and while military victories are essential, their impact is more often than not illusory. The state must be seen to provide a better alternative than the Taliban otherwise the war will most certainly be lost regardless of how many battles are won.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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