Iran�s Presidential Elections: An Analysis

Two major issues that dominated the agenda in Iran’s Presidential elections were domestic stability and Iran’s nuclear programme. In this context, Hojjat al-Eslam Hassan Rouhani’svictory assumes significance on two counts. First, he won an absolute majority with over fifty per cent of the votes and second, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, chose to accept his victory. The six candidates in the fray were all clerics and were approved to campaign by the conservative, unelected Guardians Councilbecause they were judged to be reliable followers of the supreme leader, unlike other moderate and reformist candidates who were banned from the ballot. However, amongst the six contestants, the public perceived Mr Rouhani as the least radical amongst them and one who represented a distinct change from the combative style of Mr. Ahmadinejad, who presided over a painful economic decline and international isolation. The election results thus represent a victory of the Iranian people and a striking repudiation of the ultraconservatives who wield power in Iran. They demonstrate that a majority of Iranians continue to yearn for a freer society and reject the reactionary policies of Ayatollah Khamenei and his clique of hard-line clerics.

The acceptance of the result was a pragmatic move by Khamenei as it served to restore at least an element of legitimacy to the theocratic state. The 2009 presidential elections that returned Ahmadinejad to office were widely perceived to have been rigged, forcing millions to the streets in protest. Security forces quelled the opposition through brute force and placed its leaders under house arrest for years. The Supreme Leader took sides in that dispute and at least temporarily lost his standing as an arbiter above the partisan fray. To re-establish that role, legitimacy and fairness of election were high on agenda of the regime’s elite in the 2013 Presidential Elections. Although largely unaffected by the regional unrest post the 2009 elections, the clerical regime needed to demonstrate both to its citizens and to foreign capitals that the Iranian people could still bring about change at the ballot box, not just through the streets. At the same time, they wanted to discourage someone like Ahmadinejad who intended to challenge the supremacy of the Supreme Leader. By ensuring that only pro Khamenei candidates or at least those who were not considered a threat/challenge to the Supreme Leader took part in the presidential race, a possible challenge to his leadership was averted. At the same time, the elections restored to a considerable extent the faith of the people in the “democratic” system of the Islamic Republic as well as in his image as a supreme arbitrator. In a message posted on Twitter on June 15, Khamenei said that a vote for any of the six candidates in the presidential race is a 'vote of confidence in the system.' This underlined a larger goal of achieving legitimacy for himself through engagement with the electorate.

Many consider Rouhani a moderate but that is a comparative assessment. He took part in the Islamic Revolution and had ties to Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic. He also has ties to Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's second clerical president, and is a representative of the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, on the Supreme National Security Council. He served for sixteen years as Secretary of Iran's National Security Council (NSC) and for two years as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. He served five terms in the Majlis, or parliament. He sits on two major state councils, one of which, the Assembly of Experts, will elect Khamenei's successor whenever he passes away. However, he combines reformist tendencies with his conservative streak and is unlikely to seek fundamental changes in Iran's power structure on the lines of his predecessor. He is thus likely to work in cooperation with and extend an outreach to other branches of Iran's power structure such as the military and civilian politicians. Domestic stability will however remain Rouhani’s immediate concern and a cooperative approach will assist in addressing the structural economic stresses that are coming to a head because of decades of economic sanctions.The previous government under the ultra-conservativePresident Ahmadinejad had over played the “nuclear nationalism card” and invited strict sanctions from the International Community, which had devastating effects on the weak, oil dependent economy. The sanctions primarily targeted Iran where it hurt the most: oil, shipping and banking, thus leading to the magnification of problems for the local Iranians manifold. Rouhani is conscious of the need to focus on revival of the economy and provide to the people greater levels of freedom and higher standards of living. This was his poll plank that got him victory and he would be required to deliver on this front.

Iran's domestic concerns also act as an incentive to pursue a more pragmatic engagement and dialogue with the West, especially on issues such as Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's interests in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the nuclear issue, however, it is the Supreme Leader and not the President who is in charge in matters of foreign policy and defence under whose ambit the nuclear issue lies. Rouhani too, is supportive of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme and defends the claim, stating its use for peaceful intentions and not for development of weapons.He has agreed to abide by the NPT rules to which Iran is a signatory and has offered a transparent process abiding by the guidelines of the IAEA and the additional protocols, which Iran has signed.This however may not be enough to prevent further sanctions against Iran. Conservatives in the West as well as in Israel remain of the opinion that sanctions must continue until Iran first makes some significant, favourable concessions like completely suspending its nuclear enrichment programme.This, in the current context is unlikely.

It will be naïve to expect comprehensive concessions on the Iranian nuclear issue without equally rewarding returns to Iran from the international community. In any event, the ruling elite will perceive a compromise as a sign of weakness and treachery, thus putting the President in jeopardy. However, the offer for dialogue, which Rouhani has put forth,could soften the stand of the West and end Iran’s isolation, which it has “earned” from its nuclear defiance. US President Obama also has an uphill task ahead especially while dealing with the country’s strong Israeli lobby, whichwill continue to press hard on continuing sanctions on Iran until Iran makes substantive concessions in its nuclear imbroglio.

For Iran, the need of the hour is a diplomatic, conciliatory tone rather than brazen rhetoric and a hope that the West buys Iran’s statements on commitment. Rouhani’s more moderate face has already prompted calls for the Obama administration to sweeten its proposals for compromise with the regime. This could buy the country time and keep additional sanctions at bay until restoration of confidence in the dialogue process. However, many in the West retain a hard line stance, which in the extreme includes airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear installations. This could well lead to the situation spinning out of control and unlike Iraq, Iran lies in a much better geostrategic position to strike back at the West.Dialogue would be advantageous to Iran as it stands a chance to gain support from its friends in the UNSC as well as some Asian and European nations, indirectly affected by the sanctions.

The task in front of both the camps is huge as powerful lobbies, vested interests, mutual distrust, personal ambitions etc. all stand in the way of any significant breakthrough. However, keeping in mind the intricacies of the situation and the diplomatic skills of both President Obama and President Rouhani, it is a fair assessment that things are likely to go beyond the deadlock.

The author is a Research Intern at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal