The King is Dead. Long Live the King.

 

Political commentators are in quite a conundrum. Zardari is not quite the epitome of the statesman they believe Pakistan needs at the helm, and they’re hedging their bets on how long he’ll survive [political and physically], before the army takes over again. On the other hand, they also believe that it is the army which has led Pakistan into dire straits that it is in now, and the least that Zardari deserves is the benefit of the doubt. In return, he’ll need to show why he wanted the job in the first place and what he’s going to do with it.

 

Of the many concerns that will be jostling with each other for his attention, Zardari will have to devote key time to three of them in particular, the economy, the army, and the border which would include Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and the United States.

 

Increasing domestic political and security risk is having a negative effect on foreign investment inflows. The economy is also likely to suffer from lack of effective policymaking, given the continuous political strife. The country needs donors to bring up its foreign currency reserves. Saudi Arabia has signaled its willingness, in principle, to allow Pakistan to import oil in exchange for a schedule of staggered payments. The United States is in talks to grant $15 billion, over a decade, but only if Zardari and his associates can show that they are willing to take the much-needed, yet unpopular, steps at economic stabilisation. Although the US has been considerably gracious in the past, most of the aid provided has gone to the armed forces, in line with its ‘war on terror’ strategy. However, poverty reduction and employment opportunities would do much to stem the country’s problems, and Zardari’s political future depends heavily on his ability to keep the economy from slipping into recession. Political stability is already at risk, as the coalition government is a house divided. 

 

In the meantime, terrorism, both domestic and international, continues to be a threat. However, the American administration has misapprehensions about this threat. Their fear of the government being taken over by those of a religious or otherwise intolerant bent is not as likely, as the fact that if this trend is not checked then soon, more and more of the country will be out of the bailiwick of the political and/or military administration. The tribal areas [both FATA and PATA] are already in this position, while Peshawar tethers on the borderline.

 

Relations with Afghanistan are also a key issue. From what is apparent so far, it seems that Zardari is making more of an effort in this regard than Musharraf did (inviting Karzai to be guest of honor at his inauguration). However, whether or not Zardari would be able to strike a balance between curbing the insurgency in the north-west, and avoiding any backlash from the Pakistani public (a majority of which, including the army, do not believe that this is a war they should be fighting) remains to be seen. If he vacillates too long, the Americans might take matters into their hands, as they have proven only too willing to do so. Such a turn of events would be disastrous not only for the people of Pakistan, but for Zardari himself.

 

Yet, of all the problems Zardari has ahead of him, the most crucial remains relations of the civilian administration with the army. The Army has administered the country for many years and has been responsible for the removal of a fair number themselves. The army high command is not exactly in awe of their commander-in-chief and would prefer to pursue a policy of containment, as far as the militants in the border are concerned, preferring to view them as latent allies in the future [as they have seen them in the past]. The government has yet been unable to establish a firm standing with the army, and the failed attempt to try and exert control over the ISI is a clear indication that as an institution, the army is keen to maintain the role of the final arbiter.

 

Relations between India and Pakistan are still tentative. The peace process that was initiated during Musharraf’s tenure didn’t result in any concrete resolution. Protests, both pro- and anti-Pakistan continue in the Kashmir valley. In meetings with Dr. Manmohan Singh, Zardari has made the right noises about Pakistan’s equation with India, but given that suspicions still rage about the ISI’s involvement in the Kabul embassy bombing, much dialogue needs to take place before any reconciliation can take place.

 

The worst-case scenario that is being debated by governments and analysts across the board is the likelihood of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands [if they haven’t so already], or of another attack a la September 11 originating from the strife-torn border region. To put it delicately, Pakistan is in a mess right now. And to improve the situation would tax the capabilities of the most capable leader. Given that Zardari had submitted documents claiming to suffer from dementia, major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder to a court of law in the UK when pleading extenuating circumstances in a corruption case filed by the erstwhile Pakistani government, he, in no way, fits the bill to handle the challenges. In Pakistan, where civilian governance has been spotty, the world will have to wait and watch to see what President Zardari can do for the country, which has chosen him to speak for them.

 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)