China�s Central Military Commission Prioritises Combat Effectiveness

A recent meeting held in Beijing in August 2013 focused on finance management and supervision of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) according to law. Fan Changlong, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) stressed that combat effectiveness is the sole fundamental criterion for the management and use of military expenditure. Fan further placed emphasis on scientific determination of the direction and amount of military expenditure, besides prioritising related aspects such as weaponry and equipment support, battlefield construction, education and training, and personnel training. It is widely known that the PLA has been striving to make military expenditure management more scientific and contingent. Apart from Fan Changlong, the senior leadership from the four general headquarters/departments of the PLA and the CMC’s General Office, namely, Chen Yong, Cen Xu, Sun Huangtian and Liu Sheng were present at this meeting.

The above-mentioned meeting is seen to be critical given the recent belligerent assertiveness that the Chinese PLA has been displaying at various fronts, including with India, Japan and the Philippines. In fact, earlier, Xi Jinping had reiterated the imperative of raising the PLA’s combat-readiness when he approved deployment of more short- to medium-range missiles on the coastal areas facing Japan. For that matter, the PLA Navy’s largest-tonnage, the Jinggangshan amphibious dock landing ship of the South China Sea Fleet left a naval port in Sanya in southern China’s Hainan province for the waters of the South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean in March 2013. The Jinggangshan houses the “Lanzhou” guided missile destroyer, the “Yulin” and “Hengshui” guided missile frigates and helicopters and hovercrafts on the warships and conducted combat readiness patrols and high-sea training including command post establishment, maritime maneuvering operation, maritime right protection, high-sea escort and rapid response to support operations.

More recently, a two-day observation and mission deployment competition of the PLA’s special operation troops codenamed “Sharpen Edge 2013” was concluded on August 19, 2013 at the Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base of the Beijing Military Area Command of the PLA. The competition focused on eight major aspects including comprehensive combat skills, maritime and mountain blocking, covering main missions and action modes of special operations. According to the head of related department under the General Staff Headquarters (GSH)of the PLA, the competition aided in effective improvement of actual-combat capabilities of special operation troops under information-based conditions, providing effectual methods for actual-combat training as well as providing basis for compiling a new training programme. Special troops of the three services completed reconnaissance and guide operations, seizing and control operations and night urban anti-terrorism operations. At the PLA’s unit level, informationization is all about making officers adept in high-tech warfare.

Combat capability and effectiveness seems to be the flavour within the PLA. In yet another manifestation, an integrated battle group under the Lanzhou Military Area Command of the PLA conducted a live-fire drill at a training base few weeks back, aiming to improve the troops’ combat capability. China’s state-controlled media reported details of the drill site of the Red Army with a commander in charge of the drill, and Shi Zhongwu, President of the Shijiazhuang Army Command College of the PLA, subsequently commenting on the drill.

It is evident that the PLA is being driven by the future specter combat with greater levels and standards of information and joint operation readiness. The current training methods and educational exposure within the PLA revolves around meeting real combat needs against an ‘informationized’ adversary. In order to maintain an optimal level in the officer cadre, personnel management is being given greater emphasis. Among the many schemes formulated to retain talent in the recruit are inherent changes in the incentive configurations—and the continuing boom in the Chinese economy has most definitely aided the PLA with funds to boast of a high-tech officer corps. However, on the flip side, these incentives, flowing out as a direct result of the economic growth, have paved way for increasing number of challenges within the PLA when it comes to retaining competent and skilled candidates.

A recent example of the incentive trend is visible in that the PLA last year increased starting salaries for new officers and NCOs by 80 to 100 percent. What drew greater attraction was a package of additional tax-free subsidies and allowances. Notwithstanding these reforms and inducements, what needs to be ascertained in the coming time period is the efficacy of these reforms and of the recruitment process, which more or less remains obscure and for that matter, rather vague. How is the PLA going to handle facets such as quotas and remuneration packages, which is likely to impact upon the texture of recruits? While, the outward appearance of the Chinese PLA surely is going through a transformation of sorts, it still has a long way to go before becoming fully integrated into a fully modernised system given the high scope for improbability.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal