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The desertion rate in the Sri Lankan armed forces is one of the highest in South Asia. As of September 2008, there were over 15,000 deserters from the Army alone. This constitutes about 10 per cent of the total strength of Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and raises key questions: what turns a soldier into a deserter? Is this related to the ongoing confrontation? What are the implications of desertions? What are the steps being taken by the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) to contain desertion and how effective are they?
Averaging 10 per year, desertions shot up during Eelam War III (1995-2001). The numbers came down considerably during the ceasefire period (2002-2005). However, with the commencement of Eelam War IV from mid-2006, desertion has once again been on the rise. From the statistics one could conclude that ethnic conflict is a major cause for desertions. Fear of life, stress during conflicts, and family pressure not to return to the warfront after leave also cannot be ignored. Monetary inducement is another major factor because a deserter can earn much more using the ‘power that flows from the barrel of his gun’ than serving in the Army under difficult conditions. The affluent life style of previous deserters has an effect on serving regulars. A study by Peradeniya University of Sri Lanka identifies other factors for desertions, such as poor leadership in the Army, enlistment of unsuitable soldiers and officers, bad administration, insufficient training, lack of a strategy to retain the service personnel, and family and personal problems. Even the Navy and Air Force face desertions, but these are numerically insignificant compared to those in the Army. The fact that Navy and Air Force offer better facilities to their men who are not as stressed as the Army personnel may be reasons for this anomaly.
A significant implication of desertion is the phenomenal increase in crime, especially in central and southern Sri Lanka. Since the deserters are trained in warfare they are preferred by underworld criminal gangs for extortions, abductions, kidnappings for ransom, murders and robberies. Deserters are also sought after due to their possession of sophisticated weapons and knowledge of the loopholes in laws. Rival gangs also hire deserters to settle scores and demarcate their areas of operation. Thus one finds the ‘brothers in arms’ fighting on opposite sides of rival gangs.
Army deserters are also used by leading political parties during elections for intimidation and rigging. An increase in the number of election-related violent incidents is not unrelated to the increase in desertions. While the political parties require deserters to augment their muscle power, the deserters, in turn, need political patronage to continue as fugitives. For this reason, the issue has not been given adequate attention by successive political leaderships. Thus, desertion has not only increased the proliferation of sophisticated arms, but also led to spiraling violence in society.
To address this issue seriously it is vital to screen candidates properly at the time of recruitment. This is important because the desertion pattern shows that nearly 67 per cent of the deserters do so immediately after their basic training; 12 per cent after five or six years and the rest within 10 to 12 years of their joining service. Most importantly, no fresh recruitment should be undertaken without rectifying the existing administrative and infrastructural lacunae.
To bring the deserters back into service, the government has periodically made amnesty offers and surrender policies, the latest being in May 2008. The response, however, was poor despite several renewals of the deadline. The option of issuing discharge certificates is also being pursued, but it too has elicited only a partial response. The deserters involved with criminal gangs continue to be elusive. There is a view that if employing deserters is legalised, resort to crime by them would come down. That, however, is tantamount to legalising desertion itself. What is the guarantee that those fugitives who had deserted to make more money will accept this legal offer? Since most deserters lack technical skills (unless they are from the technical services) it is difficult to obtain gainful employment. Even if they posses marketable skills, given the criminal image of deserters it is difficult for them to get jobs.
While addressing the cause for desertions, no leniency should be shown to deserters. Laws governing possession of weapons and organized crime should be strengthened. Budget allocations to the Army should be augmented to meet the requirements of serving soldiers. Presently, a considerable portion of the defence budget is spent on acquiring military hardware. The concerned commanding officers should be made responsible for desertions in their respective battalions. During the ongoing phase of confrontation, the Army has been projecting its successes while playing down the casualties in order to avoid desertions. This strategy will succeed as long as there is no major reversal on the ground. For long-term solution of the issue, however, deeper concerns will need to be addressed.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
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