Karachi: The Impending Operation?

 In a unique move, Pakistan’s federal cabinet is meeting at the Governor’s House in Karachi on 04 Sep 13 to analyse Law and Order situation in the city.   The meeting follows a demand by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party that has controlled Karachi during the last few decades; for deployment of the Army in Pakistan’s largest metropolis. The demand shows how the power equation in the troubled city has changed drastically.  In the past MQM was steadfastly opposed to the Army’s intervention in Karachi, which it considered as its pocket borough. MQM has also been the victim of “Operation Clean-up” launched by Pakistan Army from 1992 to 1994 in the city and consequently was firmly opposed to any military intervention in the city.  However, with its back to the wall, the unquestioned lords of Karachi have been forced to make a volte-face and seek military operations.

The changing ethno-political equilibrium in Karachi has brought about this change in MQM’s stance.  MQM, which draws its primary support from the Urdu speaking Mohajir or migrant community, which migrated from India, has seen its support base erode under the continuing influx of Pakhtoons from Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa.   Successive military operations in Swat Valley, Waziristan and other parts of FATA have forced large number of Pakhtoons to migrate to Karachi in search of livelihood and according to most estimates they constitute about a quarter of Karachi’s population. There are more Pakhtoons in Karachi today than in Peshawar or Kabul.  To compound the problem for MQM, the birth rate amongst Mohajirs, who are relatively the most educated amongst various ethnic groups of Pakistan; has been falling consistently vis-à-vis Pakhtoon, Baloch and Sindhi masses, who are by and large uneducated and conservative in their outlook.  As a result, the population of Mohajirs in Karachi has fallen below the crucial half way mark.

To retain its dominance, MQM tried to broaden its support base, but failed to win substantive support amongst other ethnic groups, despite changing its name from Mohajir Qaumi Movement to Muttahida (United) Qaumi Movement.  It then resorted to maintaining its influence by clinging on to power and for last 10 years was an integral component of the governments in Islamabad and Karachi, despite the changes in ruling dispensation. It used its proximity to power in gerrymandering constituencies in urban Sindh to ensure its political dominance, despite falling numbers.   It also continued to use strong arm tactics to ensure its vice like grip on the city and used its influence in the government to remove its breakaway faction from its stronghold in Karachi.  Its influence also ensured that the religious parties, which had significant influence in the city, were eclipsed.  However, 2008 elections saw the Awami National Party (ANP), supported by Pakhtoon youth take on the MQM at its own game.  The 2008 elections also saw the ANP make a debut in Sindh Assembly and next five years saw frequent clashes between armed Pakhtoon and Mohajir gangs.

However, by 2013 elections, the Taliban had made its presence felt in the city and Pakhtoon loyalties in the city shifted from secular ANP to Taliban, which had made terror an integral part of its activities and for the first time Karachi had an outfit that could easily beat MQM at its own game.  Taliban resorted to frequent attacks on MQM, its rallies, offices and activists, forcing it to curtail electioneering. The election also saw Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI) emerge as a new force in the city.  Many of the educated youth were carried away by Imran’s charisma, clean image and anti-American crusade.  PTI ended up polling the second highest votes from the city.

Although both Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which is ruling Sindh, invited MQM to join their governments in Islamabad and Karachi respectively; MQM was forced by its electorate (in an internal referendum) to remain outside the government.  In the absence of MQM from government, PPP successfully changed the local government system established by Musharraf, which gave the MQM Nazim of Karachi huge resources and control over local officials including police. Devoid of government backing, MQM cadres found themselves being targeted not only, by Taliban and Sunni sectarian outfits, but also by the Baloch underworld of Karachi, which has been nurtured by the PPP for many years.  To aggravate its woes, MQM’s unquestioned leader Altaf Hussain, who has been living in London since 1991, has come under a cloud and is being investigated by the Scotland Yard for the killing of his former close associate and deputy Imran Farooq. .

As MQM finds itself pushed into a corner with PPP controlling the police, its supporters being hounded out of Lyari by gangsters and its cadres being targeted by political opponents, terrorists and gangsters of different ethnicities and ideologies, it is seeking the military intervention to at least ensure the level playing field.  It realises that the police is biased and in any case incapable of taking on the Taliban. Even the businessmen, who are receiving the extortion chits on a daily basis, have pleaded with the Army Chief to deploy the Army.   However, after the Eighteenth amendment Islamabad cannot deploy the Army in Karachi without the provincial government recommending it.  Nawaz is therefore talking of building consensus, but PPP, ANP and PTI have opposed the military deployment as it would weaken the democracy.

Nawaz therefore faces a dilemma, if he does not deploy the army, Pakistan’s economic hub slips into anarchy and could hurt the economy, which is already in a precarious state. The police and the rangers simply do not seem to have the wherewithal to control the violence. Recently, the Director General of the Sindh Rangers told the Supreme Court that around 19,000 containers of weapons and vehicles from NATO supplies had disappeared from the port. IT is inconceivable that any police can contain violence with such easy availability of arms. Moreover, with growing influence of Taliban, continued inaction will virtually amount to handing over the city to Taliban.

However, the military operation in Karachi poses other set of problems, besides being unconstitutional; it strengthens the Army, while weakening the democratic and federal structure. It would have to be a protracted operation that could result in lot of bloodshed. It would pit the Army against various armed militias including the Taliban; at a time when the government is talking about negotiations with the Taliban. Most significantly, it will tie down a large number of troops in an urban guerrilla campaign for which Pakistan Army is not trained and at a time when its hands are full. The Army is overstretched and is finding it difficult to quell the insurgencies in FATA and Balochistan, its deployment in Karachi would come at the cost of reduction in its presence on both the Western and Eastern frontiers.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal