Combating insurgency

The Republic of India has faced armed rebellions and insurgencies since its very independence. The genesis of each of these insurrections may have varied - some wanted to secede from the nation at its inception, others preferred an alternative political order, and so on. While they may have lasted for differing periods of time, two factors about each of them remained constant - one, none of them have been successful in their objectives; and two, the only thing standing between them, and success, is the Indian Army. The Army has been called upon in such situations in the past, and may well be in the future. It is a mark of the trust that the institution enjoys amongst the citizens in its abilities to handle such situations.

It is said that an insurgency, or a guerrilla war, can never be won by a military - it can, at best, be controlled. The Indian Army has achieved this measure in all its domestic counter-insurgency campaigns, whether in J&K or the Northeast. The Mizoram campaign in the Northeast can actually be said to have been successfully concluded. And the Army has managed to ensure that violence, even in insurgency-affected areas, if not completely excised, is kept at a level that ensures normalcy in social existence.

The remarkable nature of the Indian Army's success in handling insurgencies, beyond its abilities, has much to do with its forbearance, in the utilisation of the minimum force necessary, and not resorting to any tactics which might be considered barbaric - no matter the provocation. While it is understood that any insurgency would have a political solution, and not a military one, to the extent that military force is necessary, the Army has forsworn the use of heavy artillery or aerial bombing, even in the face of similar tactics being employed in our neighbourhood. There is a clear intention behind the use of minimum force and that is the recognition that the resolution of any insurgency would only be hampered by the use of inordinate firepower.

The Army was first brought to bear against the Naga insurgents in the 1950s, when the forces of the state government were not able to keep them in check. Even though the Army had to fight, veritably with one hand tied behind its back, it followed these limitations in the course of its engagements. These actions by the Army were complimented by political concessions to the moderate Nagas, which resulted in the creation of the state of Nagaland, and while the rebellion cannot be said to have ceased, it is today weak and occupied more with internal divisions than external activities. The Mizo insurgency too was tackled in a similar manner. But what must be underscored in these accounts is that the political strategies of the government were successful because the Army was able to tailor itself to meet the requirements asked of it (and vice versa). The limitation of the use of force was institutionalised in its counter-insurgency activities and worldview, augmenting its capabilities in this regard. Its effectiveness is furthered, especially in J&K, by the activities undertaken within the ambit of Operation Sadbhavana, to win the hearts and minds [WHAM] of people via development activities. Such activities under WHAM find a centricity even in the Army's doctrine of sub-conventional operations, which deals with its role in counter-insurgency operations. The doctrine further outlines the other steps which the Army takes to ensure the successful conduct of counter-insurgency operations, viz. the use of a linear grid system; separating civilians from insurgents; physical domination of a particular area of responsibility [AoR], i.e. boots on the ground; and as covered previously, limited to no use of airborne or land-based firepower; and civic and developmental work to further the objective of WHAM.

In all, then, The Indian Army has been involved in counter-insurgency operations in many northeastern states in excess of fifty years, in J&K for over twenty years [though it would be more appropriate to classify these as operations to counter mujahideen and irregulars from across the border], entailing the involvement of more than 1,00,000 personnel. Further, 65 battalions of the Rashtriya Rifles, the premier counter-insurgency force, are deployed in J&K and 31 battlions of the Assam Rifles in the northeastern states.

The Army's skill in counter-insurgency operations for so many years now notwithstanding, it does draw its attention away from its primary role of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Republic of India, by all means necessary. It remains engaged in such operations principally because it has been called on by the necessary authorities to do so, and its actions in this regard are integral in keeping the fabric of the nation together. It is this capability which has increasingly led to a debate in the national discourse on whether the Army should be involved in anti-Maoist/Naxalite operations. There is no doubt that the threat posed by the Naxalite situation is a dangerous one, and has been defined as such by the Prime Minister. However, the police and paramilitary forces, both at the state and central government level, are the ones mandated to be engaged in such operations and for them to be effective in this regard, they need to be made conversant with the ethos, operational practices and training of the Army - which is being carried out through training establishments, both of the Army, and of the forces concerned. Yet, the fact remains that if called upon to do so, the Army will respond to the call of the nation, with the same spirit and dedication that has exemplified its conduct in the past.

Samarjit Ghosh is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

Courtesy: The Indian Express, 15 January 2011